Accountability and democracy in the new local governance : an evaluation by Cole, Michael Stephen
Accountability and Democracy in the New Local 
Governance: An Evaluation 
By 
Michael Stephen Cole 
A thesis submitted to the University of Plymouth in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
LGC Elections Centre 
Faculty of Social Science and Business 
September 2008 
COPYRIGHT STATEMENT 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that no quotation from 
the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without the author's prior 
consent. 
ABSTRACT 
Accountability and Democracy in the New Local 
Governance: An Evaluation 
Michael Stephen Cole 
This thesis addresses the themes of the democracy and accountability of 
British local governance, in the context of the modernising agenda, through an 
evaluation of research in five areas: the role(s) of local councillors; external scrutiny 
inquiries; consultations; community appraisals; and changes to local boundaries. Key 
issues in relation to democracy and accountability include the role of external scrutiny 
in holding the unelected local state accountable to elected representatives; updating 
the literature on the activities of county councillors; and assessing the limited impact 
of local authority consultations and community appraisals. In particular, the 
assessment of consultations suggests a process that is often driven by a public 
relations focus and that few of those exercises both generate unexpected outcomes and 
have a substantial impact. In relation to the appraisals, the study suggests greater 
effectiveness in resolving small-scale problems capable of solution through town or 
parish local governance or community groups. The research on local boundary 
changes identifies the role of democratic local representatives in the reviews and the 
weak lines of downward accountability in respect of the process. This analysis also 
shows how these boundary changes impact on the way councillors perform certain 
core activities, including electoral campaigning. 
In relation to the local government modernisation agenda, the analysis suggests 
that little progress has been made towards the aim of strengthening the responsiveness 
of service providers to the wider community and or service users. Similarly, the 
establishment of scrutiny structures has had a relatively marginal impact on external 
agencies. While the community representation focus of many councillors is in 
sympathy with local government modernisation, the Devon study suggests that such 
attitudes predated this agenda. 
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The key objectives of this thesis are to gain a greater insight into the 
accountability of local governance and assess the extent to which contemporary 
arrangements are responsive to democratic pressures. This research agenda arose 
primarily as a response to the local government modernisation agenda, which has been 
developed as part of the Labour Government's focus on public service reform and has 
encompassed a wide range of changes such as the establishment of unitary authorities; 
the creation of executive cabinets and directly-elected mayors; an expansion of 
performance measurements such Best Value and Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment; the proliferation of partnerships; and a renewed focus on community and 
extending the range of participants in public sector decisions (see, Cole, 2003a; 
Stewart, 2003). This agenda has been extensive, in part at least, contradictory (Cole, 
2003a; Cole 2008) and has notable implications for the extent to which local 
authorities were accountable and subjected to democratic scrutiny and influence. 
The five substantive themes identified in this thesis all connect to the local 
government modernisation agenda. The evaluation of the role(s) of county councillors 
and the assessment of external scrutiny relate directly to the new structures of political 
management. These reforms were intended to shift the emphasis of councillors' work 
towards `bringing the views of their community to bear on the council's decisions' 
(DETR, 1998,25) and to strengthen substantially the accountability role of elected 
members through the establishment of scrutiny committees. Similarly, the analysis of 
consultations and community appraisals links with a wider focus on making local 
governance more responsive to the communities they serve and ensuring that 
`consultation and participation' were `embedded into the culture of all councils' 
(DETR, 1998: 39). The review of ward and divisional boundaries taps into wider 
concerns about local elections, which have encompassed issues such as postal voting, 
rolling electoral registers and proportional representation (DTLR, 2001; Stoker, 
2004). 
1.2: Political science and local governance: analysis of these issues 
In this thesis, the five specific evaluations are linked to the broad themes of 
governmental accountability and democracy. The evaluation of the role(s) of 
councillors illustrates how democratically elected local politicians operate to serve 
their electorate and other narrower interests and thus enforce a channel of public 
accountability for the operation of local governance, within a framework of 
constraints from factors such as the party groups and a wider notion of county-wide 
interests. The assessment of the role of local authority scrutiny committees in holding 
external organisations accountable is concerned with the capacity of local authorities 
to influence and constrain the actions of other agencies and thus strengthen local 
democracy. There is a specific link to the literature on quangos, which concerned, in 
part, the problems in holding such organisations accountable to representative 
democracy. 
The evaluations of consultations and community appraisals undertaken in 
Devon also focus on issues of democracy and accountability; specifically the 
responsiveness of the public service providers to the opinions and attitudes of the 
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electorate. Whilst the analysis about consultations is confined to the response of the 
county council, the assessment of the community appraisals also concerns the 
accountability and democratic responsiveness of a substantial range of public and 
private sector bodies. The community appraisals assessment also focuses on 
mechanisms to enhance accountability and democratic responsiveness by 
strengthening the capacity of local communities to undertake initiatives. 
The analysis of local boundary reviews concerns a theme central to the 
mechanics of democratic accountability: elections -a topic that rose to the top of the 
British political agenda in the early 1830s with the debate over the 1832 Reform Act 
(Pearce, 2003) and has retained a notable position in British political discourse. 
Furthermore, this study considers the role of democratically elected local politicians in 
the boundary review process and the impact of such changes on how those local 
politicians operate. 
Each of these issues was selected to close gaps in the existing literature, 
arising from traditional neglect by scholars and or developments generated through 
contemporary reforms. In the next few pages, the weaknesses in the literature are 
identified and assessed. 
1.2.1: The role(s) of local councillors 
Previous studies had suffered from some important weaknesses. First, many 
scholars overlooked the representation of distinctive sections of the community. 
Second, it was difficult to draw precise conclusions about the hours spent on council 
duties. While there was evidence to suggest that over the last three decades the time 
councillors devoted to their local government work had increased, there were wide 
variations in the results and data. 
Third, there was a substantial urban bias in the literature. Many studies were 
confined to urban areas (Heclo, 1969; Hampton, 1970; Budge et al., 1972; Corina, 
1974; Newton, 1976). Most of the other evaluations were dominated by urban data 
(Bochel and Bochel, 2000). There were only two major studies about the role(s) of 
county councillors, one of which was more than 40 years old (Lee, 1963; Barron et al., 
1991). Fourth, the studies supplied an inadequate basis on which to make evaluations 
about the contemporary impact of party groups. For example, the model of councillor 
behaviour devised by Corina (1974) largely ignored party group discipline. Other 
academics treated the subject in an inconsistent fashion. For example, Newton (1976) 
commented on the cohesiveness of party groups but paid insufficient attention to this 
issue when delineating distinctions between different types of councillors. 
Contemporary research, however, suggested that loyalty to the party group had a 
significant impact on the perceptions and performance of councillors (Copus, 1998). 
Fifth, many of these publications were based on research undertaken over 25 
years ago. There have been few notable assessments of the role(s) of councillors since 
the early 1990s1, although some scholars have touched on important aspects of the 
issue (Leach et al., 1997; Copus, 1998). Some of the analysis predated the structural 
and organisational changes of the early 1970s. For example, Newton (1976) 
incorporated aldermen in his analysis. All the studies mentioned in this section were 
undertaken prior to the introduction of executive and scrutiny structures, which had 
important implications for the role(s) of councillors. 
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1.2.2: External scrutiny 
Evaluations of scrutiny undertaken by local authorities have either concerned 
general assessments or adopted, in part at least, a specific focus on internal scrutiny of 
the relevant local authority (see Baker, 2000; Cole, 2001 a; Ashworth, 2003; Leach et 
at., 2003). Scholarship about the scrutiny of external organisations had been restricted 
primarily to the NHS and broader health matters (Campbell, 2005; Coleman, 2006). 
Similarly, academics had, in general, ignored the extent to which the local media 
covered local authority scrutiny, and had, therefore, overlooked a key mechanism 
through which democratic responsiveness and accountability could be enforced. 
1.2.3: Consultations 
Despite the increasing importance of consultation to the delivery of services by 
local authorities and other governmental organisations, the subject had been relatively 
neglected in the academic literature. The topic was overlooked in most accounts of 
New Labour (see Taylor, 1999; White 2001). Similarly, the consultation agenda had 
been marginalised in the public management literature (see Horton and Farnham, 
1999). Furthermore, most of the studies about consultation or public participation 
were primarily descriptive, uncritical and/or restricted to identifying best practice 
(Sergeant and Steele, 1998). There had been an emphasis on processes rather than 
outcomes (see Fenwick and Alford, 2000), while the topic had also been subsumed 
into a wider debate about partnerships (Glendinning, et al., 2002). Similarly, most of 
the literature focused exclusively on public consultation and ignored consultations on 
internal matters (Sergeant and Steele, 1998; Lowndes et al., 2001a). 
1.2.4: Community appraisals 
Although appraisals had been held in almost a quarter of local authority areas 
(Pearce and Ellwood, 2002: 41), scholars had made few attempts to evaluate the 
effectiveness of these exercises, an omission that reflected the neglect of public 
participation and governance in rural Britain. Moseley (1997) outlined a research 
agenda but did not undertake an empirical assessment. Pearce and Ellwood (2002: 41) 
concluded that while appraisals were effective at `stimulating public debate on local 
issues they have not always been successful either in clarifying local community 
priorities or inducing a shift in the priorities and budgets of agencies responsible for 
providing local services'. These authors did not, however, base these assertions on 
original empirical research. 
The empirical studies suffered typically from methodological weaknesses. 
First, the small-scale of the analysis weakened the value of the conclusions obtained 
by most studies (Derounian, 1984; Ashman, 1993; Bovey 1993; Horton, 1996). 
Second, many studies focused on monitoring the extent to which recommendations 
contained in the appraisal report were implemented (Ashman, 1993; Moseley et al., 
1996; Taragon, 1998). This approach concentrated on the interpretation of the steering 
group at the expense of the issues identified by the respondents and could inflate 
achievements because some recommendations were restricted to communicating 
concerns rather than resolving them. Third, the impact of the appraisals on community 
development was typically marginalised or ignored in these studies (Horton, 1996; 
Moseley, et al., 1996; Moseley, 1997). Fourth, scholars failed to link this process with 
the debate about social capital. 
1.2.5: Local boundary reviews 
Academic analysis of changes to electoral boundaries in the UK and elsewhere 
had focused primarily on parliamentary constituencies (McLeod, 1996; Bowden and 
Falck, 1996; Johnston et al., 1996; Rossister et al., 1999). The main exception in 
relation to the UK was One Vote, One Value (Railings, Thrasher and Downe, 2002), 
which concerned reviews to local electoral boundaries in England and had become 
established as the key text in this field. One Vote, One Value, which should be 
viewed as the background to and the starting point for the evaluation contained in 
chapter eight, supplied a comprehensive assessment of the process of local re- 
districting. This thesis aims to supplement and build on that study by shifting the 
focus away from a macro analysis of the whole process to a micro analysis of the 
perspective of individual councillors. 
1.3: Thesis structure 
In chapter two, the academic literature relevant to the study is discussed. There 
are sections about the themes of democracy and accountability as well as the five 
substantial areas covered in the thesis: the role(s) councillors; scrutiny; consultation 
and participation; community appraisals; and local boundaries and the review process. 
In addition, scholarship in relation to community development and social capital is 
discussed because these issues are relevant to one of the substantive topics. 
Chapter three outlines the methodology deployed to obtain the data relevant to 
each of the five component studies of this thesis. The chapter incorporates 
methodological discussion of a range of issues, which include interview techniques; 
questionnaire design; the tactics and strategy required to maximise questionnaire 
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responses; and the development and analysis of SPSS datasets. The chapter 
culminates with a discussion about the use of case studies, which has particular 
relevance given the focus on Devon County Council in relation to the role(s) of 
councillors and consultations. 
In chapter four, there is an analysis of the role(s) of councillors at Devon 
County Council. This analysis supplies the first substantive evaluation of the impact 
of the executive and scrutiny reforms on the role(s) of councillors. There is a thorough 
analysis of the representational role(s) of councillors in relation to their divisions and 
sub-areas of the county; voluntary groups; their ombudsman function; sections of the 
community; and other local authorities. The study also considers the policy role; the 
balance between representation and policy; the impact of the party group; and the time 
devoted to council work. 
In chapter five, the issue of local authority scrutiny of external organisations is 
explored. The study delivers the first significant survey of the external scrutiny 
undertaken by British local authorities that covered non-health organisations. The 
starting point for this assessment is an audit of the external scrutiny undertaken in 
British local government, which serves as the prelude to a detailed evaluation of the 
specific inquiries. The subjects of each inquiry and their distribution amongst 
different types of authority are examined before considering the decision to undertake 
the inquiries; support for scrutiny; the attitude of the scrutinised agencies; the scrutiny 
process; media coverage; and the impact of each inquiry. 
Chapter six contains an evaluation of consultations performed at Devon 
County Council and can be viewed as complimentary to a national analysis 
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undertaken by a research team based primarily at De Montefort University (Lowndes 
et al., 2001a; 2001b). The Devon analysis is the first extensive appraisal of 
consultations undertaken in the context of the local government modernisation 
agenda. 2 The analysis presented in this chapter concerns the relationship with 
consultees; the methodological expertise of the officers with responsibility for these 
exercises; co-ordination of consultations by the corporate centre of the local authority; 
and the results and impact of each consultation. 
In chapter seven, there is an evaluation of community appraisals undertaken in 
46 primarily rural communities in Devon. The analysis focuses on two issues. First, 
the responsiveness of the external agencies to concerns expressed in those 
communities is considered. Second, the capacity of those appraisals to promote 
community development and enhance the stock of social capital is assessed. The 
concepts of community development and social capital are at the centre of 
international debates about civic society, the delivery and accountability of public 
services and democracy (Putnam, 1993: 2000; Hambleton, et al., 2002; Knight et al., 
2002). The international implications of this analysis also arise from the use of similar 
initiatives in other countries (Parola, 1994; Horton, 1996). 
In chapter eight, the attitudes of councillors towards reviews to ward and 
divisional boundaries are assessed. The analysis incorporates the decision to review; 
the local community and these reviews; the role(s) of elected councillors in the review 
process; and the impact of re-districting on electioneering and the role(s) of 
councillors both in relation to their ward or division and the wider aspects of their 
local authority work. 
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Conclusions about the research are drawn in chapter nine. Conclusions 
specific to each section are discussed and placed in the context of the existing 
literature, the focus being on the contribution the research outlined in this thesis has 
made to academic knowledge. In addition, these research findings are related to 
democracy, accountability and the local government modernisation agenda 
1.4: Conclusion 
In this chapter, the research programme has been placed in the context of the 
local government modernisation agenda. In addition, the broad themes of 
accountability and democratic responsiveness have been linked to the five areas of 
substantive research. Weaknesses in the existing literature have been identified and 
the research agenda for this thesis has been mapped. This research is grouped around 
two key themes, which recur throughout this thesis. First, there is the issue of the 
responsiveness of local governance and some private sector bodies to opinion in the 
locality. The second theme concerns the role of local political and administrative 
structures as mechanisms of local democratic responsiveness and accountability. Key 
elements include the role(s) of councillors as local representatives, the impact of 
scrutiny committees on holding external bodies accountable and the effectiveness of 
the community appraisal process in delivering a local agenda. Both themes are, of 
course, central issues in an evaluation of the extent to which the local political and 
administrative culture is accountable and responsive to democratic pressures. 
For an exception see Bochel, C. and H. Bochel (2000), The Careers of Councillors: Gender, 
Party and Politics, Aldershot, Ashgate. 





In this chapter, a wide range of academic literature relevant to the study is 
identified and evaluated. The analysis opens with a discussion of democracy and 
accountability. The subsequent sections deal with the substantive issues to be 
discussed in future chapters: the role(s) of councillors; external scrutiny; consultation 
and participation; community appraisals; and local boundaries and the review process. 
In addition, there is a discussion of the concepts of community development and 
social capital, which are crucial to the analysis of the community appraisals. 
2.2: Democracy 
The ancient Greeks drew a contrast between monarchy, government by one; 
oligarchy, government by a few; and democracy, government by all; this typology 
dominated `political theory down to the time of Montesquieu' (Duverger, 1972: 81). 
More contemporary scholars have also considered the definition of democracy. For 
example, Lively (1975: 49-51) identified the characteristics of political equality and 
an inclusive concept of citizenship. 
Ruling elites have traditionally seen a pure form of direct democracy as a 
threat to their privileges. As Wright (1994: 9) noted, in relation to British government, 
democracy `represented the spectre of the untutored poor finding the means to 
expropriate property and destroy culture, liberty and civilization...... democracy 
entered British political culture as a problem'. Similarly, in writing about early 
American government, De Tocqueville (1994 ed.: 260) viewed `the omnipotence of 
the majority' as a threat. 
A more contemporary contribution was supplied by Copus (2006: 101), who 
considered how the representative model had operated to contain this problem, and 
commented that representative government had succeeded because `it produces the 
illusion of wide-scale political involvement and control without threatening certain 
fundamental political beliefs about the hierarchical nature of society'. This legacy had 
strong echoes in nineteenth century municipal reform, which, as Young (1989: 6) 
argued, could be characterised as the establishment of a 'form of ratepayer 
democracy'. Furthermore, for many decades this representative model was based on a 
small franchise (see Seymour, 1915). 
In Britain, the pure form of direct democracy became marginalised and has 
been confined primarily to occasional referendums and the governance of some small 
communities', which have few powers and a very limited capacity to raise money. 
Initiatives to extend public participation (including expanding and enhancing 
consultation mechanisms) in decision-making should also be interpreted as a form of 
direct democracy and are treated as such in this thesis. The extent of influence 
afforded by typical participation and consultation initiatives (which included 
community appraisals) was, however, much lower than under pure forms of direct 
democracy through which power resided clearly with the popular will. 
There has also been an assumption amongst many practitioners that 
governance was best left to the professionals. This elitist approach was summarised by 
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Saward (2003: 41), who commented that the prime reason for `downgrading the role 
of ordinary people in democratic politics' was `because most people are ignorant 
about issues, irrational in their opinions and preferences, and easily swayed by 
manipulative appeals from unscrupulous politicians'. There was a clear implication 
that `people should vote, choose their government and then get out of the way' 
(Stoker, 2006: 152). This distrust and scepticism about ordinary voters had echoes in 
both the socialism of Labour politicians and paternalism of Conservatives, although 
from the late 1960s such assumptions were challenged by movements such as the new 
left and the libertarian right. Political elitism has been matched by the behaviour of 
professions such as doctors and teachers, which have sought to retain self-regulation, 
or horizontal accountability, and have often been wary of proposals either to extend 
the powers of non-specialist mangers accountable to politicians or measures to 
promote responsiveness to clients and or the wider community. 
A wide range of academics have challenged this elitist notion, in which the 
substantial role of most citizens was confined primarily to voting. As Stoker (2006: 
152) observed, `the academic/theoretical narrative of democracy.... has now moved 
towards a more participative, expansive understanding of democracy'. For example, 
Dahl (1956) stressed the importance of active citizens focused on expressing opinions 
and obtaining information between elections. Putnam (1993) and others considered 
similar issues through the establishment and development of the notion of social 
capital (see below). This agenda has encompassed social entrepreneurship and a focus 
on communities solving problems in their locality (Pike, 2003). There has also been a 
broader concern amongst many writers about the level of democratic participation. For 
example, scholars such as Habermas (1984) and Laclau and Mouffe (1987) have 
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emphasised the importance of `an inclusive, radical or participatory democracy, and 
give ideas about how public participation initiatives can be judged in terms of their 
democratic potential' (McLaverty, 1999: 38). Arnstein (1971) developed a conceptual 
framework to measure participation in decision-making (see below). Stoker (2006: 
102) noted weaknesses in political engagement and suggested that the problem was 
`how to construct a political system to cope with the kind of engagement people want 
and to enable the political system to be both sustainable and effective'. 
Public choice theorists have challenged this consensus on the basis that the 
delivery of public services was paternalistic and concerned mostly with the self- 
interest of bureaucrats (Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1965). Proposed solutions had `a 
strong right-wing prescriptive dimension' (John, 1998: 139), which typically involved 
extensions of competition and shrinking the size of the public sector. 
In this thesis, each of the five substantive areas is evaluated in terms of the 
impact on democracy. This analysis covers two distinct issues: changes in the general 
characteristics of representative democracy; and the extent to which democracy has 
become more participatory and, at least in theory, involved an extension of the 
influence of a wider circle of people over the decision-making process. In the case of 
the community appraisals, this discussion incorporates the extent to which the 
communities have been empowered to undertake socially useful initiatives. 
2.3: Accountability 
Accountability and its pursuit have a key place in British constitutional 
practice and the academic literature about British government. As Pyper (1996a: 1) 
commented, the `concept of accountability is often a basic benchmark against which 
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systems of government can be judged'. A useful framework was supplied by Flinders 
(2001: 13), who defined accountability in terms of `the condition of having to answer 
to an individual or body for one's actions'. 
The debate about public sector accountability in the UK and governmental 
structures in other countries derived from the Westminster model had traditionally 
focused on the idea of ministerial responsibility to Parliament. The notion was a 
`vertical' concept through which accountability operated `upwards' to governmental 
scrutineers. This notion also incorporated accountability to structures operating 
independently or at `arms-length' from ministers such as parliamentary select 
committees, the National Audit Office, the utility regulators and local government 
scrutiny committees. 
It has also been argued that the operation of vertical accountability had been 
affected by accountability to `whom' issues. For example, a strong focus on officials 
might emphasise mechanisms such as `systems of performance appraisal and review, 
which identify key indicators, against which the general and specific performance of 
officials can be judged' (Pyper, 1996a: 7). Such devices were tailored to internal line 
management forms of accountability and also were suitable for internal financial 
accountability through devices such as `delegated budgetary systems' (Pyper, 1996a: 
8). In contrast, the accountability of politicians had been traditionally focused on a 
range of distinct mechanisms such as parliamentary debates, parliamentary questions, 
select committees, the Ombudsman and external audit agencies (Pyper, 1996a: 8). It 
could, however, be argued that the emergence of the performance agenda and the use 
of an array of published performance indicators to hold politicians accountable meant 
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that the spirit and, to some extent, style of the mechanisms used to appraise and assess 
officials had been adapted to politicians. 
Weaknesses in the vertical model had long been the subject of debate amongst 
commentators and political scientists. In the 1920s, the expanded role of the state led 
to scepticism that the traditional notion of ministerial accountability was still 
adequate. In 1929, Lord Hewart published an influential critique of these 
arrangements in The New Despotism, which led to the establishment of an inquiry on 
ministers' powers (Donoughmore Report, 1932). In the 1950s, Finer drew attention to 
the reluctance of UK ministers to resign following policy or administrative failures 
and distinguished between being `answerable to' and `answerable for' mistakes. The 
former concept required ministers to `explain and defend to Parliament the actions 
carried out on their behalf (Finer, 1956: 379) but did not incorporate an obligation to 
resign in the event of serious failure. In 1954, the Crichel Down Affair led to the 
establishment of the Franks Committee, which made a series of recommendations 
about tribunals and the conduct of public inquiries. 
The theme that the increasing scale of governance, combined with the 
fragmentation of public service provision, had undermined traditional vertical 
accountability mechanisms or, at least, affected them significantly had been reflected 
in the writing of more contemporary scholars (Sutherland, 1991; Pyper, 1996a, Pyper 
1996b; Barberis, 1998; Elcock, 1998). As Flinders (2001: 367) observed, the 
`challenge.... will be to reconcile a complex and fragmented state based around a 
nexus of inter-organisational contacts with a coherent and workable framework of 
accountability'. These issues could be viewed more clearly through the experience of 
executive agencies, which (in theory) allowed ministers to retain responsibility for 
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policy while devolving a substantial degree of operational autonomy. These changes 
led to officials being blamed for failure, often in controversial circumstances, the 
dismissal of Derek Lewis as Head of the Prison Service being a notable example 
(Lewis, 1997). It has, however, been suggested by Talbot (1997) and Cole (2000) that, 
in practice, the relationship between ministers and agencies often did not reflect the 
formal position outlined in the policy and resources frameworks. The establishment of 
executive agencies could, therefore, be viewed as allowing ministers to retain power 
whilst devolving responsibility. 
The debate about the vertical accountability of British government has also 
focused on the accountability of quasi-governmental organisations (quangos), the 
academic analysis of which was concentrated into two time periods: the late 1970s to 
early 1980s and 1992 to the late 1990s. The first wave of interest drew on the Anglo- 
American accountability discussions and more populist criticism of the operation and 
scale of governance through quangos under the 1974-79 Labour administration. The 
political debate was fuelled primarily by a centre-right critique although centre-left 
politicians and commentators contributed substantially to criticism about the system 
of appointments (see Hood, 1973; Coote, 1978; Holland and Fallon, 1978; Davies, 
1979; Holland 1979; Holland, 1980; Holland 1981; Barker, 1982; Cole, 1998; Cole, 
2005). 
Concern about quangos re-emerged in the early 1990s and focused around the 
notion that a proliferation of these organisations had created a democratic deficit, 
especially in relation to local governance (Flinders and Smith, 1999), this 'intellectual 
climate' (Cole, 2000: 34) served as the framework for the 1990s' debate. Concern 
about a `democratic deficit' led Weir and Hall (1994) to construct a model of public 
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accountability that could be applied to a wide range of quasi-governmental bodies. 
This approach combined governmental institutions such as the Ombudsman and the 
National Audit Office with the public disclosure of a wide range of information and 
public access to meetings. Stewart and Davis (1994) argued that the democratic deficit 
would be diminished if local authorities acquired direct responsibility for many of the 
functions undertaken by quangos. Hirst (1995) claimed that accountability could be 
improved by shifting some quango functions to voluntary organisations. 
Debates about the democratic deficit and the weaknesses in ministerial 
responsibility should not/have not obscure(d) the reality that contemporary British 
government was also characterised by an array of regulatory mechanisms. In 
particular, local authorities have been the subject of an extensive range of regulatory 
institutions such as OFSTED, the Audit Commission, the Standards Commission and 
the Commission for Social Care Inspection and regimes like Best Value and 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment (Cole, 2008). These arrangements have 
attracted criticism from academics such as Stewart (2003: 210), who questioned the 
assumption of `inspectoral infallibility'. Central and devolved UK governance has 
also been subjected to a notable regulatory regime characterised by bodies such as the 
National Audit Office, the parliamentary select committees and the Prisons 
Inspectorate (Hood, et al., 1999). 
There was also a significant regulatory structure to monitor and constrain the 
privatised utilities. For example, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) 
regulated those industries, while the Office of Communications (OFCOM) acted as 
the regulation and competition authority for the communications industry and the 
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Water Services Regulation Authority (OFWAT) had a similar role in relation to the 
water utilities. 
The traditional vertical accountability has been supplemented with horizontal 
and downward concepts. Mackenzie and Hood (1975: 44) considered horizontal 
accountability to peer groups and commented that such loyalty could challenge 
obligations towards vertical mechanisms. In particular, professional loyalties to fellow 
experts could often counteract vertical structures and might be a much better 
guarantee that standards were sustained than `any formal accountability to a higher 
body' (Cole, 1991: 145). 
Horizontal accountability was also addressed by Day and Klein (1987), in 
relation to the concept of professionalism in the British welfare state. The profession 
established the objectives and rules and was `incompatible with the concept of 
accountability as a series of linkages leading from the people to those with delegated 
responsibilities via Parliament and the managerial hierarchy since it brings onto the 
stage a set of actors who see themselves answerable to their peers, rather than the 
demos' (Day and Klein, 1987: 19). The medical profession was the classic example 
of a self-regulating profession. As Day and Klein (1987: 57) observed, `the case of the 
doctors provides a neat and clear-cut example of professionalism in the strict, 
traditional sense of a State-licensed monopoly of expertise and the privatisation of 
accountability'. 
Scholars have also identified the importance of downward accountability to 
clients and service users, which incorporated wider notions of participation amongst 
those groups (Hague et al., 1975). In this thesis, the notion of downward 
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accountability is addressed primarily through literature on consultation, participation 
and the community appraisals (see below). 
The five substantive issues are evaluated primarily in terms of the impact on 
holding governance to account for their activities, although the sections on external 
scrutiny and the community appraisals incorporate the accountability of other 
organisations. There is a close relationship between the notions of democracy and 
accountability. The former was focused on the issue of where sovereignty lay within a 
political system and the extent to which such power was dispersed. In contrast, the 
concept of accountability was narrower and concerned the capacity of the people, 
audit agencies, peer groups and or their elected representatives to monitor, influence 
and obtain remedies from service providers. Accountability was a prerequisite for 
democracy - it would be possible to subsume completely the analysis of accountability 
within the framework of democracy. That approach was rejected because such a 
strategy would have risked understating the issue of accountability, which was central 
to the thesis. Both democracy and accountability could, therefore, be seen as intrinsic 
to each other but offering distinctive frameworks to illuminate different conclusions. 
2.4: The role(s) of local councillors 
2.4.1: Ward and divisional representation 
A key role for councillors was the representation of their ward or division. 
While councillors had a specific responsibility to tackle grievances of individual 
constituents, they also possessed a general role in representing their locality. 
Newton (1976) distinguished between trustees, delegates and politicos through 
a study of councillors and aldermen at Birmingham City Council. Trustees regarded 
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themselves as a `relatively free and independent agent who is elected to follow his 
own conscience'. In contrast, delegates gave `greater weight to the wishes and views 
of the electorate' (Newton, 1976: 118). The delegate could `listen carefully to public 
opinion in the hope of picking up general clues which might guide his actions', or 
alternatively s/he could `seek out a specific mandate and follow orders' (Newton, 
1976: 118). Politicos attempted to balance delegate and trustee orientations. Almost 
half of the sample of Birmingham city councillors and aldermen identified themselves 
as trustees, while the others divided evenly between the other categories (Newton, 
1976: 119). Grant (1977: 23) applied Newton's classification to a sample of 26 
predominately Independent councillors and identified 14 delegates, ten politicos and 
two delegates. 
Heclo (1969: 193) observed that there was `very little policy discussion or 
pressure transmitted from constituents to councillors'. In contrast, communication was 
almost exclusively restricted to specific grievances. The member was, therefore, `far 
from a delegate representing the given policy view of his constituents'. The councillor 
had `considerable latitude in the conclusions he draws from these specific grievances'. 
Newton concluded that many councillors emphasised the government of the 
city as a whole and gave a lower priority to representing their ward. In Birmingham, 
he found that 40% stressed governing the city as a whole, 30% emphasised their ward 
role and the remainder noted the mixed ward and city roles (Newton, 1976: 125). 
Budge and colleagues found that Glasgow city councillors typically stressed their dual 
role towards the city and their ward, only eight percent emphasised their ward 
representation role. First term councillors tended to `endorse ward commitments more 
heavily than other councillors' (Budge et al., 1972: 88). Newton (1976: 125) also 
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claimed that the most junior members typically emphasised representing their ward, 
whilst senior colleagues were more likely to stress governing Birmingham as a whole 
or possessed a dual focus. Finally, Leach et al. (1986: 58) commented on the 
importance of loyalties to geographic areas larger than wards or divisions but 
substantially smaller than the whole authority; they quoted one politician as observing 
that this `council is divided by area not party'. 
Copus (2006) noted the impact of the establishment of directly-elected mayors 
on the balance councillors made between the interests of their ward or division and the 
whole local authority areas. He observed that `the office of mayor makes it easier for 
councillors to manage' the tension `between their political focus on governing an 
authority area and their specific (ward-based) community responsibility to act as a 
very local representative'. This effect arose because `the governing mandate is clearly 
given to the mayor, not to councillors' (Copus, 2006: 188). Snape (2004: 73) 
suggested that the wider modernisation agenda had generated a subtle change in the 
nature of ward or divisional representation through the development of the idea of 
councillors as community leaders, which obliged them to adopt a wide-ranging focus 
on their area `extending beyond the services provided'. 
2.4.2: Voluntary groups 
Several studies have distinguished between councillors with positive attitudes 
towards engagement with voluntary bodies and members with a more cautious or 
negative approach. For example, Dearlove (1973: 126) observed that the Conservative 
leadership of Kensington and Chelsea encouraged councillors `to be wary of external 
groups' and `to limit their contact' with them. Both Hampton (1970) and Newton 
(1976) showed that councillors were responsive to voluntary bodies. Hampton (1970: 
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297) asked Sheffield city councillors about the use of voluntary groups in `meeting 
new and developing needs in the community' and concluded that 90% of the 
interviewees `thought that there were advantages'. 
Similarly, Newton (1976: 128) discovered that most Birmingham city 
councillors had positive attitudes towards the contribution of voluntary bodies. He 
asked members whether they thought voluntary organisations interfered with or 
assisted the democratic process and classified councillors as facilitators, resistors or 
neutrals according to their response; 82% of Birmingham councillors were listed as 
facilitators and less than an eighth were resistors. Grant (1977: 24) reached similar 
conclusions and classified 21 out of 26 councillors as facilitators. 
Barron et al. (1991: 178) found even less resistance to the idea of representing 
voluntary groups. They concluded that pressure groups which were limited to the 
councillor's division or parish appeared to `evoke a clear-cut (and generally 
cooperative) response and members were prepared to champion their case in spite of 
some occasional misgivings'. 
2.4.3: Representing a section of the community and or another local 
authority 
Jones (1973: 142) argued that councillors had a role in representing sections of 
the community to which they felt an affinity. Grant (1977: 77-82) assessed the role of 
ratepayer councillors in representing residents critical of the tourist industry in Seaton 
(Devon). Leach et al. (1986: 61) implied that ward or divisional representation had 
been supplemented by a `sectional focus -a concern with particular sections of the 
local community'. In general, however, scholars have overlooked this aspect of 
representation. 
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Jones (1973: 142) also suggested that, in a two or three-tiered structure, 
councillors could have an important role in representing the views of different 
authorities to each other. Scholars of local government have neglected this activity. 
Lee (1963: 141) was an exception and argued that the role of county councillors was 
`largely concerned with the business of being a go-between', both on behalf of 
divisional authorities and the standing committees of the council. 
2.4.4: Ombudsman 
Councillors had a role in handling grievances from individual constituents. 
This function has been documented in many important studies. As Jennings (1982: 
72) argued, casework had become an accepted element of the duties of councillors. 
Furthermore, as Wilson and Game (1994: 219) commented, many councillors found 
that casework was the part of the job `that brings them their greatest satisfaction'. 
Barron et al. (1991: 159) also drew attention to the `positive attitude' of county 
councillors towards casework. There was, however, a marked difference between the 
parties; in general Labour councillors had heavier caseloads than Conservatives. The 
authors argued that Labour councillors were more proactive and inclined to generate 
casework (Barron et al., 1991: 162). In addition, these authors acknowledged that the 
different social and economic composition of Labour and Conservative divisions 
might also affect the volume of cases. As Heclo (1969: 191) had earlier noted, `by 
representing many of the better-off areas of the city, the Conservatives have less 
demand for advice bureaux'. 
Scholars also identified a tendency for junior councillors to be the most 
interested in casework. As Jennings (1982: 70) observed, `most new councillors do a 
great deal of casework'. A similar observation was supplied by Newton (1976: 138), 
24 
who commented that the councillors with the greatest commitment to individual 
casework were also likely to be relatively junior members with less than five years 
service and hold only minor official positions. 
2.4.5: Politician 
Councillors had critical roles as politicians. All members had a function to 
balance interests within their electoral area. Tension between the roles of councillors 
as area representatives and party politicians was emphasised by Jennings (1982), who 
noted the problems posed for local authority leaderships by councillors with a strong 
focus on representing a locality. Young and Davies (1990) observed that the `nature 
of party control in the most rural areas' could be distinguished from the position 
elsewhere. Those authorities typically had `a greater degree of power sharing, with 
committee and sub-committee leadership roles being played by members of other 
parties' (Young and Davies, 1990: 24). Since this research was undertaken the 
committee system has, of course, been transformed, in most authorities, through the 
introduction of executive and scrutiny structures. Copus (2004) made a substantial 
study of the impact of the party group on the role(s) of local councillors and asserted 
that `it is defending the position of the party group to the public, rather than 
channelling the views of the public to the council, that takes precedence' (Copus, 
2004: 239). 
In some studies, the analysis about party loyalty was detached from and served 
to weaken the main conclusions. For example, Newton (1976) discussed his concepts 
of delegates, trustees and politicos before evaluating the impact of party loyalty and 
discipline. His subsequent assertion that councillors often possessed `a fierce sense of 
duty and loyalty to the group' (Newton, 1976: 122) reduced the credibility of the 
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previous distinctions. Newton (1976: 124) also found that councillors of both parties 
stressed their loyalty to support their group with the `exception of special issues which 
affect the member's own ward'. 
Dearlove (1973) identified a more rigid imposition of party discipline in 
Kensington and Chelsea. Although councillors were able to abstain on matters of 
conscience, `voting against any committee or party decision in open council is 
forbidden and does not occur' (Dearlove, 1973: 126). Similar conclusions were made 
by Alexander (1985: 203), who showed that in the Reading Labour Group, apart from 
occasional free votes, `members were expected to defy the party whip only on matters 
of conscience and then only after receiving the permission of the group'. Copus, 
surveyed more than 600 councillors and suggested that a councillor's loyalty to his/her 
ward or division `must not be overplayed to suggest it can somehow compete with the 
demands of group loyalty' (Copus, 1998: 223). Furthermore, he argued that 
councillors were `reluctant to transfer acts of representation against the group, from 
the group meeting, to a wider public theatre' (Copus, 1998: 223). The behaviour of 
councillors altered, therefore, in relation to the theatre of representation. 
Leach and Wilson (2000: 56) noted differences between the political parties. In 
particular, they observed that `group cohesiveness can be a particularly severe 
problem for Liberal Democrat leaders'. However, they also commented that when 
Liberal Democrats won power or obtained a share of power `the group normally holds 
together' (Leach and Wilson, 2000: 56). 
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2.4.6: Policy-maker 
Many scholars have distinguished between councillors with specialist and 
generalist policy interests. For example, Newton recorded that over 90% of 
councillors `claimed to concentrate on the work of one or two committees' (1976: 
131). Dearlove (1973: 125) supported these findings and commented that councillors 
were `more or less compelled to specialise'. Concern with a wide range of policy 
matters was often restricted to a small group of senior members. Jones (1973: 142) 
estimated that five percent of councillors made policy across a broad range of areas. 
Heclo (1969) identified narrower specialisation and claimed that in Manchester the 
`standard strategy is to specialize in certain subjects even within one's committee 
assignments' and that `most councillors (70 per cent) had done so within their first 
year on the council' (1969: 188). 
Newton distinguished between three types of generalists. First, some members 
with under two years experience were classified as generalists because they had `not 
yet had enough time to decide which aspect of council work they were going to 
specialise in' (Newton, 1976: 131). Second, some councillors claimed that their 
ombudsman role `took them into every aspect of council work' (Newton, 1976: 131). 
Third, two alderman said that their `positions in the majority group required them to 
keep a watching brief over the full range of committee activities' (Newton, 1976: 
131). 
Scholars have also assessed councillors' preferences for local representation or 
policy-making. For example, Jones concluded that three-quarters of councillors were 
`primarily representatives' (Jones, 1973: 142). Newton (1976: 126-130) evaluated 
whether councillors preferred handling individuals' problems or broad policy matters; 
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41% chose individuals' problems, 26% broad policy issues and 32% said that they 
tried to mix both. Jennings (1982: 72) speculated that the specialist policy role of most 
councillors `seems to pull the elected member deeper into the structures, away from 
the public'. 
The advent of overview and scrutiny altered the policy role of councillors. 
Non-executive councillors exchanged, in most local authorities, their direct decision- 
making input on the traditional policy committees, although this aspect of their job 
has been retained in relation to full council, for a scrutiny role which combined policy 
analysis and development with an enhanced focus on challenging executive proposals 
and decisions and, in some authorities at least, an interest in scrutinising external 
organisations (see Snape and Dobbs, 2003 and below). 
2.4.7: Time commitment of councillors 
Many surveys have asked councillors how many hours they spent on their 
council activities. Results are outlined in table 2.1., which also recorded the type of 
authorities included in each study. In addition, Bochel and Bochel (2000: 71) surveyed 
a sample of Scottish councillors and concluded that over one-third classified 
themselves as full-time members. These results showed some evidence of increasing 
workloads over time. There was also evidence that county councillors had heavier 
workloads than those in other types of authority. For example, England's (1986) 
separate analysis of English county councillors produced a statistic of 74 hours a 
month, while Barron et al. 's (1991) survey of county councillors produced the highest 
total. These findings might, in part, reflect the predisposition of many county 
councillors to serve on district and parish authorities. Barron et al. (1991: 60) also 
concluded that women worked longer hours than men. 
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Table 2.1: Time spent on council business each month 
Study 






Hampton (1970) 40 Sheffield City 
Robinson (1977) 79 Mixed 
England (1986) 74 Mixed 
Barron et al. (1991) 137 County Councils 2 
Rao (2000) 88 Mixed 
2.4.8: Modelling councillor roles 
Some scholars identified distinct types of councillors based on the information 
obtained from their studies. Lee (1963) developed the terms ministeralist to describe 
leading councillors and officers and non ministeralist to cover other councillors. 
Corina (1974: 73) devised five categories. Party politicians tried to `assess policies 
and decisions against a fairly coherent set of social values which they had resolved 
into political principles'. Ideologists expressed strong opinions that could be pushed 
to `the point of open and uncompromising opposition'. Partyists placed most 
emphasis on allegiance to their party and were often responsible for `overt party 
division within the committees and full council' (Corina, 1974: 75). Associates were 
members who, whilst belonging to a political party, had not `fully identified' 
themselves with their party (Corina, 1974: 77). Politico-administrators were at the 
centre of party and council business. They tended to be the most powerful members 
and often held cross-party views. 
Newton (1976: 136-142) constructed a fivefold classification. Parochials 
combined the delegate, ward and individual problem orientations. They focused 
primarily on their own ward and stressed their role as a local ombudsman. People's 
agents shared the parochials' concern with the problems of individual constituents but 
also regarded themselves as trustees with a responsibility to the whole city or a 
29 
combination of ward and city. Policy advocates combined the trustee role with 
preferences for policy matters and governing the whole city. Policy brokers shared the 
bias in favour of policy matters and city governance, but considered themselves to be 
politicos. Policy spokesmen combined the delegate inclination with city governance 
and general policy preferences. 
Grant (1977: 28) adapted Newton's model to rural local governance. He 
distinguished between policy-makers and parochials and sub-divided both categories 
to separate those performing the role through necessity and inclination. In addition, his 
dovetailers category was used to classify councillors who `see the potential tension 
between their ward/individual and policy/district roles, but are consciously trying to 
integrate the two'. Bochel and Bochel (2000) related Newton's classification to their 
study of the careers of Scottish councillors. For example, Bochel and Bochel (2000: 
104) suggested that the rise of `municipal socialism' (see, for example, Lansley et al., 
1989) could be `equated with councillors who were policy advocates or policy 
brokers'. 
Barron et al. (1991) expressed scepticism about models but identified a 
distinction between minimalist and proactive councillors. Minimalists stressed 
attendance at council and committee meetings and attracted little casework. Proactive 
councillors regarded committee meetings as a relatively unimportant part of their 
work, except when they could play a crucial role in making policy. In contrast, they 
thought that their main role was to provide a service to their community(ies). These 
members `take part in such activities as attending parish council meetings, holding 
surgeries, visiting outlying suburbs and villages regularly, putting out ward 
30 
newsletters and generally taking a very active part in local affairs' (Barron, et al., 
1991: 180). 
2.5: Scrutiny 
Scrutiny and overview committees were established through the provisions of 
the Local Government Act (2000), which also facilitated the creation of executive 
committees and directly-elected mayors in English and Welsh local authorities 
governing a population of over 85 , 000 
3 In local authorities with executive models of 
governance, scrutiny and overview committees were designed, in part at least, to 
compensate non-executive councillors for losing the main element of their direct-input 
into the policy-making process through the abolition of the traditional service 
committees (see above). 
Wilson and Game (2006: 116) supplied a useful definition of overview and 
scrutiny. Scrutiny was defined in terms of holding the executive accountable by 
focusing on decisions before they were made or implemented "ideally through 
consultation with the executive, but if necessary through the use of `call-in' powers, 
requiring the executive to reconsider its decision; and scrutinising decisions after 
implementation". Overview was identified in terms of policy development and review 
through which non-executive councillors were able to contribute to developing policy; 
examining the implementation and impact of policy; and reviewing broad policy 
areas. Wilson and Game (2006: 116) also said that overview encompassed reviews of 
external organisations, through which councillors had a role in `investigating the work 
of outside bodies on local communities'. This neat typology was not reflected in the 
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survey undertaken by Stoker et al. (2002: 46), which found a diverse range of 
permutations. 
Overview and Scrutiny committees can be viewed as echoes of and as derived 
from parliamentary select committees. Ashworth (2003: 1) drew a notable comparison 
with parliamentary select committees and evaluated local authority scrutiny through 
an analysis of five factors that had been identified as impediments to parliamentary 
scrutiny. Copus (2004: 224) also noted similarities between both procedures and 
commented, for example, that there `is the same attempt to generate all party support 
for the scrutiny process, and to emphasise the role of evidence and analysis (rather 
than party politics) in the proceedings'. 
However, Copus (2004: 224) also highlighted three important differences 
between scrutiny in national and local government. First, local government scrutiny 
had a more ambiguous role and was required to assist the executive as well as hold it 
to account. Second, there was `a clear division of support responsibilities at 
Westminster, which does not apply in local authorities'. Third, `the tradition of 
aggressive questioning of ministers and civil servants.... has not been given the same 
emphasis at local level'. Leach and Copus (2004: 335) established a useful framework 
for evaluating the effectiveness of scrutiny. It was suggested that scrutiny could be 
`judged as effective' if it added value and they asserted that the `ultimate effectiveness 
test for scrutiny is whether the decisions (or policies or services) which result from the 
intervention are better than those which would have resulted had that intervention not 
taken place (and been accepted)'. Such an idea was, however, difficult to evaluate in 
relation to specific inquiries and, therefore, did not form part of the research agenda 
discussed in chapter five of this thesis. 
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Some studies have generated optimistic conclusions about the impact of 
scrutiny and overview committees. Snape et al. (2002: 7) suggested that overview and 
scrutiny was potentially the most exciting and powerful element of the entire local 
government modernisation process, put councillors `at the heart of policy-making' and 
was a `mechanism by which councillors can become powerful and influential 
politicians'. Similarly, Coleman and Glendinning (2004) noted that most respondents 
to a national study were fairly positive about the impact of health scrutiny, while 
Coleman (2006) commented on the potential for scrutiny to strengthen public and 
patient participation in the NHS. Many scholars have, however, drawn sceptical 
conclusions about the effectiveness of overview and scrutiny committees. Leach 
(2001) argued that overview and scrutiny committees were struggling to develop a 
meaningful role, while Baker (2000) expressed scepticism about the effectiveness of 
overview and scrutiny in relation to education. 
Studies generated evidence that scrutiny had little success in holding the local 
authority executive to account (Ashworth, 2003; Leach et al., 2003). In particular, 
there was a pronounced focus on pre-decision scrutiny arising from factors such as 
"scrutiny's lack of `teeth' or influence, inadequate officer support and the impact of 
party politics" (Ashworth and Snape, 2004: 544). Holding the executive accountable 
had been limited `even in those authorities which have determinedly attempted to 
undertake the role' (Snape et al., 2002: 42). Leach (2006: 80) concluded that in most 
local authorities `overview and scrutiny has emphasised the supportive role, 
undertaking pieces of policy analysis' which `do not by any stretch of the imagination 
involve holding the executive to account'. 
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The weakness of the scrutiny side of local authorities could be illustrated in 
relation to finance. Executives controlled the budget and requests for expenditure on 
scrutiny `can easily be refused on the basis that limiting council tax or maintaining 
front-line services has a higher priority' (Cole, 2001b: 243). Although many 
authorities had established special scrutiny units they tended to be small and had little 
influence within the officer structure `which is primarily geared to the needs of the 
executive' (Leach 2006: 80). Furthermore, as Cole (2001b: 243) argued, there could 
be problems in relation to the fact that the staffing of scrutiny with officers seconded 
from elsewhere in the authority meant that there was a potential conflict of interest 
because scrutiny might want to scrutinise decisions made by current scrutiny officers 
or former/future colleagues. As the IDeA (1999: 12) noted in relation to Bury, the 
scrutiny panels were `being supported by officers who themselves may be the subject 
of scrutiny'. 
In an evaluation of scrutiny at Devon County Council, Cole (2001a: 30) 
commented that the agenda was controlled by the majority party political machine. He 
observed that scrutiny often concentrated `on activities that posed a relatively minor 
threat to the power of the executive'. There was a `tendency to concentrate on 
relatively minor matters such as tourist advice centres rather than key issues such as 
the funding of county schools'. However, there was little evidence of formal 
whipping being applied to scrutiny. Snape et al. (2002: 142) concluded that it was 
`rarely the case that formal whipping or discipline is applied to overview or scrutiny 
committees'. Similarly, Stoker et at. (2002: 49) found that only 9.2% of local 
authorities reported that a party whip was used `to control decisions'. 
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Party influence over scrutiny and overview committees could also be measured 
by focusing on whether those groups held party pre-meetings before scrutiny or 
overview sessions. Stoker et al. (2002) concluded that 39.1% of councils had such 
party pre-meetings, against 44.5%, which said there were no such gatherings, while 
16.4% didn't know whether such meetings occurred. It was claimed that this data 
`indicates that parties take a great deal of interest in the workings of scrutiny 
committees, which could indicate that their proceedings follow the priorities of party 
politics' (Stoker et al., 2002: 49). 
The capacity of scrutiny and overview committees to hold external 
organisations accountable was also constrained because the government had not given 
them the power to subpoena witnesses to attend scrutiny events. Scrutiny by 
councillors of external agencies had, therefore, to be `a voluntary and negotiated 
affair' (Copus, 2004: 221). However, two caveats had to be made. First, the Health 
and Social Care Act (2001) gave `county and unitary authorities the power to 
scrutinise local health authorities and opened the door to other such powers being 
extended over other bodies should scrutiny prove successful' (Copus, 2004: 221). 
Second, an analysis of formal powers bestowed through national legislation could not 
reflect adequately the nature of the governance, partnership and policy-making 
community in each locality. For example, external bodies part-financed or owned by 
the local authority might have a specific written obligation to supply witnesses and 
evidence to the relevant scrutiny or overview committee. Furthermore, where such an 
obligation was not codified it might nevertheless be required to comply with realities 
of the distribution of politico/administrative power at the local level (see Cole and 
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Cotterill, 2005). Similar incentives not to antagonise the local authority might also act 
to compel partner organisations to assist local authority inquiries about their activities. 
Stoker et al. (2002: 54) generated some notable data about the scale and scope 
of external scrutiny and identified large differences in relation to the type of English 
local authorities. London boroughs were `far more likely to consider non-local 
authority provision, which may reflect the complex governance arrangements in the 
capital'. The inclination to scrutinise external bodies was also relatively widespread 
amongst the counties and the metropolitan boroughs but much less common amongst 
unitary and district councils. External scrutiny, however, `remains a marginal activity' 
for most local authorities (Ashworth and Snape: 2004,550). In particular, it has been 
suggested that external scrutiny has been inhibited through concern that this process 
`might adversely affect relationships that were otherwise productive' (Ashworth and 
Snape, 2004: 550). 
2.6 Consultation and participation in the UK 
Chapter six focuses primarily on the notion of consultation, which has been 
used as the conceptual and linguistic foundation for the study. However, the close 
links between consultation and participation and the many references to the latter term 
meant that it was also considered necessary to discuss both concepts. 
A strong `rhetorical commitment' (Haughton, 1998: 872) to community 
engagement and participation has long been present in UK public policy initiatives. In 
particular, this emphasis has been evident in area-based regeneration programmes 
undertaken since the 1960s. In practice, however, there have been `considerable 
fluctuations' (Haughton, 1998: 872) in the extent to which such schemes reflected a 
36 
community driven approach or, more typically, were the product of a `top-down' 
agenda. For example, the Community Development Project and the Urban Programme 
`represented at least partial attempts at locally-based holistic forms of urban 
regeneration' (Haughton, 1998: 872). In contrast, the Thatcher governments, in 
general, adopted a more prescriptive approach, which incorporated a substantial role 
for the private sector and marginalised community influence (Pearce, 1993). 
Since 1997, the Labour Governments have embraced the idea of `extending 
opportunities for citizens to participate' (PASC, 2001: x), which has become an 
important aspect of the public service reform agenda. As Sullivan and Skelcher (2002: 
164) observed, this process involved `the development of a new political ethos, where 
citizens are expected to contribute to the solution of key policy problems in concert 
with service providers and policy-makers'. Politicians and bureaucrats developed a 
range of mechanisms to promote community engagement and participation in public 
policy decisions. For example, the involvement of user groups in the provision of 
NHS services has been extended. Similarly, responsiveness to local stakeholders has 
been emphasised through the establishment of multi-agency partnerships (Cole, 
2003b; Sullivan 2003; Cole and Cotterill, 2005). 
Strengthening public participation and consultation was central to the local 
government modernisation agenda (DETR, 1998). In the white paper Modern Local 
Government: In Touch with the People, the government, therefore, stressed the 
requirement to `see consultation and participation embedded into the culture of all 
councils' (DETR, 1998: 39). This agenda has been reflected in the Best Value process 
and the decision to oblige local authorities to subject their new political management 
structures to a public consultation (Copus, 2003). 
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The stress on enhanced consultation and participation strengthened a parallel 
focus on delegating responsibility for decision-making in rural areas to local 
communities. This approach predated Labour's local government modernisation 
agenda (see, for example, DOE and MAFF, 1995), but was adopted by the Labour 
Government and reflected in the 2000 Rural White Paper. That publication observed 
that central government wanted to give rural localities `a bigger say in managing their 
own affairs' (DETR and MAFF, 2000: 146). This approach was also a component of 
the sustainable development agenda. It was suggested that sustainability depended on 
the involvement of local people who `were best placed to identify problems and 
propose and implement solutions for better services, housing and jobs' (Owen, 2002: 
44). 
There is a significant academic literature about public participation in the 
delivery of public services in the UK. For example, Klein and Lewis (1976) studied 
arrangements for citizen involvement in health decision-making. Similarly, Lowndes, 
Pratchett and Stoker (2001 a) produced a census of local government activity to 
enhance public participation, while Sergeant and Steele (1998) assessed a variety of 
consultations about specific public-policy decisions. Fenwick and Alford (2000) 
considered the use of citizens' juries as a mechanism of public participation, while 
Glendinning et al. (2002) discussed these issues in relation to the partnership agenda. 
Scholars have also questioned the reformist focus on and enthusiasm for 
consultation. Rouse and Smith (2002: 54-5) disputed the capacity of this agenda to be 
`genuinely inclusive and representative of community diversity'. It has also been 
suggested that `consultation risks merely framing questions that reflect the dominant 
discourse' (Brooks, 2000: 609). Furthermore, consultation initiatives have been 
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criticised on the basis that participants were drawn from local elites (Klein and Lewis, 
1976; Rao, 2000: 145) and on the grounds that they might raise unrealistic 
expectations and generate `greater dissatisfaction' (Rouse and Smith, 2002: 55). 
2.7: Consultation and participation: definitions 
There is a substantial academic literature about the definition of consultation 
and participation. Gyford (1991: 53) commented that participation involved some 
degree of `sharing in the processes of policy-making and service provision'. In 
contrast, consultation exercises acknowledged that the public had the right to be heard 
even if they did not take part in decision-making. Gyford (1991: 53) identified a series 
of `initiatives lying broadly in the field of consultation', which included petitions, 
asking councillors questions and complaints procedures. Similarly, Hampton (1987: 
127-128) asserted that participation could be viewed as the mechanism through which 
people protected `their rights as consumers of public goods and services; it can be 
described as the right to consultation or it can involve the full' concept of `people 
sharing in the processes of policy-making and service provision'. 
Arnstein (1971) studied US federal social programmes and constructed a 
`ladder of participation' based on the extent to which participants affected decisions. 
This typology identified eight levels of participation "with each rung on the ladder 
corresponding to the extent of citizens' power in determining the end product" (Burns 
et al., 1994: 156). The bottom two rungs related to non-participation, the aim being to 
"enable power-holders to `educate' or `cure' the participants" (Bums, et al., 1994: 
156-157). The next three levels, which included consultation, were termed `degrees of 
tokenism' and involved public dialogue in which citizens possessed the right to be 
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heard even if they did not have a direct involvement in decision-making. The top three 
rungs (partnership, delegated power and citizen control) provided participants with, at 
least, a share in the decision-making process. Participation was used as a generic term 
for a wide range of devices for involving outsiders in decision-making. Burns et al. 
(1994: 162) modified Arnstein's model and introduced additional rungs. In particular, 
they distinguished between consultation and cynical consultation, the latter was 
regarded as non-participation. 
Such definitions helped to clarify important theoretical distinctions. In 
particular, the analysis identified the key notions of participation and consultation and 
the capacity of agencies to deploy consultation mechanisms for manipulative and 
cynical purposes. These concepts were, however, subject to some weaknesses. First, 
the notion of rungs suggests that agencies should be attempting to reach the summit of 
the ladder, although, in practice, the extent to which decisions should, for example, be 
taken in partnership with external participants or delegated to them might need to be 
limited. Second, this literature often disparaged the notion of consultation and 
suggested that it was a mechanism to allow citizens a limited degree of influence. In 
contrast, other scholars with a less theoretical approach have used a much broader 
definition of consultation (Sergeant and Steele, 1998) or implied a wider definition by 
discussing consultation through the notion of participation (Lowndes, et al., 2001 a). 
Third, the strength of the policy-based definitions of participation was weakened 
through use by psephologists in relation to elections and voting. In this context 
participation was, therefore, associated with a minimal degree of civic engagement 
that was seldom associated directly with decisions about specific issues (see, for 
example, Railings and Thrasher, 1997). 
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Fourth, these models were constrained by an attachment to a definition based 
on methods. For example, Arnstein's (1971) `ladder of participation' was constructed 
substantially on variations in the extent to which different methods affected the 
capacity of citizens to influence decisions. This approach, however, circumvented the 
possibility that citizens might exert more influence through methods located lower in 
the ladder. For example, dialogue methods might enable citizens to have a greater 
impact than partnership. Dialogue could supply substantial evidence of widespread 
opposition to a proposal, while the involvement of an elite group of citizens in a 
partnership might lead to their co-option into the decision-making elite. Fifth, the 
methods component also caused problems for the analysis of consultation exercises 
that combined methods at different levels on the ladder. For example, a consultation 
initiative incorporating one-way communication, such as pamphlets, two-way 
communication, such as public meetings, and an element of partnership, would be 
difficult to evaluate through Arnstein's approach. 
The discussion about participation and consultation could also be linked to the 
concepts of horizontal accountability to peer groups and downward accountability to 
clients and service users. These notions emerged from the Anglo-American 
discussions held under the auspices of the Carnegie project in the late 1960s (Smith 
and Hague, 1971; Hague, Barker and Mackenzie, 1975; and see above). These ideas 
were linked subsequently to form the concept of mutual accountability, which 
involved a network of interrelated organisations (Barker, 1982). Other scholars chose 
to emphasise the importance of horizontal or downward forms. Rowe (1999: 100) 
argued that accountability arrangements must incorporate the `experiences of users 
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and citizens'. Similarly, Hood and Schuppert (1988: 254-258) asserted that quangos 
should be held accountable through a combination of peers, clients and markets. 
Participation initiatives have also been linked to debates about the structure 
and distribution of political and economic power. For example, Diamond (2002) 
applied a model developed by Fainstein and Fainstein (1982), which concerned the 
strategies used by local elites in the context of economic decline in US cities, to the 
UK's Single Regeneration Budget. 
2.8: Community appraisals 
Although communities have been undertaking assessments of their 
requirements for centuries, the first assessment designated an appraisal was 
undertaken in Stocksfield (Northumberland) in 1969. The perceived success of the 
Stocksfield appraisal encouraged some rural community councils to promote 
appraisals. It has been estimated that in the 20 years up to the mid-i 990s 
approximately 1,500 appraisals were undertaken in Britain (Moseley, 1997: 197). In 
the last decade, several development initiatives have promoted the use of appraisals. 
For example, the good practice guide on Local Agenda 21 `advocates village 
appraisals as one way of fostering a genuine participative process' (Moseley et al,, 
1996: 310). 
Community appraisals are questionnaire surveys undertaken for and by the 
local community. They have been characterised as social audits (Grayson and Horton, 
1996) and represented an important device for obtaining community views on a wide 
range of issues. Scholars have identified two main objectives for appraisals. First, 
appraisals were undertaken to improve certain aspects of the community. As Moseley 
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et al. (1996: 312) commented, most appraisals were `intended as a means to an end, 
the end being some tangible improvement in the local area, its facilities and amenities, 
and the life of its people'. As Pearce and Ellwood (2002: 40) commented, appraisals 
could enable communities `to identify their own needs and priorities for future 
development'. 
Second, the process can be regarded as the most important end `with the value 
of enhanced local skills, awareness and confidence outweighing the more tangible 
outputs' (Moseley et al., 1996: 312). In particular, scholars have noted the importance 
to the process of obtaining opinions from people `who normally take no part in public 
life' (Lumb, 1990: 181). This approach suggested, therefore, that appraisals promoted 
the community development ethos (see below) because they used the skills, 
commitment, enthusiasm and resources of local people, were 'owned' by the local 
community and strengthened the capacity of the community to undertake more 
initiatives. Long-term improvements in the more tangible outputs could be viewed as 
being, in part at least, dependent on community development. Some scholars have, 
however, suggested that appraisals had become separated from community 
development. Lumb (1990: 182) argued that the standardisation of the process had 
moved the emphasis away from community development. There had, therefore, been a 
shift `from being a process towards being a product in its own right'. 
2.9: Community development 
Community development has been defined as a `process designed to create 
conditions of economic and social progress for the whole community with its active 
participation' (Moser, 1989: 81) and was meant to assist people to determine their 
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own needs (Wright, 1990: 48). Community development could, therefore, be viewed 
as a process focused on establishing economic and social progress for a locality, with 
the community's active participation. As Buller and Wright (1990: 12) observed, `the 
fundamental characteristics of genuine development' were `an increased social and 
political role for local communities in the definition and choice of their own 
development objectives, and access to the material resources and political means to 
sustain them'. 
Haughton (1998: 874), who focused on the economic aspects of community 
development, illustrated the scope of this approach. The aim of community economic 
development was `the development of stronger local economies through engaging 
local communities in shaping their own destinies, taking responsibility for local 
strategies which seek long term, durable solutions to addressing economic 
regeneration'. Community development aimed to empower those individuals and 
transform their capacity to address local issues. This agenda linked with the idea that 
an important benefit of extending participation in public affairs was that the process 
enhanced the capacity of individuals to participate (see Mill, 1873). It has also been 
asserted that public participation strengthened a focus on community because the 
requirement to express your opinions in public forced participants to adopt a more 
communal and less self-interested approach (Cohen, 1989; Elster, 1998). 
Community development has been promoted as part of the Labour 
governments' modernisation agenda. For example, community development was a 
component of the Health Action Zone initiative and reflected the need to enhance the 
capacity of local communities to engage with the development of health policy and the 
delivery of health services (Holden and Craig, 2002). Similarly, `time and resources 
44 
for capacity building at local level' (Taylor, 2003: 188) has been incorporated into the 
neighbourhood renewal programmes. 
The community development focus also had implications for the evaluation of 
programmes and projects. For example, an assessment of progress towards community 
economic development could focus on the `value of community ownership of assets 
as a good outcome in its own right' (Haughton, 1998: 876). Similarly, community 
`confidence building would also be measured, for instance attendance at meetings of 
local community bodies, numbers of ideas generated by local community activists 
which are worked up into definite project proposals, and so on' (Haughton, 1998: 
876). 
The capacity of such initiatives to empower communities had, however, been 
questioned by Mayo (1975: 140), who identified reasons for the failure of community 
development. First, the local groups involved could be isolated and ignored because 
they lacked `wider, less fragmented support'. Second, demands arising from these 
initiatives could be `met by shifting the problem somewhere else'. In such 
circumstances community action could `easily become divisive.. . the authorities can 
play off one group against another'. In particular, the process might favour vocal 
middle-class amenity and consumer groups and disadvantage working-class 
communities. In contrast, Haughton (1998: 876) observed that there was a widespread 
assumption that community development activities were suitable for marginalised 
communities but were `largely irrelevant to middle-class communities'. 
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2.10: Social capital 
The potential impact of community appraisals on the stock of social capital in 
a community meant that an understanding of this notion and the relevant literature was 
important. Robert Putnam's books Making Democracy Work (1993) and Bowling 
Alone (2000) combined with a series of journal articles (see, for example, Putnam, 
1995a; 1995b) inspired a substantial academic literature about social capital (see, for 
example, Foley and Edwards, 1998; Szreter, 1998; Johnston and Percy-Smith, 2003; 
Stolle, 2003). Social capital emerged as an important theoretical foundation for New 
Labour's social policy and was `used in the specification of a wide range of social 
problems that New Labour seeks to address including, most obviously, social 
exclusion' (Johnston and Percy-Smith, 2003: 322). For example, Brunsdon and May 
(2002: 63) noted that the need to rebuild social capital was seen as `a prerequisite not 
only for economic regeneration in deprived areas but also for the reconstruction of 
responsible citizenship'. 
The debate about social capital reflected concern about a decline of trust and 
an assumption that this trend in western democracies had implications for both 
economic development and political stability. The `existence and maintenance of 
social trust and networks in communities' (Stolle, 2003: 19) was thought to assist the 
achievement of important public policy objectives (Fukuyama, 1995; King and 
Wickham-Jones, 1999). Social capital had been identified `as a societal resource that 
links citizens to each other and enables them to pursue their common objectives more 
effectively. It taps the potential willingness of citizens to cooperate with each other 
and to engage in civic endeavours collectively' (Stolle, 2003: 19-20). Putnam (1993) 
used the concept of social capital to explain the relative strength of political 
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institutions in the north and south of Italy. In particular, he related `the inefficiency of 
southern institutions to the weakness of its civic culture' (Huysseune, 2003: 213). 
There was, however, `considerable disagreement about the conceptualization 
and measurement of social capital and its sources and about exactly how and why it is 
important' (Stolle, 2003: 20). In particular, there was an important distinction between 
academics who `view the source of social capital as residing mainly in the realm of 
civil society, centered chiefly on groups of voluntary associations and largely 
disconnected from the state and political institutions' (Stolle, 2003: 21) and scholars 
(see, for example Tarrow, 1996; Berman, 1997; Foley and Edwards, 1998) who 
argued `that for social capital to flourish it needs to be embedded in and linked to 
formal political institutions' (Stolle, 2003: 21). This latter group claimed that `social 
capital does not exist independently in the realm of civil society' (Stolle, 2003: 21). 
The idea that social capital was located mainly in civil society was associated 
with Putnam (1993; 1995a; 1995b), who equated social capital with the extent of 
associational involvement and participation within a community. For example, 
Putnam (1993: 167) defined social capital in terms of the `features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating co-ordinated actions'. Similarly, Giddens (2000: 78) observed 
that social capital `refers to trust networks that individuals can draw upon for social 
support'. Szreter (1998: 5) adapted this approach and emphasised the quality of 
relationships within those associations. 
Maloney et al. developed a substantial critique of the Putnam school. First, 
these scholars argued that Putnam neglected `the role played by political structures 
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and institutions in shaping the context of associational activity and hence social 
capital' (Maloney, et al., 2000: 803). In contrast, these authors suggested that political 
institutions had `a significant role, at least in helping to sustain civic vibrancy and 
probably also stimulating its growth' (Maloney, et al., 2000: 803). 
Second, Maloney et al. (2000: 803) claimed that Putnam was incorrect in 
assuming that `it is possible to read off the implications for governance from 
knowledge about associational activity and stocks of social capital in a particular 
area'. Maloney et al. (2000: 803-804) concluded that the impact of social capital on 
governance had to be evaluated in the context of the characteristics of each locality. In 
response to the criticisms, Putnam attempted to reconcile these two approaches by 
arguing that employers, individual citizens, the government, the media and voluntary 
associations should combine to increase social capital levels in the USA (Putnam, 
2000; 2002 ed. ). 
2.11: Local boundary reviews 
As Railings, et al. (2002: 7) observed, countries with 'single member electoral 
districts and/or plurality voting systems need mechanisms for boundary reviews'. This 
process was `formalised over time as the move towards universal franchise brought in 
its wake a demand that each vote should be of equal value' (Railings, et at., 2002: 7). 
It had, however, also been acknowledged that ensuring that there was an approximate 
equality in the size of the electorate in each electoral division was a `minimal goal' 
(Gelman and King, 1996,212) and that this objective was not the sole factor. In 
particular, boundary reviews were also typically required to acknowledge the 
existence of distinctive local communities. This second criteria could encompass a 
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focus on securing representation for certain specific types of elector. For example, in 
the USA, Supreme Court decisions reached in the 1960s about civil rights led 
electoral boundaries to `be drawn in such a way as to permit fair representation of 
racial minorities' (Reeve and Ware, 1992: 124). This factor facilitated the 
construction of some very strange districts, for example Reeve and Ware (1992: 124) 
noted the case of New York's seventeenth congressional district, which `had a voting 
age population of 442,000 but in places.. . is no wider than one 
block of apartment 
buildings'. 
In the USA, the allocation of boundary reviews to state legislators allowed 
politicians to implement configurations favourable to their partisan interests. As 
Gelman and King observed (1996: 212), these provisions allowed `the possibility of 
partisan gerrymandering, incumbent protection plans and other apparently insidious 
consequences'. In the UK, these effects were absent because independent boundary 
commissions undertook the process of altering political boundaries. In relation to 
local government, the main organisation was the Local Government Commission for 
England, which was established in 1992 and had responsibility for reviewing local 
government boundaries in England (Railings and Thrasher, 1997: 39). 
The non-partisan review process in England had not, however, operated to 
exclude the participation, of political parties, which were often involved in the 
consultation process and generated proposals designed to promote their electoral 
prospects. Submissions from political parties also reflected an internal bargaining 
process in which the interests of certain councillors might be marginalised or 
sacrificed in pursuit of the wider interests of the party. The attitudes of political parties 
towards local government boundary changes could also be influenced by concern 
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about the implications for parliamentary constituencies. For example, in discussing 
the Conservative response to the proposed 1976-77 changes to the wards on 
Wandsworth Council, Lucas (1990: 64) noted the importance attached to ensuring that 
Putney was not `more difficult to win as a Parliamentary constituency'. 
The review process in England, however, operated to constrain the political 
parties through factors such as the primacy given to electoral equality and the 
tendency for proposals to use existing electoral boundaries as the basis for new 
schemes. Furthermore, officers could warn the Commission about blatant attempts at 
gerrymandering, whilst the transparency of the process meant that other groups had an 
opportunity to comment on and object to proposals. As Railings et al. (2002: 172) 
observed, "it soon became clear that `biased' schemes would not be accepted and that 
any local authority or political party tempted to put one forward was wasting its time". 
Such pressures could generate a relatively apolitical process characterised by a 
substantial consensus between the political parties. The key reason lay in the attitude 
of the Commission; the more that organisation `develops a reputation for being hard 
to deceive, the fewer will be the attempts to hoodwink it' (Railings, et al., 2002: 173). 
Politicians were also involved in the boundary review process through 
participation in local authority submissions. As Railings, et al. (2002: 97) observed, 
most local authorities established working parties to formulate their submissions, 
which were often `member-based, with perhaps half a dozen councillors drawn in 
proportion to political strength and including the party leaders'. In authorities such as 
Harrow and Kennet those working parties incorporated officers, who were asked to 
formulate schemes for submission to the councillors, while in other authorities, such 
50 
as Bristol and Lincoln, the process was `purely officer driven' (Rallings, et al., 2002: 
98). 
The tension between drawing boundaries to reflect a coherent local 
community(ies) and equalising the size of the electorate in each ward or division had 
been reflected in the work of the Local Government Commission for England. The 
Commission inherited `bandings of tolerance' (Railings, et al., 2002: 47) for electoral 
equality, which meant that proposals for redistricting should be `based on variations in 
each ward of no more than plus or minus 10 per cent from the average 
councillor/elector ratio for the authority' (Guidance, 1996: para, 25), while variations 
of `plus or minus 20 per cent may be acceptable' (Guidance, 1996, para, 25). 
The Commission was also, however, obliged to take account of the `identities 
and interests of local communities' and to generate boundaries that produced local 
authorities which were `effective and convenient' (1992 Act, section 13(5)). In the 
initial stages of its deliberations the Commission decided, however, that electoral 
equality should be the prime consideration. It was asserted that the "definition of 
communities and `local' ties was.... subjective and likely to be contested, whereas 
electoral equality - notwithstanding the problems in arriving at accurate base figures - 
could be measured" (Railings, et al., 2002: 48). In practice, the focus on electoral 
equality meant that variations seldom matched the tolerance levels indicated in the 
bandings. The Periodic Reviews in the urban areas resulted in variances of 
approximately two to three percent, while in London guidance was issued that the aim 
was `perfect electoral equality, and variances above 2-3% would only be acceptable in 
exceptional circumstances' (Railings, et at., 2002: 49). 
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This emphasis on mathematical equality could be viewed, in part at least, as a 
reaction to the substantial variations in the size of wards and divisions in local 
authorities that had been changed in recent times. For example, in 1993, the year after 
the Commission was established, the largest electoral division in Hampshire, which 
had been revised in the early 1980s, was over two and a half times larger than the 
smallest, while in Northamptonshire `the largest division contained almost four times 
as many electors as the smallest' (Railings and Thrasher, 1997: 36). Despite an 
obligation to consider potential population growth, before 1992 the review process 
struggled to achieve a lasting parity in the size of wards and divisions. 
A similar focus on equalising the electorates was also identified by Rossister et 
al. (1999: 131) in relation to parliamentary constituency boundaries. Those scholars 
concluded that in the 50 years after the passage of the 1944 legislation, which 
established a regular review process, there had been a `gradual shift in emphasis away 
from the representation of communities... . and towards the equal representation of 
people'. In rural areas, the demands of electoral equality were to some extent 
mitigated through recognition of the impact of low population densities on obtaining 
`effective and convenient local government' (Railings, et al., 2002: 49), although the 
absence of empirical evaluations meant that it was impossible to assess the impact of 
this factor. 
2.12: Conclusion 
The five substantive issues addressed in this thesis have been the subject of a 
significant amount of scholarship. There were, however, notable gaps in the literature 
and there was, in particular, a need to update the research evidence in the light of the 
52 
recent local government modernisation agenda. In the case of external scrutiny and 
ward boundary reviews, the gaps in the knowledge base were broader and the 
requirement for new research substantial. 
The role(s) local councillors had been assessed by many academics and a wide 
variety of functions identified, although many of the studies were undertaken over 20 
years ago and there had been little evaluation of the role(s) of members in authorities 
with executive forms of governance. The debate about local government scrutiny was 
substantial and characterised by much scepticism about practice and some optimism 
about its potential, although much of the analysis had focused on internal evaluations 
of the relevant local authority or the NHS. Scrutiny of other external organisations had 
been relatively neglected. 
There had been substantial discussion about the renewed focus on participation 
and consultation since the election of the Labour Government in 1997. The academic 
literature was, however, still in the shadow of Arnstein's (1971) work and there had 
been a failure to address adequately some of the weaknesses with this conceptual 
framework. Scholars had also tackled community appraisals, both from practical and 
theoretical perspectives, although the literature remained small, a factor perhaps 
explained, in part at least, by the dominance urban studies has exerted over analysis of 
local governance in the UK. There was, however, recognition that community 
appraisals could promote both community development and social capital, which have 
been subjected to extensive deliberations. In particular, during the last decade there 
has been much interest in the notion of social capital, which was inspired substantially 
through Robert Putnam's work and has often involved a development and or critique 
of his theories. 
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There was a significant literature about the boundary review process, although 
much of this scholarship related to the boundaries of constituencies of members of 
national parliaments or assemblies. Apart from the work of Railings, et al. (2002), 
scholars had almost completely avoided the issue of local authority boundary reviews, 
while even those academics had not focused significantly on the impact on/attitudes of 
councillors in relation to this review process and or the impact on their activities. 
Parish meetings are used to govern some small parishes. 
Total based on a diary kept by councillors. Figures from recall data were different. 
There were no directly-elected mayors in Wales. Brighton and hove Council, despite governing over 
85,000 people, was allowed to retain the traditional committee system after a proposal for a directly- 





This chapter describes the methodology deployed to study each of the 
substantive issues assessed in the thesis: - the role(s) of councillors; external scrutiny; 
consultations; community appraisals; and local boundary reviews. The discussion 
embraces semi-structured interviews; questionnaire design; statistical data analysis; 
and techniques for persuading potential respondents to complete questionnaires. There 
is also an assessment of the utility of the case study approach, which was of particular 
relevance for the research on the role(s) of councillors and consultations because the 
analysis was restricted to one organisation: - Devon County Council. In addition, 
consideration is also given to more general people skills, which proved crucial at key 
stages of the process and were of particular use in negotiating bureaucratic politics at 
County Hall. 
3.2: The role(s) of local councillors 
The evaluation was based on a series of interviews with councillors 
undertaken between November 1999 and February 2000. The interviews ranged in 
length from 40 minutes to two and a half hours. This work initially formed part of a 
wider study of modernisation at Devon County Council and the same interviews also 
covered attitudes towards the then new executive and scrutiny system, which had been 
implemented in 1999, ahead of the Local Government Act 2000, which compelled 
local authorities in England and Wales governing more than 85,000 people to 
introduce this model. 
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The project was influenced, assisted and constrained by its dual purpose - the 
production of a research report for Devon County Council and academic material 
suitable for journal article(s) and a ultimately a PhD. The author approached the 
interviews with the status of a semi-detached insider at County Hall, having been 
based in the Policy Unit part-time for over a month before the first interview was held. 
His work benefited significantly from the obvious attachment of the Chief Executive 
to the research process and high-profile support from the Strategic Development 
Manager, who was the Head of the Policy Unit and also sat on the Management 
Board, which comprised the authority's six most senior managers. 
The status and high-profile of the initiative facilitated access to councillors and 
meant that few members even raised significant problems about the timing of the 
interviews. The one refusal to participate came from a very senior Conservative 
member who was known to have a short attention span! The high profile of the 
project within County Hall also, however, meant that far more interviews were 
undertaken than would normally be the case in such a study. The author and his 
manager were worried that if a sample were used to represent the views of councillors 
those members excluded would complain. These concerns meant that 52 out of the 54 
councillors were interviewed. The only other exclusion was a Liberal Democrat who 
had suffered a serious illness. The sample interviewed in this study, therefore, 
represented 96% of the total and was more extensive than any of the comparable 
studies, although some of the other projects surveyed more individuals because the 
authorities they appraised had more councillors. For example, Newton (1976) 
interviewed 66 out of 142 Birmingham city councillors, while Corina (1974) based the 
evaluation of Halifax councillors on survey responses from 80 out of 172 elected 
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members serving between 1945 and 1966. The high-profile of the project also, 
however, generated a pressure to meet deadlines, which primarily reflected managerial 
rather than academic timescales. The interviews had to be completed quickly, the first 
was held in late November 1999, the last in mid-February 2000. 
The interviewing was also affected by the political sensitivity of the issues. 
Concerns about sensitivity meant that each interview had to be tape recorded and 
transcribed, although one senior councilor demanded that the tape recorder be 
switched off and implied that he would only make bland non-controversial statements, 
which had little value, if his comments were subject to a sound recording. Taping 
almost every interview, however, substantially increased the workload for a very small 
quality gain. The author lacked the secretarial skills to transcribe quickly, but in the 
absence of funds to pay for professional transcribers was forced to transcribe every 
interview, over 50 hours of interview time. 
The success of the interview process depended substantially on the 
development of strong communication skills. It was essential to use charm to establish 
a rapport with the interviewee, make them feel comfortable and allow them 
considerable scope to answer the questions in the manner they desired. It was also, 
however, necessary to ask each member every question and not avoid asking some 
members questions that might provoke hostile and critical body language and or 
comments, such reactions were rare but occurred occasionally. The key skill was the 
capacity to draw the maximum number of councillors into making candid and 
interesting comments. Some people came with an agenda, while others were naturally 
communicative, such people would have given good copy to almost any interviewer. 
In contrast, two groups of councillors were uncommunicative and added little to the 
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process. First, some councillors with little influence or evident abilities were unable to 
add significant insights. Second, a few senior members were instinctively cautious and 
would approach any interviewer in the same manner a senior politician would handle 
a Humphreys or Paxman. In most cases, however, the amount and quality of their 
answers depended on the atmosphere of the occasion and the rapport between 
interviewer and interviewee. 
The process necessitated the tactful handling of some eccentric and or difficult 
individuals. In general, councillors required a sceptical respect, whilst suggesting a 
mild empathy with their agenda. It was also crucial not to make enemies because these 
interviews occurred at the start of a two-year programme and antagonism from any 
important politician might have led to significant problems with the subsequent 
projects. 
The interviews followed a semi-structured format. Although care was taken to 
ensure that everybody supplied answers to several key questions, members were 
allowed a considerable degree of autonomy in relation to their response. For example, 
one member demanded, and was granted, the right to answer the questions about his 
role before those on the modernisation agenda, an inversion of the standard format. 
Similarly, a colleague was allowed to ramble through long and irrelevant anecdotes 
because his was the only interview on that afternoon and it was felt that such an 
approach would increase the value of the data. 
The discussions covered the following themes, which were identified through 
a study of the relevant literature: 
" Representation of their division or sub-division of the county. 
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" Representation of a section(s) of their local community(ies). 
" Representation of voluntary groups. 
" Representation of other local authorities. 
" Representation of individuals through casework. 
" Impact of loyalty towards the party group. 
" Policy interests. 
" Relative importance of policy-making and representation. 
" Time spent on council work. 
The objective was to evaluate the literature in the light of the modernisation 
agenda and discuss the changing role(s) of the councillor. The study benefited from 
the lack of many similar studies in recent times and was the first assessment of the 
role(s) of councillors in an authority with an executive and scrutiny political 
management structure. Care was taken to ensure that evidence could be deployed to 
classify each respondent in relation to several issues. For example, councillors were 
grouped in terms of whether they focused on representation, policy or both. Similarly, 
respondents were assessed in relation to whether they tried to constrain or encourage 
their ombudsman workload. 
3.3: External scrutiny 
The analysis concerned the role of local authorities in scrutinising the activities 
of external organisations. It drew on the author's expertise in local government 
research and, in particular, the evaluation of scrutiny arrangements at Devon County 
Council in the first few months after the executive and scrutiny model was established 
(Cole, 2001 a). In this thesis, the term `scrutiny' has been preferred to `overview' with 
regard to evaluations of external organisations despite the definition adopted by 
Wilson and Game (2006). This approach reflected two considerations. First, many 
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scholars did not apply such a rigid distinction (see Cole 2001a; Stoker et al., 2002). 
Second, the term scrutiny had a greater resonance with the prospective respondents; in 
contrast the concept of overview was not used in some local authorities, might have 
confused some potential respondents and thus lowered the response rate. 
The first stage of the project involved a scoping study of the external scrutiny 
undertaken by county councils, district councils, unitary authorities, London boroughs, 
metropolitan boroughs and the Isles of Scilly Council. The survey covered top and 
second-tier authorities in England, Scotland and Wales; a total of 441 councils. First, 
each respondent was asked to specify whether the `scrutiny side' of the authority had 
completed an inquiry into an external organisation between 1st January 2003 and 31st 
December 2004. Quangos, other local authorities; voluntary and community bodies; 
privatised utilities; private companies; professional associations; national government; 
and regional government were all incorporated within the definition of an `external 
organisation'. 
Second, respondents was asked whether their authority had a scrutiny 
committee dedicated completely to external scrutiny; health scrutiny committees were 
specifically excluded to avoid duplication with a contemporary research project 
funded by the Centre for Public Scrutiny and directed from the University of 
Manchester. Third, the questionnaire sought information about the external scrutinies 
finished in 2003 and 2004. The information requested covered the theme of the 
inquiry; the committee undertaking the inquiry; the organization(s) scrutinised; the 
name of the committee chair; and which party(ies) controlled the authority during the 
course of the inquiry. 
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The questionnaires were emailed to a relevant officer in member/democratic 
services in December 2004. Email addresses were acquired form websites and The 
Municipal Yearbook 2005. Officers were invited to respond either via email or by 
post to the LGC Elections Centre freepost address. Non-respondents received several 
follow-up emails, one of which was sent by the Centre for Public Scrutiny through 
their newsletter. In spring 2005,80 local authorities received at least one telephone 
call from the author. After a slow start, by mid-January only 26% had been returned, 
the response rate soared to an impressive 90% by the end of this phase of the project 
in July 2005. The decision to finish the audit at this stage reflected the conclusion that 
it had reached a natural end and that attempts to obtain more returns might generate 
open hostility and perhaps jeopardise future relations with some councils. Four 
authorities (Broxbourne, Harlow, Mole Valley and Selby) replied but refused to 
complete a return. 
Overall, the process was relatively straightforward. The questionnaire was 
succinct and the only substantive problem concerned producing a definition of 
external scrutiny that incorporated all the intended organisations. The most skilful task 
was telephoning the authorities that had not replied in respect of all their inquiries and 
persuading a relevant officer that the survey was important and should be completed. 
An approach that combined tact, sensitivity and charm with the phrase `major national 
survey' was usually sufficient, although inevitably a few people were difficult or 
charming but ineffective. Failures were, however, occasional and overshadowed by 
triumphs elsewhere. For example, a telephone call to Carlisle generated a reply despite 
the contemporary flooding crisis in the city, which was imposing a substantial 
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additional workload on the scrutiny officer. In total, the scoping study identified 381 
inquiries about external organisations. 
In March 2005, a second questionnaire was dispatched to the committee chair 
of each external inquiry identified in the scoping exercise asking them to evaluate 
their study. The questionnaire incorporated questions grouped into six main areas: the 
decision to undertake the inquiry; support for scrutiny; the attitude of the scrutinised 
agency; the scrutiny process; scrutiny and the media; and the impact of the inquiry. 
One questionnaire was sent in relation to each inquiry, each mailing specified which 
organisation(s) had been scrutinised. Where more than one external agency had been 
assessed, the authority was asked to select one of those bodies and use the experience 
of scrutinising that organisation to answer the questions. 
This phase of the project used a print questionnaire and the postal service; it 
was thought that sending an electronic copy of such a complex document to 
politicians would have generated an insufficient level of response. Similarly, 
questionnaires were not dispatched during the local and general election campaigns 
for the same reason. Late respondents to the scoping study were sent second stage 
questionnaires between May and July 2005. 
The response to the initial request was, however, disappointing. By mid-July 
2005 only 70 completed replies had been received. A follow-up copy of the 
questionnaire sent via email in late September and early October 2005 raised the 
response level to 100; the exercise was repeated in November and by the end of the 
year the total had climbed to 140. In early January, a print questionnaire was 
dispatched to officers in democratic/member services in the 103 local authorities that 
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had failed to provide a completed response for all their inquiries. It was thought that 
politicians who had ignored three requests were unlikely to reply. This trawl increased 
the total to 185 returns. Another email in late March and early April to officers in the 
remaining 73 authorities that had not supplied a comprehensive return raised the 
number of completed responses to 220. Subsequent chase-up emails to May 2006 (51 
local authorities) and November/December 2006 (45 local authorities) generated a 
final total of 238 relevant responses. 
Replies to the second questionnaire led to the removal of 11 of the inquiries in 
the scoping study from the analysis. Some had not been completed or concerned 
organisations that were not genuinely external; others related to agencies as witnesses 
not subjects; while the relevant local authority claimed to be unable to identify a few. 
The responses also revealed that many of the questionnaires concerned inquiries 
finished outside the specified time-period, typically ending in 2005. It was, however, 
decided to retain these examples in the study. The time limit was intended as a guide 
to ensure that the analysis concerned recent inquiries and to reduce non-response due 
to the scope of the request and the difficulty of identifying earlier inquiries. The 
substantial loss of data involved in adhering rigidly to the time-period was not viewed 
as worthwhile. 
The data collection was concluded in February 2007 and the quantitative data 
was entered into two SPSS files, each relating to one stage of the project. The 
information in both files was also linked to authority type; the subject of the inquiry; 
the authority's political management arrangements; and political control of the 
authority. Once the data had been inputted and checked a statistical analysis was 
undertaken. The first stage involved the calculation of frequencies in relation to each 
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issue. The analysis was then deepened through the identification of cross-tabulations 
in relation to a range of issues. 
3.4: Consultations 
This study formed the second part of the analysis of the impact of the 
modernisation agenda at Devon County Council. The project started in September 
2000 and the research report was submitted to the council in April 2001. The initial 
idea was to send a questionnaire to every manager that had undertaken a consultation 
on behalf of the authority and was constructed on the naive assumption that a list of 
such people existed. The author was assured that sufficient information was held by 
Policy Unit research staff to make such a strategy feasible. Unfortunately, nobody at 
the centre had realised that few officers bothered to comply with policy and register 
their consultations with County Hall. The list of consultations held in the Policy Unit 
was, therefore, very short and identified few of the relevant people. Such problems 
were exacerbated by the imprecise notion of `consultation'; people were uncertain 
about whether their activity should be incorporated in the list or this study. The lack 
of information held at the corporate centre raised fundamental issues about the 
capacity of senior managers to implement the modernisation agenda and served as a 
warning to scholars. Studies that attempt to obtain information about the activities of 
middle and junior management by sending a letter or questionnaire to the corporate 
centre are likely to generate partial and or inaccurate results. 
The lack of an accurate and extensive list of officers that had undertaken a 
consultation meant that the study was forced to send the questionnaire to 600 officers, 
whose details appeared on a more general list of managers constructed for training 
64 
purposes. The process produced information about 85 consultations submitted by 81 
officers, a substantial improvement on the 30 consultations recorded in the research 
section's allegedly definitive list. The wide scope of mailing list meant, however, that 
it was impossible to identify a meaningful response rate, thus the focus of the research 
was shifted towards interviews. Forty-four officers responding to the questionnaire 
were questioned about the consultation(s) they oversaw. Conclusions were based on 
this interview data and supplemented with evidence from the relevant questionnaire 
returns. ' 
The choice of managers rather than consultees reflected the requirement to 
obtain subjects capable of supplying information about the process and evaluate the 
outcome(s). Interviewees were selected to represent a cross-section of areas of 
responsibility, gender and type of consultation. The survey was restricted to local 
authority projects and excluded community-generated initiatives such as petitions. The 
sample of selected consultations, however, incorporated a wide range of methods 
including customer surveys, staff surveys, public meetings, exhibitions and displays, 
private discussions with partners/interest groups or stakeholders, one-to-one 
interviews, complaints systems, satisfaction surveys, consultation documents, focus 
groups and long-term advisory groups. All of these activities encouraged 
`participation in local affairs beyond the traditional processes of political engagement' 
(Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker, 2001 a: 207). There was, however, no evidence of 
some of the most innovative techniques identified by Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker 
(2001 a: 207). For example, none of these consultations used an interactive website2 or 
a citizens' panel. 
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Each manager had a detailed knowledge of the procedures used and the 
outcome(s) of the consultation(s) they discussed. Fifty-one consultations that had been 
held between 1997 and early 2001 were incorporated into the analysis. This evidence 
was supplemented by the study of documentation from the local authority. The survey 
covered consultations on a wide range of topics including the historic environment 
strategy, the transport plan, the structure plan, skips, the special educational needs 
plan, library use, foster care, the economic development plan, residents' parking, the 
Barnstaple Western By-Pass, a IT helpline, registration and inspection of care homes, 
respite care, staff attitudes towards IT, Devon Youth Council and an Area of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty (ANOB). 
The interviews were held in the winter and early spring of 2001. It was decided 
to rely on written notes rather than take sound recordings and transcribe them. The 
relatively short length of most interviews combined with often extensive 
supplementary material from the questionnaire and other documentation meant that 
the substantial effort in transcribing the text could not be justified. This decision was 
also influenced by the need to generate a first draft of the research report within a 
couple of weeks of the final interview 
These interviews were shorter than those held with councillors and seldom 
lasted beyond 30 minutes. There was also less need for tact and diplomacy because 
the issues discussed seldom had the capacity to generate tension between the 
interviewer and the interviewee. The lower profile of most officers, compared to most 
councillors, also meant that the author was seldom able to obtain insights into the 
actions and personality of prospective interviewees prior to meeting them. The 
interview programme benefited, however, from the disaffection of some interviewees 
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from senior management and or politicians and their willingness to criticise important 
aspects of the process. The existence of personal agendas and bureaucratic alliances or 
grudges between the interviewees and other officers and or politicians was a potential 
concern because such considerations might have affected the answers. This factor was 
not, however, a major problem. First, competent interviewing, in particular asking 
several similar but slightly different questions, can encourage the interviewee to refer 
to such agendas and or office politics. Second, interviewees were promised that 
sensitive comments would not be linked to a specific project unless they consented. 
The interviews had a semi-structured format and encompassed the following 
issues: 
" Relationship with consultees. 
" Methodological expertise. 
" Co-ordination and the corporate centre. 
" Results and their impact. 
The interview agenda was constructed from studying the academic literature, 
reading the questionnaire returns and knowledge about the bureaucratic and corporate 
structure of the authority. 
3.5: Community appraisals 
This evaluation comprised the third and final part of the study of the impact of 
the modernisation agenda on Devon County Council. The research focused on the 
community appraisal process, which was supported through the Community Council 
of Devon and sought to identify opinions about public service provision in a range of 
primarily rural communities. 
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Initial support was supplied through the Community Council of Devon, which 
supplied the full text of a wide range of community appraisal reports on their website. 
Assistance was also given by Sarah Taragon, an employee of the Community Council, 
who had completed a dissertation on the appraisal process in 1996 as part of a masters 
degree at the University of Exeter. A copy of the dissertation and the relevant 
questionnaire was supplied and provided an important starting point for the project. In 
return, the author agreed not to write to the communities that had participated in this 
study on the basis that they had already contributed to an evaluation of their appraisal 
and might not welcome a request to repeat the exercise. In any case, incorporating 
these areas in the study would have threatened the response rate because the 
significant time lapse and resistance to duplicating the original return might have 
meant that few of them would have responded. 
Sarah Taragon's questionnaire was used as the basis for the first phase of the 
project. However, whereas her questionnaire asked communities to specify the 
progress that had been made in implementing recommendations, this evaluation 
decided to ask about the progress made in meeting the concerns raised in the appraisal 
process. This approach ensured that the analysis was concentrated on responses from 
the wider community. Focusing on the recommendations would have made the project 
an evaluation of the extent to which the agenda of the appraisal steering group was 
implemented. This strategy also ensured that each question covered a significant issue. 
Focusing on recommendations would have meant that many questions would have 
asked whether the authorities had been informed about opinions or problems, not 
whether they had responded to reflect concerns voiced by the community. 
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Each questionnaire was constructed on the basis of the relevant appraisal 
report. This approach caused difficulties for comparing appraisals. A standard format 
would have facilitated comparisons; however there were two substantial problems 
with this strategy. First, a standard format would have ignored the distinctive local 
identity of each exercise. Second, there was a significant risk that splitting the 
structure of the questionnaire from that of the appraisal report would have confused 
the respondents and diminished the volume and accuracy of the responses. The main 
section of the questionnaire asked whether concerns raised in each category of the 
report had been met in full; met in part; investigated but not met; or whether no action 
had been taken. Respondents were also invited to specify what had occurred in 
relation to each of these topics, to indicate which of a selection of statements 
described the outcome of the appraisal and evaluate the extent to which the process 
had been successful. The questionnaire also asked whether the process had obtained 
views from all sections of the community. 
The questionnaires were sent with a covering letter, a pre-paid envelope and 
notes on the interpretation of some of the terms to the clerks of the relevant parish or 
town councils. The clerks were instructed to send the details to a local resident 
capable of answering the questions. In some communities, the forms were completed 
at a meeting of the parish council. In one case, these documents were sent to the chair 
of the relevant steering group because neither the Community Council of Devon nor 
Devon County Council was able to supply the name and address of the clerk. 
Elsewhere it was, however, decided not to approach the steering group chair direct 
because many steering groups had disbanded and some chairs had moved away from 
the locality. The questionnaires were sent to 58 communities in Devon that had 
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experienced an appraisal between 1996 and 2001. Although the notion of `rural' is 
almost impossible to define, the vast majority of the Devon communities participating 
in the appraisal process would be normally considered as rural. The study did, 
however, incorporate some urban communities such as Totnes, Sunnningmead and 
Whiddon Valley. 
The initial mailing occurred in January 2001; and throughout the first nine 
months of the year questionnaires were dispatched to non-respondents. Letters, emails 
and phone calls were also directed to the clerk and other key individuals throughout 
the summer and autumn of 2001. Several responses were delayed by the outbreak of 
Foot and Mouth, which meant that some parish councils did not meet for many 
months. Forty-six questionnaires were returned by the end of the project in mid- 
October; a response rate of 79%. 
The questionnaire evidence was supplemented by ten focus groups/interviews 
with representatives from the appraisal steering groups, which were held between late 
June and early September 2001. The communities were selected to cover a cross- 
section of examples both in terms of geographic spread and type of settlement, 
although East Devon was not represented because its appraisals had, in general, 
occurred before 1996. This sample incorporated one market town (Totnes), a fast- 
growing commuter settlement (Exminster), a small town (Moretonharnpstead) and 
seven villages (Westleigh, Willand, Instow, Horrabridge, Comworthy, Bradworthy 
and Tedburn St Mary). The discussions at Exminster and Instow took the form of a 
one-to-one interview, while at Bradworthy two local activists participated. Elsewhere, 
the debate involved at least three appraisal participants. 
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The interview process required the author to establish a good rapport and 
empathy with the participants, however this objective was relatively easy to achieve. 
Most interviewees had a substantial commitment to the appraisals and discussed them 
with enthusiasm. Conducting group discussions was, however, more challenging than 
holding one-to-one interviews because of the requirement to hold the attention of all 
the participants for, at least, most of time. It was also necessary to obtain a 
contribution from everyone with the capacity to advance the discussion rather than 
merely those with the loudest voices and most forceful personalities. There were also 
small difficulties such as the dog at Tedburn St Mary and the proud owner who was 
unable to accept hints, through body language, that when conducting a discussion with 
six or seven people an interviewer does not want to contend with a dog attempting to 
overturn the briefcase, which, in the absence of a table, the notes of the discussion 
were balanced on! 
The Tedburn St Mary discussion, which was staged at the home of one of the 
appraisal organisers, raised the issue of location. Holding appraisals in the house of an 
interviewee is often combined with problem-free and successful deliberations (Totnes, 
Willand, Westleigh, Instow and Bradworthy). There is, however, an inevitable 
reduction of the capacity of the researcher to guide the discussion because s/he has the 
de facto status of a guest. The ideal location for a discussion is a town or community 
hall (Mortonhampstead and Exminster) -a neutral location without distractions. Other 
venues such as a meeting room in a pub (Horrabridge) can also be effective; however 
staging the discussion in a social and noisy environment such as a bar (Comworthy) is 
not ideal. The absence of local knowledge and dependence on the goodwill of the 
interviewees means that a researcher can usually exert little influence over such 
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venues. Apart from Bradworthy (which lasted about 45 minutes) the length ranged 
from between 1 hour and 30 minutes to 3 hours, although the longer sessions, such as 
that at Totnes, often benefited from a mid-session interval. 
The interviews used a semi-structured format and covered the following 
issues: 
" Subsequent progress in addressing the specific concerns raised in the appraisal 
report. 
" Subsequent development of the community and the link to the appraisal 
process. 
" Impact of the appraisal process on relations with the external agencies. 
3.6: Local boundary reviews 
The research considered changes to divisional and ward boundaries and the 
impact on local councillors. It drew on the resources and research agenda of the LGC 
Local Elections Centre, which had already undertaken a major study of electoral 
redistricting in English local government (Railings et al., 2002). The key element of 
the analysis was a questionnaire, which was sent to councillors affected by changes to 
their wards or divisions. The evaluation covered the decision to review local 
boundaries; community issues; the process of change; the impact on electioneering; 
and how the changes affected their work as a councillor. In addition, respondents were 
also asked to supply personal information about gender, age, occupation, educational 
qualifications, the length of time served as a councillor; and ethnicity. 
The questionnaire was dispatched to 2965 councillors who had experienced a 
change to their ward or divisional boundaries. The study incorporated councillors for 
county councils, unitary authorities, metropolitan boroughs and London boroughs and 
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was restricted to England. The list represented a sample from the LGC Elections 
Centre's database that incorporated over 12,000 names and had been used for the 
Centre's previous study of electoral redistricting in English local government 
(Railings, et al., 2002). The decision to use a sample rather than the entire database 
reflected cost and time constraints. 
The study used a print questionnaire accompanied with a covering letter and a 
pre-paid envelope. Print was preferred over an email attachment because a judgment 
was made that an electronic version of such a complex questionnaire would generate 
few replies. A 24th March 2006 deadline was specified in order to ensure that a large 
number of responses were obtained before the start of the local election campaign. 
By the deadline over 800 replies had been acquired, returns trickled in 
throughout the summer. It became apparent that some ex-councillors had been 
incorporated in the study and that those individuals seldom replied. In late May, with a 
response level of 920 questionnaires or 31 %, it was, therefore, decided that the 
credibility of the study would be strengthened by removing questionnaires sent to the 
115 individuals who were not sitting councillors in mid-March from the analysis. 
Evidence was obtained from local authority correspondence and the web, The main 
source was, however, The Municipal Yearbook 2006. The list of councillors was 
compared with the mailing list and names not listed in the book deleted. The 
methodology was imperfect because the list in the Municipal Yearbook 2006 was 
published in November 2005 and compiled in late summer or early autumn 2005. The 
use of that data, therefore, probably meant that a few people who had ceased to be 
councillors between autumn 2005 and spring 2006 were retained in the analysis. 
However, it was likely that the number of such ex-councillors was low because most 
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politicians depart at election time rather than resign or die mid-term. Data from 
Railings and Thrasher's regular analysis of by-elections supports this assumption by 
showing that the number of local authority by-elections is quite low in relation to the 
total number of councillors (see Cole and Jones, 2007). 
The next stage of the project involved the codification of the questionnaire 
data and its input onto a SPSS spreadsheet. The quantitative answers were codified 
primarily between late-April and mid-June 2006. The qualitative answers were 
subjected to the same process in autumn 2006. This latter exercise added little 
quantitative data because comments in few of those sections were capable of being 
quantified to generate useful evidence, although qualitative responses were coded to 
strengthen the data obtained in response to question seven, which asked councillors to 
specify how they expressed an opinion about changes to their ward or divisional 
boundaries. 
From mid-October to mid-December 2006 a succession of emails was sent to 
non-respondents with an identifiable and functioning email address. This 
correspondence incorporated an electronic copy of the questionnaire and a request to 
respond. Such persistence generated another 85 responses, increasing the number of 
returns from 957 to 1042 or from approximately 34% to approximately 37%. There 
were no hostile or angry replies although the response rate on each email was very 
low; in the one to five percent range. Whilst valuable, the email follow-up was time 
consuming and also emphasised the problems of electronic communication with 
councillors. The experience of this thesis suggests that while sending questionnaires 
through email attachment is a sensible strategy in relation to local authority officers, in 
general councillors are best surveyed through more traditional methods and emails 
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should only be deployed in a follow-up capacity when resource constraints will not 
allow another postal questionnaire. 
The final work on codifying the data was undertaken in winter 2006/2007 and 
involved checking the accuracy of the entries, inputting data from the later responses 
and filling gaps that had been left empty in the initial process, primarily as a 
consequence of typing errors. A complete data set was compiled in March 2007 and 
the data evaluated using a range of univariate and bivariate methods. 
3.7: Case studies 
This analysis has made a substantial use of case studies. The term `case study' 
is fraught with difficulties and there is no consensus on a precise definition (see 
Lijphart, 1971; Platt, 1988; Yin 1994). However, a useful working definition can be 
constructed around the notion that this concept relates to `the idea of having cases as 
the building blocks for data collection and analysis' (Burton, 2000: 215). Many 
scholars have regarded case studies as `an inferior method of inquiry, being of little 
use and of minimal significance, since they allowed very little quantification and no 
generalisations' (Sarantakos, 1997: 192). The key criticism concerned the issue of 
representativeness and the `extent to which the research findings can be generalised to 
a wider population beyond the case study' (Burton, 2000: 224). Evidence from 
multiple-case studies was, therefore, regarded as `more compelling and more robust' 
(Burton, 2000: 224). In this thesis, such criticisms are handled through the selection of 
an authority likely to generate findings with a widespread application. 
Case studies have been advocated as "the preferred strategy when `how' or 
`why' questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events 
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and when this focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real life context" 
(Yin, 1994: 1). Descriptive case studies can be deployed if there is little published 
research on the topic. If there is a substantial literature on the subject, selective case 
studies can be used to focus on particular aspects and enrich knowledge (see Hakim, 
1992; Burton, 2000). 
The selection of a Devon setting for three of the five sections of the thesis and 
the exclusive focus on the County Council for two of them arose directly from the 
two-year research project funded by Devon County Council. The focus on Devon can 
be, however, justified in terms of a number of factors. First, the evaluations of the 
role(s) of councillors and the consultation agenda were conducted within the context 
of the local government modernisation agenda and were, therefore, best evaluated 
through an authority such as Devon County Council, which had embraced key aspects 
of that agenda with enthusiasm (Cole, 2001a). Second, the county covered a 
substantial geographic area, had a population of about two thirds of a million and 
possessed an interesting mixture of urban, suburban and rural areas, although the loss 
of Plymouth and Torbay in 1998 had reduced the urban influence. Third, this selection 
helped to counteract the urban and suburban focus of much of the academic literature 
on British local governance (see Newton, 1976; Alexander, 1985; Hill, 1994). 
3.8: Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the work undertaken for this thesis has used a 
variety of methods, which included an extensive deployment of both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. The study illustrates a wide range of difficulties, which 
included the challenge of creating two substantial datasets within a specified 
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timescale; designing questionnaires that were both user-friendly and would generate 
sufficient and useful data; and persuading non-respondents to return the 
questionnaire(s) that had been sent to them. This project involved a range of 
competencies from technical expertise to people skills, which usually meant 
combining assertiveness with much charm and tact. The achievements of this thesis 
reflect success in deploying this wide mix of techniques. 
Questionnaire responses from the interviewees. 
Innovative at that time. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ROLE(S) OF LOCAL COUNCILLORS 
4.1: Introduction 
This analysis evaluates the role(s) undertaken by Devon county councillors. 
The chapter incorporates representation of their division or wider sub-area of the 
county; voluntary organisations; specific sections of the community; district, town and 
parish authorities; and individual constituents in relation to their personal problems 
(Ombudsman role). The evaluation also covers the impact of their party group; their 
interest in policy matters; the balance between representation and policy; and the time 
they devoted to their activities as a councillor. These issues are linked to the themes of 
democracy, accountability and the local government modernisation agenda. 
4.2: Divisional representation 
Councillors were asked about their role in representing their electoral division. 
In particular, the questioning considered whether members had a role in defending 
controversial county policies in their division or whether they would just explain those 
decisions and the legal and external constraints on the authority's action. Similarly, 
interviewees were also asked whether they had a strong focus on the impact of policy 
across the whole county. The results are outlined in table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Electoral division representation 











Liberal Democrat 26 92.9 '2 7.1 26 92.9 
Conservative 3 21.4 11 78.6 12 85.7 
Labour 1 25.0 3 75.0 4 100.0 
Non-Aligned 3 50.0 3 50.0 4 66.7 
Total 33 63.5 19 36.5 46 88.5 
Some councillors had a strong divisional focus. For example, an Independent 
member observed that obtaining resources from Devon County Council for his 
electoral division was `the most important role of a councillor'. Similarly, a Liberal 
Democrat commented that obtaining resources for his division was a `crucial' aspect 
of a councillor's job. A Conservative stressed the importance of representing his 
division and commented that he could not recall an example of a Devon-wide agenda 
`where he felt sufficiently strongly' to support county interests against those of his 
electoral division. An Independent from East Devon also had a strong focus on local 
representation and commented that she could not `get any closer to the people I 
represent without causing a scandal...... I could only get into bed with them to get any 
closer'. In contrast, a Liberal Democrat said he did not have a role in winning 
resources for his relatively prosperous division. This member fought for education and 
campaigned for resources for specific schools that required extra funds regardless of 
where they were situated. 
Many councillors spoke about campaigns they had waged on behalf of the 
broad interests of their electoral division. For example, a Conservative member 
discussed his support for the construction of a Sidford relief road, while a Liberal 
Democrat mentioned her activities in campaigning against the possible closure of the 
Exeter to Barnstaple rail link, which served her division. A Conservative from south 
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Devon discussed his opposition to the Western Valley road scheme that would have 
meant damaging a unique valley, while a Liberal Democrat from the north of county 
recalled his participation in a lobby against the construction of a primary school on a 
flight path. Another Liberal Democrat reported her actions to combat a perceived 
neglected of one west Devon town in favour of a near neighbour. Similarly, a 
councillor from the north of the county alleged that his division had been 
`undervalued by Devon County Council for 100 years'. One senior Liberal Democrat 
commented that initially he focused on his division and only acquired a genuine 
understanding of the Devon-wide context when the Liberal Democrats formed an 
administration. 
In general, however, there was little evidence to suggest that a significant 
number of councillors ignored the countywide perspective. These results implied that 
there was a stronger dual focus on the division and the whole authority than some 
other surveys had concluded (see Newton, 1976), although these findings were closer 
to those obtained by Budge et al. (1972). Almost 90% of the interviewees 
acknowledged a strong attachment to the whole county (see table 4.1). Some members 
took pride in their wider perspective and drew a favourable comparison with district 
councillors, who were viewed as `parochial'. One Liberal Democrat criticised 
colleagues who focused excessively on their division for being `upgraded parish 
councillors'. There was also evidence that members acquired a loyalty towards the 
council. A Liberal Democrat spoke about how she had acquired `maternal feelings' 
towards the authority. A senior Liberal Democrat observed that councillors `have to 
be reasonable and understand that your priorities are not always the highest in the 
county'. In contrast, another Liberal Democrat warned against the seductive impact of 
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County Hall and argued that councillors could become too close to the political 
establishment and neglect the interests of their electorate. 
Although concern with the interests of Devon was widespread there was, 
however, a distinction between those councillors willing to defend unpopular County 
Council policies in their division and those restricting this role to explaining policies 
and outlining the external constraints. Attitudes towards this aspect of their role 
divided most members along party lines. For example, a Liberal Democrat recalled 
that he supported the council over its unpopular decision to close the rural skips. In 
contrast, a Conservative commented that he would support his division rather than the 
County Council `unless their case was daft'. 
The response of some councillors could not, however, have been predicted 
through knowledge of their party affiliation. Two Liberal Democrats expressed a 
pronounced reluctance to defend unpopular County Council policies. In contrast, some 
opposition members acknowledged that they had defended unpopular policies of the 
Liberal Democrat county administration. For example, a Conservative from Ivybridge 
recalled that he had supported the authority's decision to reduce the number of 
teachers at Shaugh Prior primary school. There was also substantial evidence to 
support the view that councillors had a strong loyalty to a sub-area wider than their 
division (see Leach et al., 1986). In particular, many opposition councillors suggested 
that the Liberal Democrat administration was directing resources disproportionately 
towards its heartlands in the north and west of the county. For example, an 
Independent who placed considerable emphasis on representing his/her division 
argued that `they are all as parochial as I am'. These allegations were re-enforced by 
responses from some Liberal Democrats. These members argued that the 
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disproportionate allocation of funds to those areas was justified by social and 
economic deprivation and historic neglect by Conservative administrations. 
A senior Liberal Democrat challenged the view that the geographic 
distribution of funds was determined by need. This member claimed that a recent 
committee chair had channelled a disproportionate amount of funding towards his 
division. He noted that members with service responsibilities could spend more 
money in their division because they had a detailed knowledge of `need' in their 
locality. In contrast, another senior Liberal Democrat asserted that the sole advantage, 
as a local representative, obtained by a senior councillor lay in the speed of the 
decision. Senior councillors from the majority group usually received quicker replies 
from officers than other members. This conclusion was supported by an executive 
member, who said that senior councillors from the ruling group had better access and 
obtained results faster than other members. For example, he observed that when a wall 
in his division collapsed he was able to persuade a senior officer to sanction a loan to 
pay for the damage quickly. 
Most opposition councillors adopted a more overt and robust attitude towards 
campaigning for divisional resources. Similarly, there was evidence that Labour 
members had acquired the role of lobbyists for Exeter. For example, one Labour 
councillor from the city claimed that resources were being diverted from Exeter to 
subsidise rural areas. In contrast, a Liberal Democrat councillor from the city 
commented that he had `no sympathy with the view that the city doesn't have 
sufficient resources'. 
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Some members discussed the problems of balancing interests within their 
division; the Conservative member for Dartmouth mentioned the difficulties he faced 
representing a town with a distinct geographic and social division. A Liberal 
Democrat councillor commented that he focused on the larger villages in his division 
and admitted that this choice reflected, in part at least, electoral considerations. 
Similarly, a Conservative who represented a village and part of a major town 
discussed his role in balancing the interests of town residents that wanted a by-pass 
and the residents of the village who campaigned to stop the road being constructed 
through their valley. He tried to reconcile these differences by arguing that an existing 
road should be upgraded rather than a new one built. This solution was, however, 
rejected by the Environment Directorate because the cost was estimated at £300,000 
higher. He then supported a new road and argued his case locally. Similarly, a Liberal 
Democrat from south Devon mentioned his role in balancing the quarrying and anti- 
quarrying perspective, while a Liberal Democrat colleague backed the creation of a 
local park and ride scheme despite NIMBY type opposition. 
Other interviewees raised the problems of balancing vocal and often small 
lobbies against wider interests. For example, a Labour councillor from Exeter recalled 
his support for traffic calming measures on a council estate despite the presence of a 
small local opposition. Councillors had also been obliged to place opinion in their 
division ahead of personal views. For example, one Conservative supported the 
provision of an incinerator in a village, but the strength of local opposition obliged 
him to present the strength of opinion to the council. He commented that `there was a 
surge of opinion that it was wrong, so I had to go along with it. 
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This analysis suggested a strong focus on the notion of the democratic 
representation of a small locality. In terms of Newton's (1976) distinction between 
delegates, trustees and politicos, Devon county councillors tended towards the 
delegate orientation. There was little evidence to imply that any councillor could be 
termed a `trustee'. The idea that councillors were elected to represent their personal 
opinions almost irrespective of ward/divisional interests did not reflect the behaviour 
of county councillors in Devon. There was, however, an important tension between 
the democratic representation of their locality and a wider county interest. The 
strength of allegiance to countywide interests meant, however, that the use of the term 
`delegate' in relation to divisional representation was misleading in the Devon 
context. This conclusion also implied that the downward accountability of most 
councillors to grassroots concerns was ameliorated through a wider accountability to 
the whole county. 
The concern to balance the democratic representation of divisional and county 
interests also suggested that the government's view, expressed as part of its local 
government modernisation agenda, that councillors should emphasise `bringing the 
views of their community to bear on the council's decision' (DETR, 1998: 25) was 
only partly reflected in the attitudes of councillors in Devon. There was no evidence to 
suggest that the introduction of the executive and scrutiny reforms had altered 
members' attitudes towards representing their division or the balance between 
divisional and county interests. In this respect, at least, the modernisation agenda had 
not affected the character of local democratic representation and the downward 
accountability of councillors. 
84 
Opponents of the changes, however, asserted that the abolition of the service 
committees had reduced their ability to represent their divisions because they were no 
longer able to place local problems directly onto the agenda of a decision-making 
committee! Similarly, the initial restriction of confidential information to Liberal 
Democrats denied some councillors information about important decisions affecting 
their division, thus weakening downward accountability. For example, the Labour 
Group Leader was initially denied access to information about plans to sell county- 
owned land in her Exeter division (Cole, 2001a: 29). It should, however, also be noted 
that this research was conducted when the new political management system had been 
in place for six to nine months and before many other local authorities had introduced 
similar changes. 
4.3: Voluntary bodies 
Responses were analysed in terms of a modified version of Newton's (1976) 
classification system. The notions of resistors and facilitators were retained but the 
`neutrals' category was dropped in favour of `occasional facilitator', which 
incorporated those members who acknowledged an occasional role in representing 
voluntary groups. This change reflected the problem of categorising members who 
had assisted a few voluntary groups as `neutral'. The idea of them being occasional 
facilitators was a better reflection of the approach of these members. The interviews 
were also used to identify councillors having a deeper participatory role in local 
voluntary bodies. The results are outlined in table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 Attitudes towards voluntary groups 















Liberal Democrat 24 85.7 4 14.3 0 0.0 11 39.3 
Conservative 9 64.3 3 21.4 2 14.3 4 28.6 
Labour 4 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 75.0 
Non-Aligned 5 83.3 1 16.7 0 
' 
0.0 3 50.0 
Total 42 80.8 8 
__ f -15.4 2 TT 3.8 21 1 40.4 
The survey indicated that most councillors possessed a positive attitude towards 
the role of voluntary groups and thus contrasted with findings identified by Dearlove 
(1973) but was closer to conclusions generated by Hampton (1970), Newton (1976) 
and Barron et al. (1991). All the members interviewed said that they lobbied the 
County Council on behalf of voluntary groups and acknowledged a role in obtaining 
funding from the County Council for voluntary bodies. For example, a Conservative 
mentioned his work in securing grants for Age Concern, while a Liberal Democrat 
provided information about his activities lobbying the County Council and 
Teignbridge District Council for money to repair the roof of a community centre. 
Councillors also emphasised their role in supporting wider campaigns 
launched by local voluntary bodies. For example, an Independent councillor identified 
a role in supporting the Ramblers' Association. Similarly, a Liberal Democrat 
mentioned her work in lobbying on behalf of Dartmoor Access Group, which 
championed disabled access to the National Park. Most councillors restricted their role 
to assisting voluntary bodies. Twenty-one councillors were, however, regular 
participants in one or more voluntary bodies. For example, several councillors were 
active in residents' associations and community centres. One facilitator expressed 
misgivings about councillors assuming a direct role in the day-to-day affairs of 
voluntary bodies. This member relinquished sonic existing commitments soon after he 
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was elected. He argued that he was more useful as a lobbyist if he did not have an 
obvious interest in the organisation(s) he was trying to assist. 
The eight occasional facilitators expressed positive attitudes towards the role 
of voluntary bodies but emphasised that they seldom represented them. Two members 
expressed resistance towards the notion of representing voluntary groups. A 
Conservative said that he tried `to keep away from single-issue groups'. He asserted 
that single-issue groups had too narrow a political agenda and often failed to 
appreciate the wider community benefit of proposals they were campaigning against. 
In particular, he mentioned his clash of opinion with opponents of a plan to relocate a 
local school. Another Conservative expressed a more fundamental objection to 
voluntary bodies. He commented that he `was not a great one for receiving lobbies'. 
He worried that he might become involved with 'unworthy causes' and argued that 
many voluntary bodies were duplicating the work of the County Council or other 
voluntary organisations. He also expressed scepticism about the origins of many 
bodies and claimed that sometimes `people with nothing much to do set things up and 
then ask for grants of money to keep them going'. 
This survey suggested that the representation of voluntary groups had evolved, 
despite some scepticism, into an integral and regular component of the local 
democratic process, although a minority of councillors showed reluctance to embrace 
fully this concept of local representation. This characteristic of democratic 
representation can also be seen as an expression of the horizontal and downward 
accountability of elected local politicians. The role evolved before the emergence of the 
local government modernisation agenda, although the increasing use of partnerships 
between local authorities and the voluntary sector might have contributed to this trend 
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and strengthened this form of local accountability since winter 1999/2000 when these 
interviews were held. The evidence from these interviews showed, nevertheless, that the 
attitude of most Devon county councillors towards voluntary organisations reflected the 
approach promoted by the local government modernisation agenda. 
4.4: Representing sections of the community 
Most members said that they represented everybody in their division and were 
reluctant to specify a priority group. In total, five councillors mentioned a role in 
representing a distinctive group of constituents and thus reflected conclusions reached 
by academics, such as Jones (1973) and Leach et al. (1986), that some councillors 
focused on the representation of distinctive groups of constituents. For example, an 
executive member mentioned her role in representing the large-number of low-income 
retired constituents in her division. She emphasised the role of a councillor as `a tool 
of social inclusion'. Similarly, another Liberal Democrat said that he had a focus on 
representing the interests of long-standing residents, many of whom were elderly, and 
expressed an implicit scepticism bordering on hostility towards the influence of recent 
incomers. A Conservative admitted that he sought to champion the countryman's 
viewpoint. He argued that a crucial part of his job was the promotion of the 
countryside as a living and economically viable community. This emphasis led him to 
oppose the authority's decision to import Irish beef to use in school meals, 
These findings suggested that, for some councillors, the notion of democratic 
local representation incorporated an emphasis on, or even bias towards, the 
representation of specific types of constituents and an enhanced focus on the 
issues/problems that had the greatest resonance with them. The downward 
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accountability of these members was, therefore, strongest in relation to certain 
favoured groups. This issue did not relate directly to the local government 
modernisation agenda, although it is doubtful whether a disproportionate focus on 
certain types of constituent was within the spirit of the government's aim that 
councillors should become `a champion of their community' (DETR, 1998: 34). 
4.5: Representing other local authorities 
In Devon most councillors representing divisions outside Exeter, which did 
not possess a third-tier of elected local governance, had close links with their town 
councils, parish councils and parish meetings. Many councillors tried to attend every 
one of these gatherings, although meetings of different third-tier authorities often 
clashed. In the most sparsely populated areas there were over 20 third-tier authorities 
in each division. For those county councillors, attendance at such meetings and the 
representation of third-tier local authorities involved a substantial time commitment. 
Many county councillors presented a county report to these gatherings. County 
councillors used these occasions to keep in touch with grassroots' opinion on 
community issues and acquire personal casework. In addition, county councillors were 
used as a source of expert advice about county responsibilities. For example, a former 
chair of planning noted that she had given a parish council advice about its response to 
the County Council's structure plan. 
Members serving as county representatives on joint authorities also had a role 
in representing the views of those authorities to the County Council. One member 
who had served on the Flood Authority recalled how personal experience of flooding 
led her to vote against county policy and support an increase in the authority's budget. 
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That defiance of the county mandate led to her prompt replacement as a county 
representative on that organisation. 
There was a more substantial division of attitudes over the extent to which 
county councillors represented the views of their district authority to the County 
Council. In particular, attitudes were affected by the significant number of councillors 
serving on both county and district authorities. Councillors were asked whether they 
lobbied on behalf of their district council. Table 4.3 records the number of councillors 
that acknowledged a role in representing their district authority at County Hall. 
Table 4.3: Role in representing the views of their district council to the county 




Lib Dem 21 40.4 
Conservative 7 13.5 
Labour 4 7.7 
Non-Alined 3 5.8 
Total 35 67.3 
The analysis showed that over two-thirds of county councillors acknowledged 
a role in representing the views of their district authority at County Hail. Predictably, 
the proportion of sitting district councillors in this category was higher than the 
percentage of county members without a dual mandate. Whilst 20, almost three- 
quarters, of the 27 members with both county and district seats acknowledged a role in 
lobbying the County Council on behalf of their district, only 60% of those without a 
district seat had a similar perception of their role. These findings offered, therefore, 
some support to the opinions of scholars such as Lee (1961) and Jones (1973), who 
identified this form of representation. The implied focus on community inherent in 
this notion of representation implied a link with the local government modernisation 
agenda. Similarly, co-operation with other local authorities can also be linked to the 
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partnership approach (see Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002), which has been advocated as 
part of local government modernisation. 
The study also revealed variations in the manner in which district council 
views were promoted at county level and five distinct models of behaviour were 
identified: geographic; political; community; single-decision; and campaign. 
4.5.1: Geographic model 
County councillors and the district council have the common aim of fighting 
for their area of the county. This model is dependent on county councillors possessing 
a strong sense of loyalty to their division, their district or a wider sub-unit of the 
county and having a relatively weak attachment to countywide interests. Often this 
agenda can arise from a perception that the County Council has diverted resources to 
more favoured areas. 
4.5.2: Political model 
Campaigning arose substantially as a consequence of the political affiliations 
of the county councillor and the district authority and a more politically partisan 
agenda. Loyalty towards the Conservative administration and a natural convergence of 
views often led the Conservative county councillors from East Devon to support the 
district against the Liberal Democrat administration at County Hall. In particular, 
Conservative county councillors from that area were concerned to protect the finances 
of the district council from incursions by the Liberal Democrat county administration, 
which they regarded as extravagant and incapable of controlling its expenditure. This 
model was re-enforced where county councillors belonged to the ruling district party 
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group(s). For example, in East Devon five of the six Conservative county councillors 
also held office as district councillors. 
4.5.3: Community model 
County councillors lobbied with the districts on specific matters important to 
their community. This approach stressed a natural convergence of views and interests 
rather than a conscious decision to promote the views of the district council. For 
example, one councillor noted a convergence of views with the district authority over 
local flood defence provision. This approach differed from the geographic model 
because the agenda was usually smaller scale and arose through a relatively narrow 
and specific set of grievances. The objective was to solve a problem relevant to a 
relatively small geographic area rather than assist a more substantial campaign to win 
resources for the district. 
4.5.4: Single-decision model 
County councillors supported districts over specific decisions or policies. This 
approach contrasted with the community model because the issues were relevant to a 
wider geographic area and with the geographic model because the campaign was 
based on a convergence of opinion on one issue and was not part of a wider agenda. 
These alliances also resulted from a conscious decision to agree rather than emerged 
as a consequence of the obligation to respond directly to constituents' grievances. The 
decision of a senior Liberal Democrat county councillor to support his Conservative 
controlled district authority over borrowing provisions was an example of this type of 
relationship. 
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4.5.5: Campaign model 
County members were involved directly in a district led or district supported 
campaign. County members were more active participants and collaborators than 
under the other models. This approach was recommended by a member who argued 
that attracting funds into an area often depended on establishing a team of 
campaigners representing a variety of interests. In addition, these campaigns were 
relevant to the whole district rather than a smaller geographic area. The campaign 
model also concerned collaboration on one campaign and did not assume that the 
county councillors had a primarily `parochial' focus. This approach was, therefore, 
compatible with the retention of a strong interest in the wider concerns of the whole 
county. 
The analysis also, however, revealed substantial tensions between some county 
and district councillors. In Exeter, frustration about the city's failure to obtain unitary 
status and suspicion of County Hall led many Labour city councillors to regard even 
Labour county councillors from the city with suspicion. Similarly, the failure of North 
Devon's attempts to acquire unitary status had strained relations between some 
Liberal Democrat county councillors and their district colleagues. One county 
councillor commented that he would never regard the leader of North Devon district 
council as `a friend again'. 
4.5.6: Democracy and accountability 
These findings in relation to the willingness of councillors to represent other 
local authorities suggested a significant institutional component in the notion of 
democratic representation accepted by many Devon county councillors. In practice, 
however, this focus was often blurred or even obscured by a convergence of opinion 
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which was not grounded in a desire or obligation to represent the views of a specific 
local authority but which emerged because both the county councillor and the local 
authority(ies) were representing the same geographic areas and championed the same 
grassroots agenda. In addition, the intensity and regularly of this institutional 
component was affected by political and personal relations. 
The strongest institutional element lay in the relationship between most county 
councillors and town councils, parish councils and parish meetings in their divisions. 
Reflecting opinions expressed at such forums was seen by most county councillors as 
an integral part of their wider role in the democratic representation of their 
community(ies), which was, of course, a key component of the local government 
modernisation agenda. The role of town councils, parish councils and parish meetings 
in reflecting and communicating community concerns and attitudes meant that county 
councillors could also be seen as being accountable to them as part of their wider 
downward accountability to the community. 
Although informal accountability to a district authority could be exerted 
through organisations such as local political parties, formal accountability 
mechanisms between county councillors and their district authorities were, however, 
weak and, in general, restricted to participation in joint-committees, boards or 
partnerships. In such instances, institutional representation would, however, be 
confined to a few functions and focus on the partner organisation rather than directly 
on the district authority. In general, a formal notion of the accountability of county 
councillors to district authorities was restricted to those county councillors who also 
sat on a district council and was often confined to their activities as a district 
councillor. 
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4.6: Ombudsman function 
Quantification of the volume of individual problems handled by members was 
difficult. In particular, questions about the number of the letters received failed to 
reflect the volume of work accurately. First, some members received many requests by 
telephone; this method was popular with lower-income groups. Second, executive 
members received many letters about their service responsibilities. Third, some 
requests arrived through email or were acquired by attending town councils, parish 
councils or parish meetings. Many members also had difficulty distinguishing 
between personal grievances and larger issues and or quantifying the number of cases 
they handled. There was, however, evidence to suggest that the ombudsman workload 
of councillors varied substantially. 
In particular, several councillors from Exeter argued that city divisions 
generated a relatively low volume of personal requests. For example, a Liberal 
Democrat from Exeter said that he had no more than four or five cases a month and 
advised the interviewer to treat claims from colleagues that they had substantial levels 
with scepticism. Another Liberal Democrat member from Exeter received about 12 
cases each month and had failed in attempts to increase the volume of casework. 
However, although four Exeter members argued that city divisions generated little 
casework, the other five councillors recorded more substantial caseloads. 
This contrast implied that enthusiasm towards casework could be a crucial 
determinant of volume. Many councillors were proactive and tried to generate 
casework. A Conservative from North Devon took pride in being accessible to her 
constituents. She advertised a contact phone number, fax and email address in every 
post office and received eight to ten telephone calls per day. In contrast, a Liberal 
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Democrat from Teignbridge placed a relatively low priority on casework. He 
commented that he focused on `major issues', such as the provision of respite care for 
a disabled constituent, but was less concerned about resolving minor matters such as 
overhanging hedges. 
The analysis did not support the views of scholars such as Newton (1976) that 
junior councillors had a greater involvement in casework. In contrast, there was 
evidence that long-standing councillors attracted more casework than more recent 
members. Many long-standing members had acquired a high profile and a reputation 
for solving problems. Several of these councillors mentioned that people approached 
them with personal problems whist they shopped at weekends. Others spoke about a 
regular stream of telephone calls and the willingness of constituents to contact them 
on Sundays and Bank Holidays. 
The study offered some support for the notion that Conservative councillors 
were, in general, less interested in the ombudsman role than their political opponents 
(Heclo, 1969; Barron et al., 1991). Councillors were classified according to whether 
they tried to contain or increase casework. For example, councillors who cultivated 
their reputation as a local problem-solver and advertised their services widely were 
classified as attempting to increase their ombudsman workload. In contrast, members 
who waited for constituents to contact them; had a relatively low profile in their 
division; and made relatively little effort to communicate with their constituents were 
classified as containing their ombudsman workload. The results are shown in table 
4.4. 
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The analysis showed that almost two-thirds of the Conservative councillors did 
not seek to add to their ombudsman workload. In contrast, all the Independents and 
Liberals and over half of the Liberal Democrats adopted a more proactive approach, 
Labour members divided equally between the two categories and were not as 
proactive as the literature suggested. 
Table 4.4: Attitude towards the ombudsman role 








Liberal Democrat 12 42.9 16 57.1 
Conservative 9 64.3 5 35.7 
Labour 2 50.0 2 50.0 
Non-Aligned 0 0.0 6 100.0 
Total 
- 
23 - - 44.2 
-- 
-- 29 55.8 
Councillors dealt with a wide range of issues. In the towns, traffic concerns 
were prominent. In the rural areas, appeals over school transport costs were often of 
key importance. Throughout the county appeals over school selection and social 
service issues were important. Many councillors with a combined county and district 
membership also had a substantial volume of housing and planning cases. Councillors 
could, however, deal with a wide range of problems. A Conservative commented that 
he had enabled a constituent to circumvent the regulations and plant flowers on a 
common grass area outside his house. Many members emphasised their duty to 
represent their constituents on personal problems regardless of the strength of their 
case. Attitudes varied over the extent to which they should explain to people with 
weak cases that they were unlikely to be successful. Some councillors stressed the 
importance of openness and that this approach was crucial in establishing trust and 
respect. In contrast, a minority of members thought that it was often easier to act as a 
channel and pass weak cases to officers without commenting on the probability of 
success 
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The results of this study suggested that enthusiasm for this aspect of the job 
was mixed. Whilst many councillors received considerable satisfaction from 
casework, some members focused primarily on other aspects of their job. The 
government's emphasis on councillors bringing their constituents' `views, concerns 
and grievances' (DETR, 1998: 34) to local authorities suggested, however, that the 
approach adopted by a substantial minority of councillors was not compatible with the 
modernising agenda. Similarly, there was no evidence to suggest that the 
establishment of the executive and scrutiny model had led councillors to increase their 
ombudsman workload, although drawing clear conclusions from this evidence was 
difficult because the interviews were conducted early in the modernisation process. 
This section illustrated the importance attached to the democratic 
representation of specific individuals and their concerns/problems by many county 
councillors. It also, however, identified notable variations in relation to the intensity of 
this effort amongst councillors and showed that the application of this form of 
democratic representation could vary markedly between neighbouring and similar 
divisions. In particular, there was a split between proactive councillors who saw 
democratic representation in terms of locating such casework and more reactive 
councillors who did not think that they had an obligation to encourage constituents to 
raise individual problems with them and, therefore, sought to contain or minimise this 
aspect of their representational role. 
In relation to accountability, this section identified two key themes. First, 
downward accountability to constituents incorporated an obligation to handle and, at 
least, attempt to solve or ameliorate problems and concerns specific to an individual 
or a small friendship or family group; an obligation that was modified in relation to 
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weak cases. Second, the extent and interpretation of this aspect of downward 
accountability could vary markedly depending on the manner in which different 
councillors interpreted their role(s). 
4.7: Party groups 
In general, councillors denied that the party group constrained their activities 
as a local representative. Some councillors commented that their party affiliation had 
helped them resolve divisional issues. For example, a Conservative councillor first 
elected as an Independent, claimed that Independents were isolated and ineffective. A 
Conservative from the east of the county discussed how membership of the 
Conservative group has assisted him, during the 1989-1993 Conservative 
administration, in ensuring that respite care facilities were retained after a residential 
home closed. 
Liberal Democrats emphasised that they were able to abstain on issues of 
conscience and divisional matters. Public dissension from the party group position 
was, however, rare and often a reflection of the electoral realities of specific 
division(s). For example, two councillors had been allowed to oppose publicly the 
building of new settlements in their divisions. Such public opposition was, however, 
dependent on the agreement of the party whip and forbidden unless the leadership was 
certain that they retained majority support on the relevant issue. 
Liberal Democrat opposition to their leadership's policies was normally 
restricted to private meetings. Several councillors said that they combined loyalty and 
tough scrutiny in private meetings. One councillor described his style as that of an 
`awkward loyalist'. A colleague observed that `heated argument and intense 
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discussion do take place, but...... secretly' and said that `no public dissension must be 
seen'. Another Liberal Democrat member suggested that although backbenchers were 
often allowed to discuss issues they were `meant to agree with decisions already taken 
by the leadership' and that debate in party group meetings seldom changed leadership 
decisions. In particular, this member argued that the group should devote more time 
to debating the authority's expenditure. At present, non-executive councillors were 
asked to ratify the total level of expenditure but there was little discussion about the 
distribution of spending between different areas and projects. These comments about 
the political culture of the Liberal Democrat Group received support from a colleague, 
who observed that non-executive Liberal Democrats were `expected to be restrained 
when criticising the party leadership, even in private meetings'. 
Councillors who opposed group decisions in public without the agreement of 
the whip indicated that colleagues had viewed such independence as unacceptable. For 
example, councillor Brian Berman, a Liberal Democrat member who had voted 
against reductions in education expenditure and the removal of external 
representatives from the education committee, recorded that he was subsequently 
sacked from a sub-committee and observed that the subsequent year was a `difficult 
year for me within the group'. Similarly, Lesley Whittaker discussed how public 
opposition to policy on school transport led to her resignation from the Liberal 
Democrat Group. 
Conservative and Labour politicians also stressed the opportunities to dissent 
from the party whip on matters relating to their divisions, However, few councillors 
recalled voting against the party line or even abstaining. For example, only one 
Conservative discussed a specific example of voting against or abstaining on 
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decisions taken by his party group. However, his vote against the plans of a previous 
Conservative administration in relation to unitary status did not result in a formal 
reprimand. Overall, Labour and Conservative interviewees argued that their groups 
were naturally more cohesive and united than the Liberal Democrats. In particular, the 
small size of the Labour group and the fact that all its members represented Exeter 
ensured its cohesion. The Non-Aligned group (NGA) had no whip so the two Liberal 
and four Independent councillors were not constrained by group loyalty or discipline. 
The evidence suggested that both Labour and the Conservatives had a greater 
culture of unity than the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrat Group also 
contained a greater diversity of views, while many Liberal Democrat councillors had a 
pronounced centre-left focus some, in particular those in leadership positions, were 
regarded as being on the right of the party. Political opponents considered several to 
be right-of-centre politicians whose association with the Liberal Democrats could be 
explained largely through local political circumstances. One executive member 
described himself as a traditionalist and acknowledged that Conservative councillors 
regarded him as a Conservative. A Liberal Democrat from the left of the party implied 
concern about the centre-right political inclinations of some in leadership positions 
and commented that he was motivated by the aim of ensuring that the administration 
operated on the centre-left of the political spectrum. A colleague asserted that `many 
policies aren't Liberal Democrat enough' and implied that he considered the 
leadership's agenda to be too far towards the political centre-right. In particular, he 
criticised the selling of county-owned farms, which enabled young people with little 
capital to become established in agriculture. A senior Liberal Democrat councillor 
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from the left of the party claimed that the group was `centre-right in terms of the 
party'. 
The Liberal Democrat Group was also divided in terms of a north-south split. 
Politicians from the north of the county dominated the leadership. Examples included 
the leader Brian Greenslade (Barnstaple North), the whip Mervyn Lane (Bideford) and 
the executive member for community development Mike Knight (Combe Martin 
Rural). In contrast, although eight Liberal Democrats represented south Devon seats 
only one of those councillors sat on the executive committee and he had a relatively 
junior job. The position of south Devon within the Liberal Democrat Group had been 
weakened by the loss of members from Torbay in 1998 when the district council 
acquired unitary status. These geographic divisions and the obligation to defend 
unpopular decisions generated tensions within group. The Liberal Democrat Group 
also contained more individualists with a strong focus on a small range of issues. One 
Liberal Democrat councillor commented that `there were too many mavericks with 
their own agendas..... if they don't get their own way they cause trouble'. Public 
dissension was, however, only marginally more substantial than in the Conservative 
and Labour groups. 
Influence within the Liberal Democrat Group also reflected informal networks 
of trust and there was a distinct `in-crowd', which before the establishment of the 
executive committee in May 1999 was not necessarily related to formal positions held. 
When the executive was established the key members of the `in-crowd' assumed the 
main roles. It was alleged that this clique was a reflection of the geographic location 
of their divisions, friendship, family links and longevity of service; and was `out-of- 
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proportion to ability'. One councillor commented that `some people were listened to 
and others rubbished'. 
There was also evidence that loyalty to the Liberal Democrat Group was 
constraining the scrutiny committees. First, the Liberal Democrats took all the chairs 
and vice-chairs. Second, the group leadership tried to impose its own agenda on the 
scrutiny committees. For example, the main inquiry undertaken by Environment 
Scrutiny during its first year concerned the budget for the county's roads; an issue that 
had emerged from the agenda of the relevant chief officer and executive member. 
Similarly, a scrutiny chair commented that `there is a degree of caution within the 
group at the moment about how far scrutiny should go. I think they (the executive) 
want to keep control of it'. 
The Devon analysis confirmed some of the conclusions from the other studies. 
In particular, this chapter has re-enforced conclusions about the importance of the 
party group in local representative democracy generated by scholars such as Newton 
(1976), Alexander (1985) and Copus (1998,2004). Similarly, the study supported 
Leach and Wilson's (2000) conclusions about the cohesion of Liberal Democrat party 
groups. The analysis also confirmed conclusions about the relationship between 
loyalty towards the party group and loyalty towards divisional interests; and behaviour 
in different theatres of representation (Copus, 1998). This model implied that 
accountability towards party colleagues, which could be interpreted in terms of 
vertical or horizontal directions, was usually the prime focus of a councillor's 
accountability obligation and would normally prevail over the need to be accountable 
to other groups such as community organisations, voluntary associations, town 
councils or widespread local opinions. Exceptions were rare, often sanctioned by the 
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whips and generated typically through fear of the electoral consequences in that. 
division if the member was held to the party line. 
The evaluation also, however, showed that the power of the party group could 
be deployed to strengthen the capacity of some councillors in leadership positions to 
represent their division, district or wider sub-area ofthe county. In Devon, the party 
group acted to strengthen the position of Liberal Democrats from the north of the 
country who were, therefore, able to draw on this notion of representative democracy 
to shift resources towards their areas. In effect, the party group operated to promote 
the democratic representation of some localities at the expense of areas whose 
democratic representatives had much less political clout. 
4.8: Policy 
Councillors were asked whether they were interested in a broad range of policy 
areas or specialised in a few aspects of policy. The findings are outlined in table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Policy interests 








Liberal Democrat 12 42.9 16 57.1 
Conservative 6 42.9 8 57.1 











Almost two-thirds of members maintained a broad range of policy interests. 
There was no evidence of councillors in the process ol'deciding on specialist agendas. 
However, this conclusion might have been affected by the timing of the interviews, 
which were held late in the electoral cycle. Only one councillor had served for 
substantially less than two years. Overall, the analysis implied that since the earlier 
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studies quoted in this thesis (see Heclo, 1969; Dearlove, 1973; Newton, 1976; 
Jennings, 1982) there had been a shift in emphasis from a specialist to a wide-ranging 
policy focus. 
The notion that senior councillors in the majority political group needed to 
acquire broad interests `to keep a watching brief over the full range of committee 
activities' (Newton, 1976: 131) was an important factor in determining the focus of 
one very senior councillor and probably affected the attitude of another member with a 
leadership role. There was, however, little evidence to suggest that seniority was a 
crucial factor. For example, the Executive Committee contained six members with 
broad interests and four who stressed a narrow focus: a split that reflected closely the 
proportions on the whole council. 
Councillors with broad policy interests cited two key reasons. First, some 
members argued that they had to obtain knowledge of a wide range of subjects to be 
effective local representatives. For example, a member of the Non-Aligned Group 
emphasised that his/her parochial style of representation depended on having broad 
policy interests. Some councillors viewed specialisation as breaking faith with their 
constituents and as incompatible with a genuine commitment to divisional 
representation. One Non-Aligned Group councillor commented that `specialisation 
brings the risk that you won't be sufficiently briefed to help constituents'. Second, 
Independent and Liberal councillors said that they had to acquire broad policy 
interests because they did not belong to a political group with spokespeople for 
specific areas. Similarly, Labour councillors claimed that the small size of their group 
meant that they had to take an interest in a wide range of policy issues. 
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Councillors emphasising narrow areas of policy were concentrated in the 
ruling Liberal Democrat Group. It was asserted that the only way to make an effective 
contribution was to specialise and that too many councillors focused on too wide a 
remit. There was also some evidence of individuals standing for election to further a 
specific set of policy objectives. For example, a Liberal Democrat observed that he 
had stood to further his environmentalist agenda. Specialists also argued that 
concentrating on a narrow range of policy issues did not impair the service given to 
their constituents because they could consult specialist colleagues or council officers 
on other issues. For example, a Liberal Democrat without expertise in social services 
commented that he passed divisional inquiries in this area direct to senior officers. 
Councillors were also asked whether their main interest lay in representing 
their division, considering wider policy issues or if they had a dual töcus on policy 
and representation. The results are shown in table 4.6. 
Table 4.6: Main interest in representation or policy 












Liberal Democrat 3 10.7 6 21.4 19 67.9 
Conservative 5 35.7 1 7.1 8 57.1 
Labour I 25.0 I 25.0 2 50.0___, 
Non-Alined 3 50.0 0 0.0 3 50.0 
Total 12 23.1 8 15.4 32 61 5 
In contrast to earlier studies (see, for example, Jones, 1973; Newton, 1976), 
most councillors were reluctant to specify a preference for policy or representation. 
Although several members said that representing their electoral division was their first 
priority, this statement was often a reflection of the order in which they performed 
their duties rather than an appraisal of the relative value they placed on them. In 
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general, councillors thought that local representation and focusing on a wider policy 
agenda were both important aspects of their job. 
Many members argued that representing constituents and influencing wider 
policy issues were dependent not competitive roles and that effective representation 
depended on involvement with wider policy issues. For example, a Liberal Democrat 
councillor argued that the grievances of individual constituents often had policy 
implications. Solutions to individual problems might, therefore, lead members to 
campaign against specific council policies. Similarly, a Conservative argued that 
councillors used their constituents to assess support for, and the effectiveness of, 
policies. Another Liberal Democrat claimed that he represented his constituents within 
the context of his party policies. He used party policies to promote the interests of his 
division. Some councillors stressed the impact of county-wide policies on their 
locality and argued that focusing on small-scale local grievances to the exclusion of 
wider issues did not constitute effective local representation. 
Less than a quarter of the sample emphasised their role as local 
representatives. This group was composed primarily of councillors excluded from a 
significant policy role. Nine of these councillors were opposition members, including 
three Independent councillors. Without the support of a party machine to deliver a 
Devon-wide policy programme or co-ordinate local election campaigns, Independents 
depended on establishing a reputation as champions of local concerns and grievances. 
Labour and Conservative councillors also highlighted the importance of local 
representation to electoral success. A Conservative representing a division without 
typical Conservative social and economic characteristics said that his emphasis on the 
representational role reflected electoral reality. Conservative and Labour members 
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also recognised that the Liberal Democrat administration had the main role in 
determining policy and argued that, at present, they could have more impact as 
divisional representatives. 
Three Liberal Democrats indicated that their focus was concentrated primarily 
on their division. Two of these members were backbench councillors with little 
influence over policy decisions. For example, one Liberal Democrat commented that 
she `prefers others to make policy'. This councillor observed that it was not her 
`intention to have a prominent role' her `motivation is more to solve people's 
problems'. Eight councillors selected a preference for policy matters. This group 
included one member of the Executive Committee, two scrutiny chairs and one 
councillor with a leadership role in another authority. Two of the other members in 
this category had strong environmental agendas. 
The study suggested, therefore, that, in general, county councillors in Devon 
had a relatively wide-ranging attitude towards their input into the local democratic 
process, which incorporated interest and participation in a substantial number of 
policy areas, rather than specialisation in a few issues, and a focus on the democratic 
representation of issues and grievances from their division without marginalising a 
wider policy focus. 
These results also implied that specific accountability obligations might be 
ameliorated by concern with policy considerations. Such a tendency could be observed 
in relation to possible tensions between divisional interests and attitudes towards 
specific council functions, while strong opinions about policy issues and the allocation 
of expenditure between functions could cause tensions with accountability towards the 
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party group. Brian Berman's clash with Liberal Democrat Group over education 
spending is an example of this phenomenon (see above). 
4.9: Time 
Interviewees were asked about the number of hours they worked each week as 
a councillor. The results are shown in table 4.7, which records the time spent on 
council activities by male councillors, female councillors, county councillors who had 
a dual mandate and also sat on a district authority and county councillors without a 
district seat. The 27 members who served on their district council did not, in general, 
distinguish between the time allocated to both roles. These councillors were, 
therefore, asked about the time spent on their combined roles as members of both 
authorities. 













20-29 11 2 13 7 6 
30-39 3 1 4 3 1 
40-49 9 1 10 3 7 
50-59 1 3 4 3 1 
60f 8 4 12 8 4 
Week 35.8 46.3 38.5 41.9 34.8 
The responses showed that most members worked as full-time elected 
representatives. One recently retired member who had served as a police inspector 
observed that he now worked longer hours than when in gull-time paid employment. 
Many councillors had a passionate commitment to their role(s) as elected 
representatives. The results also suggested that dual membership of both district and 
county councils had some impact on the number of'hours worked. On average, 
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councillors with a dual mandate worked over seven hours per week longer than 
colleagues who were not sitting district councillors. 
These results implied that the estimates supplied in the other studies did not 
reflect the time commitment of contemporary county councillors (see, for example, 
Hampton, 1970; Newton, 1976; Rao, 2000). For example, the Devon study suggested 
that councillors were working over 30 hours a month more than Barron et al. 's (1991) 
estimate, which was also constructed exclusively on replies from county councillors. 
These findings suggested, therefore, that many of Devon's county councillors were 
committed to an intensive and time-consuming style of local democratic 
representation. There was also a pronounced difference between the hours worked by 
men and women. On average women spent over 46 hours per week on council 
business, over ten hours longer than the average male councillor. This finding 
confirmed Barron et al. 's (1991) conclusion that women councillors work longer on 
their council duties than their male colleagues but also implied that the female-male 
work-rate gap was greater than the previous survey suggested. 
The introduction of the executive and scrutiny model, which was a component 
of the modernisation agenda, had an important impact on workloads. The burden on 
senior members had increased, under the new system it was thought to be impractical 
to combine full-time employment with a leadership role in the majority group. Full- 
time employment commitments led the Deputy Leader of the Liberal Democrats under 
the traditional committee system to eschew an executive position in favour of a 
scrutiny chair. In contrast, many councillors on the scrutiny committees thought that 
the loss of service committee seats had reduced the time they spent on their council 
duties. Some Conservatives commented that they were `now paid twice as much for 
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doing half as much'. There was also little evidence to suggest that councillors were 
spending more time as community representatives to compensate for the loss of tine 
in committees (Cole, 2001 a: 31-33). 
4.10: New councillors 
These responses implied a distinction between councillors with a community 
politics based approach and those with a more traditional style. The interview 
transcripts were assessed in terms of two factors. First, members were categorised 
according to whether their style of representation encouraged or contained their 
ombudsman workload. Second, respondents were assessed in terms of whether their 
activities were restricted primarily to `channelling' the concerns of their 
divisions/wards to county or district councils or whether they had a more regular and 
proactive role in their community (see table 4.8). 








Contain 20 87.0 3 13.0 
Encourage 16 55.2 13 44.8 
Total 36 69.2 16 Y 30.8 
These criteria provided a model to distinguish new from traditional members. 
Councillors classified in the top left-hand corner had a more traditional concept of 
their role. Those in the bottom right-hand corner had a much greater focus on 
community involvement. This classification should not, however, be used to 
distinguish between active and inactive councillors, some members classified in the 
most traditional category had substantial workloads. 
4.11: Conclusion 
The results from Devon suggested that some assumptions of the academic 
literature should be revised. In particular, these councillors were giving a time 
commitment substantially in excess of anything recorded in previous studies. This 
sample contained few policy specialists and suggested that many of the traditional 
distinctions between different interpretations of the role(s) might not be relevant. The 
analysis also implied that there was a substantial recognition of the need to balance 
division and authority-wide interests. Similarly, most councillors had a dual focus on 
policy and representation. Finally, only a small minority of councillors expressed even 
mild scepticism about the input from voluntary groups. The evaluation also had 
implications for an understanding of local democracy and accountability. The 
principle issues were the role of elected councillors as a channel of democratic 
communication between the grassroots and the political and administrative elite; and 
the constraints of multiple accountabilities. 
The chapter contained an evaluation of the role(s) of county councillors in 
enhancing local democracy by feeding opinion from their division into the decision- 
making process. This function encompassed the representation of attitudes of a variety 
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of specialised entities such as voluntary organisations and district authorities as well 
as widespread opinions, attitudes and assumptions. The study of their ombudsman 
role strengthened the literature in relation to that crucial element of representative 
democracy, which is central to the job description of politicians at all levels (see 
Searing, 1994). Overall, the lessons from Devon suggested that the seriousness of 
many county councillors towards the representational role(s) could be interpreted to 
claim that the elitist nature of the representative model had been modified by a 
vigorous adherence to these traditional role(s). 
The strong focus of many members on divisional representation also illustrated 
their commitment to downward notions of accountability to their division, although 
accountability to the wider interests of Devon acted as a notable counterweight to such 
parochialism. A horizontal or vertical concept of accountability to party groups also 
operated as an important constraint on councillors. Despite a degree of freedom in 
relation to their electoral divisions, it was clear that accountability to their party group 
affected other accountability relationships and could restrict the capacity of members 
to promote the interests of their localities. The analysis was marginal to an assessment 
of the effectiveness of accountability in relation to specific decisions because this 
research did not focus directly on the extent to which councillors were able to redress 
grievances and or influence the policy agenda. In contrast, this chapter was restricted 
to assessing accountability in relation to forms, processes, constraints and directions. 
Issues of effectiveness are explored in much more depth later in this thesis. 
The study also had implications for the modernising agenda. In some respects 
the approach adopted by many members was in sympathy with this agenda. For 
example, most councillors devoted a substantial amount of energy towards their 
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divisional representation role, although a notable minority of members tried to contain 
their ombudsman workload. Most councillors were, however, sceptical about the new 
executive and scrutiny model (Cole, 2001a: 26). First, many councillors argued that 
removal from decision-making committees weakened their capacity to represent their 
division. Second, the reforms had not led to an increased focus on work in the 
community. Most members already spent a significant amount of time on divisional 
representation. The substantial community involvement of these councillors meant, 
therefore, that the new political management structures could not be justified in terms 
of greater community involvement. Third, the interest in policy matters shown by 
many members meant that there was considerable resentment about the substantial 
reduction of their direct role in making countywide policies. Fourth, the strength of 
the ruling Liberal Democrat Group restricted the capacity of scrutiny to influence 
executive decisions or hold the leadership accountable for them. 





The chapter considers external scrutiny inquiries undertaken by a wide range 
of local authorities. The analysis incorporates a scoping study to identify the inquiries 
that have been performed. The second stage of the evaluation involves an analysis of 
the decision to undertake the scrutiny; support for scrutiny; attitudes of the scrutinised 
agencies; the scrutiny process; media coverage; and the impact of the inquiries, 
including an assessment of the implementation of the recommendations. The evidence 
is also discussed in relation to democracy, accountability and the local government 
modernisation agenda. 
The chapter relates primarily to representative notions of democracy because it 
is concerned exclusively with the activities of scrutiny committees, which have a 
membership comprised almost completely of elected local politicians', although there 
is also some discussion about the contribution of more direct forms of democracy to 
the scrutiny process. Accountability concerns substantially the capacity of 
representative structures to make external organisations accountable to them in a 
vertical direction. In essence, this chapter considers democratic institutions in the role 
of regulators, monitors and questioners rather than as the subject of accountability and 
scrutiny from the wider community. 2 The theme of local government modernisation 
is central to every aspect of this chapter because the establishment of scrutiny 
committees has been a crucial component of that reform process. 
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5.2: Inquiry topics 
The scoping survey questionnaires, which were sent to 441 principle local 
authorities in Britain, generated 399 replies, a response rate of' 90%, and identified 
370 external scrutiny inquiries. Second stage questionnaires were dispatched with 
regard to each of those external scrutinies and a completed form was returned in 
relation to 238 of those inquiries, a response rate of 64% (see table 5.1). 
Table 5.1: External scrutiny inquiries: topics 








Transport 63 17.0 33 13.9 
Policing and Community Action 51 13.8 35 14.7 
Miscellaneous 34 9.2 26 10.9 
Utilities 29 7.8 20 8.4 
Econom , Plannin , Regulation and Re generation 
29 7.8 18 7.6 
Leisure 26 7.0 18 7.6 
Post Office 24 6.5 18 7.6 
Youth 20 5.4 13 5.5 
Housing 20 5.4 12 5.0 
Health and Social Care 19 5.1 13 5.5 
Governance and Partnerships 17 4.6 7 2.9 
Education 15 4.1 9 3.8 
Waste and Recycling 14 
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In relation to the total identified in the scoping study, the most popular area 
was transport, which incorporated studies on issues such as the railways, buses, taxis 
and roads; followed by policing and community action, which covered policing, anti- 
social behaviour and community safety issues. The next most popular specific groups 
were inquiries on the utilities, which covered evaluations of the electricity, telephone, 
gas and water industries; and those about economic, planning, regulation and 
regeneration issues. The miscellaneous category covered a wide variety oC subjects 
including IT, fireworks, the census in Southend, voluntary organisations, older people 
and sunbeds. Of the 14 categories only transport; and policing and community action 
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were the subject of over 50 inquiries or had more than 30 inquiries incorporated in the 
second stage of the evaluation. This spread of topics implied that the institutional 
manifestation of local representative democracy attempted to hold external 
organisations accountable in relation to a wide range of issues, although the absolute 
number of such inquiries was quite low. This finding supported conclusions reached 
by Ashworth and Snape (2004: 550), that external scrutiny was a `marginal activity' 
for local authorities. It could, therefore, be argued that the contribution of external 
scrutiny to holding other elected authorities as well as the New Magistracy of 
appointed local governance, the private sector and voluntary organisations 
accountable to individuals and institutions with a locally derived democratic mandate 
was small. This finding could be interpreted as indicative of the capacity constraints 
of representative democracy at the local level. 
However, although external scrutiny did not appear to have been undertaken in 
an extensive manner, this evidence suggested that it had become established in the 
politico-administrative culture of many local authorities. This development meant that 
external agencies now had to contend with the possibility that their actions might 
become the subject of perhaps intensive analysis from local politicians and it was 
reasonable to assume that this constraint might be affecting their performance. This 
subject was, however, outside the scope of this thesis so it was not possible to take 
this discussion further, although it was important to raise the potential of the threat of 
scrutiny as a counterweight to the theory that external scrutiny was marginal because a 
relatively small number of such inquiries had been held. 
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5.3: 'lope of authority 
The response rate was high amongst all categories of local authority, while above 
average percentages were obtained in relation to authorities in non-metropolitan England. 
The lowest response rate occurred amongst the Scottish unitary authorities, where the 
percentage return was more than 12% below the national average (see table 5.2). 
Overall, 38% of the local authorities replying to scoping questionnaire had 
held at least one inquiry into an external organisation (see table 5.2). External scrutiny 
was confined substantially to English local government; less than 18% of the 45 
Scottish and Welsh local authorities that replied to the scoping study acknowledged 
holding such an inquiry. External scrutiny was also a relatively rare phenomenon 
amongst the districts, less than 35% of the districts replying to the scoping survey said 
that they had staged an external inquiry. In contrast, the larger English local 
authorities were more likely to have undertaken an external scrutiny; the comparable 
figures for the counties, London boroughs, English unitaries and metropolitan 
boroughs were 47%, 46%, 51% and 63% respectively (see table 5.2). 
The analysis suggested that, therefore, there were marked variations across 
different types of local authority in the frequency with which democratically-elected 
local politicians sought to hold external organisations accountable. The relatively 
large number of district authorities meant that inquiries undertaken by district 
authorities comprised 43% of the inquiries identified in the scoping survey (see table 
5.2). This total represented, however, only 0.7 external scrutinies per district authority; 
in contrast the comparable figures for county, London borough, metropolitan borough 
and English unitary authorities were 1.4; 1.5; 1.9; and 1.2 respectively. These findings 
bore some similarities with data complied by Stoker et at. (2002: 54). For example, 
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those scholars found that an external scrutiny had been held in 32% of the districts 
against 34% in this study. Similarly, that previous analysis showed that 59% of the 
Metropolitan boroughs and 54% of the counties had held such inquiries (Stoker et al., 
2002: 54) compared with 63% and 47% respectively in this survey. However, Stoker 
et al. 's (2002: 54) finding that three-quarters of the London boroughs had staged an 
external inquiry was in contrast to this survey, which identified an external scrutiny 
from less than half. 
Table 5.2: External scrutiny inquiries: local authority types3 
Co uncils 1 Cou kilsi I 1 
'1 
c 
1; to Co 
h l 
uncils di reply ing 








N % N % N % N % N % 
Counties 32 94.1 15 46.9 II 32.4 44 11.9 28 11.8 
Districts 218 91.6 75 34.4 53 22.3 160 43.2 98 41.2 
London Boroughs 28 87.5 13 46.4 10 31.3 42 11.4 25 10.5 
Metropolitan 30 83.3 19 63.3 15 41.7 57 15.4 34 14.3 
Boroughs 
English Unitaries 45 97.8 23 51.1 20 43.5 55 14.9 43 18.1 
Scottish Unitaries 25 78.1 3 12.0 2 6.3 5 1.4 4 1.7 
Welsh Unitaries 20 90.9 5 25.0 4 18.2 7 1.9 6 2.5 
Isles of Scilly 1 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total 399 90.5 153 38.3 115 26.1 370 238 
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The study implied, therefore, that the larger, urban and suburban local 
authorities had more interest in the vertical accountability of external organisations 
than their smaller and more rural counterparts. A finding that might appear surprising 
given that district authorities performed few functions and that, therefore, most public 
services were undertaken by external organisations. A plausible explanation might, 
however, lie in capacity constraints in terms of issues such as numbers of officers and 
councillors in the smaller districts and the fourth option status of many of those local 
authorities. 
Analysis of individual inquiries confirmed the conclusion that this idea, of 
representative local government as the agent through which other bodies could be held 
to account in a vertical direction, was substantially an English activity. In Scotland, 
only 0.2 external scrutinies were held per local authority answering the scoping study, 
in Wales the corresponding statistic was 0.4 inquiries. External scrutiny appeared not 
to be ingrained into the political and administrative culture of local government in 
Scotland or Wales. This evidence suggested, therefore, a divergence between the 
culture of accountability present in many English local authorities and contemporary 
practice in Scotland and Wales. In England, many local authorities and councillors 
had a relatively strong outward focus on the wider notions of governance and or 
community; in contrast the accountability culture in Scotland and Wales was primarily 
inward-looking and focused on holding the local authority to account to the exclusion 
of external agencies. The virtual absence of external scrutiny in Scotland and Wales 
must have meant that the threat of the imposition of vertical accountability through 
this mechanism was effectively absent. The capacity of the local government 
modernisation agenda to exert influence over the behaviour of external agencies in 
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those countries, through the development of the scrutiny function, was, therefore, 
slight. 
The returns to the second stage questionnaires were approximately in 
proportion to the distribution of external inquiries amongst diticrent types of local 
authority (see table 5.2), although a notably higher response rate amongst the English 
unitary authorities meant that inquiries undertaken by those authorities were over 
represented by more than three percent in comparison to the scoping study data. 
5.4: Decision to undertake the inquiry 
An assessment of the origins and laming ofthe programme ofexternal 
scrutiny suggested that power resided primarily with scrutiny committees. Local 
authority respondents were asked to specify the origins of each inquiry and what other 
factors were responsible for initiating the inquiry (see table 5.3 ). 4 This evaluation 
found that almost eight-in-ten arose, in part at least, from the scrutiny side of'the 
authority. For example, at Hounslow an inquiry into the local housing ALMO was 
initiated because councillors were concerned about performance in relation to 
maintenance of the housing stock. 









Su r Bestion by Scrutiny. 151 63.4 186 78.2 
Response to Issues raised by other local authorities or 
the wider community. 
33 13.9 66 27.7 
Suggestion by the Executive. 22 9.2 40 16.8 
Response to issues raised by the media. 19 8.0 63 26.5 
Suggestion by Officers 
. 17 7. I 56 23.5 
The media and other local authorities or the wider local community were 
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identified as a source in over a quarter of these evaluations (see table 5.3). For 
example, at Suffolk Coastal, a media report that police officers were being redeployed 
from three towns in the authority to another district generated a scrutiny inquiry. At 
Blackpool, a scrutiny of the speed camera safety partnership resulted from public and 
media concern about the large number of speed cameras in the borough. 
The predominant role of the scrutiny committee in establishing these inquiries 
was reflected in answers to two other questions. First, the decision to hold these 
inquiries was taken primarily by the relevant scrutiny committee, which had a role in 
this decision in relation to over 90% of these inquires (see table 5.4). 5 









Scrutiny Committee 211 88.7 218 91.6 
Full Council 9 3.8 20 8.4 
Executive Committee 10 4.2 21 8.8 
Another Council Committee 13 5.5 18 7.6 
These conclusions were strengthened when respondents were asked which 
committee determined the agenda of the inquiry. The relevant scrutiny committee had 
the most important role in more than nine-in-ten of those scrutinies and played a role 
in determining that agenda in respect to almost 19 out of 20 inquiries (see table 5.5). 6 







Scrutiny Committee 220 92.4 _ 224 ^ 94.1 
Council Full 3 1.3 _ ------ - 7 2.9 
Executive Committee 4 1.7 14 5.9 
Another Council Committee 14 5.9 24 10.1 
The evidence in relation to these issues cannot be compared to the literature 
directly because scholars have largely eschewed these questions. "These results, 
122 
however, served as a counterbalance to some of the more critical interpretations about 
the independence and influence of scrutiny. 
These findings also generated insights into the evolution of representative 
democracy within local authorities and suggested that the local government 
modernisation agenda had achieved some success in enabling non-executive 
councillors to expand their influence. This extension had occurred through the 
development of a role in relation to holding external organisations, most of which 
were non-elected bodies, accountable in a vertical direction; and giving those more 
junior councillors substantial autonomy in relation to the framing of these processes. 
The capacity to develop an accountability agenda could, therefore, be seen as an 
important component of the compensation for the abolition of the traditional service 
committees and diminution of their formal role in the decision-making process. In 
contrast, in authorities that retained a traditional committee structure the evolution of 
autonomy in relation to external accountability could be viewed as a straight gain for 
the more junior councillors and not as a component of a compensation package with 
regard to wider changes. 
5.5: Support for scrutiny 
A census of the advice supplied to the inquiries (see table 5.6) illustrated the 
importance of internal sources. More than half of these inquiries received advice from 
a dedicated scrutiny unit, while over three-quarters received support from officers not 
based in a dedicated scrutiny unit. These findings suggested, therefore, that scrutiny 
had been accompanied by a cultural shift in many local authorities through which the 
bureaucracy had embraced the idea that some staff should work to hold external, and 
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by implication, also internal decisions accountable. ' This decision to devote public 
money to fund staff to service scrutiny implied, therefore, an acceptance by senior 
management of the spirit of the local government modernisation agenda which, in 
establishing the scrutiny function, enhanced substantially the capacity of elected local 
representatives to challenge and hold to account elite decision-makers. This could be 
interpreted as a challenge perhaps to public choice theorists who emphasised the self- 
interested operation of bureaucracies (see Niskanen, 1971). There was also evidence 
to imply that external support had an important role in some inquiries. In particular, 
voluntary bodies and other local authorities supplied advice to more than 37% and a 
quarter of these inquiries respectively. For example, an inquiry about the Inland 
Revenue undertaken at Telford and the Wrekin required specialist assistance From 
external sources to enable committee members to pose technical questions and 
generate an evidence base to challenge the Revenue's assumptions. 









Scrutiny Unit 89 37.4 126 52.9 
Other Council Officers 105 44.1 179 75.2 
Academics 23 9.7 44 18.5 
Another Local Authority 25 10.5 60 25.2 
Voluntary Body 35 14.7 89 37.4 
Business 7 2.9 14 5.9 
Non-Academic Experts I 0.4 1 0.4 
Another governmental body II 
_ 
4.6 21 8.8 
Public or Service Users 2 0.8 11 4.6 
Positive conclusions about the commitment of representative local democracy 
to this enhanced and modernised concept of its role as an agent of vertical 
accountability was emphasised through findings that there was widespread satisfaction 
with the support supplied to these inquiries in relation to officer-time, officer co- 
operation and resources. In relation to each category, support was evaluated as 
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adequate in relation to more than nine-in-ten of the inquiries fl or which an answer had 
been provided (see table 5.7). 
Table 5.7: Support for the inquiry from the local authority 
N % N % 
Officer-Time 220 94.8 12 5.2 
Officer Co-operation 217 96.0 9 4.0 
Resources 203 91.0 20 9.0 
Some respondents lavished praise on the commitment of their authority to 
scrutiny. For example, the achievements of an external scrutiny at Wigan were 
explained in terms of the support supplied by the authority's policy officer. These high 
levels of satisfaction challenged conclusions from scholars such as Cole (2001b) and 
Leach (2006) that were critical about the effectiveness of the support structures. 
Echoes of this criticism could, however, be found in a few responses. For example, a 
reply from a district authority mentioned the difficulty of devoting `the time/capacity 
within increasing budget cut-backs' to provide adequate support. Similarly, at the Isle 
of Wight scrutiny was undermined because the executive failed to release sufficient 
resources. 
An analysis of support for external scrutiny in relation to dillerent types of 
authority revealed some notable variations (see table 5.8). Dissatisfaction was 
relatively high in the districts, for example support was considered not to he adequate 
in relation to resources in more than an eighth of these inquiries. Similarly, 
dissatisfaction about the support supplied in the English unitarics was also relatively 
high; for example officer-time and resources were regarded as inadequate in more 
than seven and ten percent of the cases respectively. Variations in the adequacy of 
support for external scrutiny were not, however, wide enough to imply that the 
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scepticism expressed by scholars such as Cole (2001b) and Leach (2006) was justified 
in relation to any one type of authority. Furthermore, external scrutiny inquiries 
undertaken through county councils benefited from adequate officer-time in relation to 
all the inquiries; whilst more than 96% of these evaluations were judged to have 
received adequate support in respect of officer co-operation and resources. 
Such variations might have reflected the greater capacity of larger authorities. 
There was a contradiction between this assumption and experience in Scotland and 
Wales, where all three aspects were evaluated as adequate in relation to the ten 
studies. This result might, however, have reflected the marginal nature of external 
scrutiny outside England and thus lower expectations. 




























Counties 27 100.0 0 0.0 26 96.3 I 3.7 26 96.3 1 3.7 
Districts 90 92.8 7 7.2 89 94.7 5 5.3 82 87.2 12 12.8 
London Boroughs 24 100.0 0 0.0 23 100.0 0 0.0 21 95.5 I 4.5 
Met Boroughs 32 94.1 2 5.9 31 96.9 l 3.1 29 93.5 2 6.5 
English Unitaries 37 92.5 3 7.5 38 95.0 2 5.0 35 89.7 4 10.3 
Scottish Unitaries 4 100.0 0 0.0 4 100.0 0 0,0 4 100.0 0 0.0 
Welsh Unitaries 6 100.0 0 0.0 6 100.0 0 0.0 6 100.0 0 0.0 
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[he analysis also suggested that different political management structures 
were not associated with marked variations in the perceived adequacy of support for 
external scrutiny (see table 5.9). The only notable exception occurred in relation to 
resources where approaching a quarter of inquiries in local authorities with a 
traditional committee structure were evaluated as having inadequate support; a 
characteristic that might again reflect the limited capacity of small authorities and a 
result that gave modest support to the Cole (2001 b)/Leach (2006) findings. 
















Officer-Time 17 94.4 I 5.6 187 95.0 10 5.1 16 94.1 I 5.9 
Officer Co-operation 17 94.4 1 5.6 183 95.8 8 4.2 17 100.0 0 0.0 
Resources 17 94.4 1 5.6 173 92.0 15 8.0 13 76.5 4 23.5 
The analysis also generated little evidence to imply that the cl ectiveness of 
support for external scrutiny varied markedly in relation to specific topics. With the 
exception of the resources devoted to inquiries about waste and recycling, support in 
relation to each of the issues was rated as being adequate in more than fl ur out of' 
every five cases. Overall, there was little evidence to support pessimistic attitudes 
about local authority support for external scrutiny (see table 5.10). 
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34 97.1 1 2.9 32 91.4 3 8.6 34 97.1 I 2.9 
Miscellaneous 25 100.0 0 0.0 23 95.8 I 4.2 22 91.7 2 8.3 





14 87.5 2 12.5 15 93.8 1 6.3 13 81.3 3 18.8 
Leisure 16 94.1 I 5.9 17 100.0 0 0.0 15 88.2 2 11.8 
Post Off ice 18 100.0 0 0.0 15 100.0 0 0.0 15 100.0 0 0.0 
Youth 12 92.3 1 7.7 13 100.0 0 0.0 II 84.6 2 15.4 
Housing II 100.0 0 0.0 10 100.0 0 0.0 7 
__8_7.5 
1 12.5 
Health and Social 
Care 
12 100.0 0 0.0 12 100.0 0 0.0 12 100.0 0 0.0 
Governance and 
Partnership 
7 100.0 0 0.0 7 100.0 0 0.0 7 100.0 0 0.0 
Education 8 88.9 1 11.1 8 88.9 1 11.1 8 100.0 0 0.0 
Waste and 
Recycling 
11 100.0 0 0.0 11 100.0 0 0.0 7 63.6 4 36.4 
Fire Service 5 100.0 0 0.0 5 100.0 0 0.0 5 100.0 0 0.0 
5.6: Attitude of the scrutinised agency 
Analysis of the attitude of the scrutinised agency towards the process revealed 
an overwhelmingly positive focus. 8 This finding suggested, therefore, that the subject 
agencies accepted the local government modernisation agenda in respect of the new 
role of local representative democracy in holding external agencies accountable. In 
almost three-fifths of the inquiries, for which a response was given, the scrutinised 
agency was characterised as `generally enthusiastic' towards the inquiry, while in 
almost another fifth of these cases the external organisation was assessed as having 
been `supportive'. There were, however, some variations in relation to local authority 
type. For example, while the external agency was `generally enthusiastic' in three- 
quarters of the inquiries held by county councils and more than seven-in-ten of the 
scrutinies held in the metropolitan boroughs, the corresponding figures for the English 
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unitary authorities and the London boroughs were less than four-in-ten (see table 
5.11). 
Table 5.11: Attitude of the scrutinised agency: local authority types 
DC 1 8 N IB FU s l ! 
N 
CC 
% N % N 
. 











21 75.0 60 63.2 8 34.8 22 71.0 16 37.2 2 50.0 6 100.0 135 58.7 
Supportive 2 7.1 19 20.0 6 26.1 3 9.7 12 27.9 I 25.0 (l 0.0 43 18.7 
Obligation 3 10.7 10 10.5 8 34.8 4 12.9 8 18.6 I 25.0 (1 0.0 34 14.8 
Significant 
Tensions 
2 7.1 6 6.3 0 0.0 I 3.2 6 14.0 0 0.0 _ 0 0.0 15 6.5 
Open Conflict 
_0 
0.0 0 0.0 I 4.3 1 3.2 1 2.3 0 
_0.0 
0 0.0 3 1.3 
In contrast, the percentage of agencies evaluated as enthusiastic was similar across 
each of the three political management arrangements, although inquiries held in authorities 
with a directly-mayor contained a relatively low proportion of `genuinely enthusiastic' 
cases and a relatively high number of `supportive' responses (see table 5.12). 














General) enthusiastic. 9 52.9 116 58.9 10 62.5 
Supportive but little evidence of enthusiasm. 5 29.4 35 17.8 3 18.8 
Polite and civil but viewed the process as an 
oblation or burden and showed some suspicion. 
2 11.8 30 15.2 2 12.5 
Sýnt tensions with the committee. I 5.9 13 6.6 1 6.3 
open conflict with the committee. 0 0.0 3 1.5 0 0.0 
There were more substantial variations in relation to the attitude of the agency 
in relation to the topics (see table 5.13). It was, however, difficult to identify many 
trends, although the low percentage of `generally enthusiastic' Post Office 
contributions was notable; a possible consequence of the critical focus ol'many of 
those inquiries, which concerned decisions to close branches and might also have 
reflected an administrative culture in that organisation that was sceptical about the 
role of local representative democracy in enlorcing a wider concept of local vertical 
accountability. The high percentage of housing organisations that were judged as 
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generally enthusiastic' was also interesting and could be explained in terms of the 
fact that many of these agencies were ALMOS, not-for-profit organisations, which 
had sitting councillors on their boards. Those organisations were, therefore, much 
more clearly linked to local representative democracy because indirectly-elected local 
politicians participated in their governance, and their capacity to circumvent or avoid 
pressures to account to scrutiny committees was, thus, diminished. 























Transport 18 56.3 5 15.6 3 9.4 6 I8.8 0 0.0 
Policing and 
Community Safety 
22 64.7 7 20.6 3 8.8 0 0.0 2 5.9 
Miscellaneous 18 69.2 4 15.4 4 15.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 





14 82.4 1 5.9 2 11.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Leisure 10 55.6 4 22.2 3 16.7 0 0.0 I 5.6 
Post Office 7 41.2 4 23.5 5 29.4 1 5.9 0 0.0 
Youth 5 38.5 5 38.5 2 15.4 1 7.7 0 0.0 
Housing 7 70.0 I 10.0 I 10.0 I 10.0 0 0.0 
Health and Social 
Care 
8 61.5 1 7.7 2 15.4 2 15.4 0 0.0 
Governance and 
Partnership 
3 42.9 2 28.6 I 14.3 I 14.3 0 0.0 
Education 14 50.0 1 12.5 2 25.0 1 12.5 0 0.0 
Waste and 
Recycling 
6 54.5 2 18.2 3 27.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Fire Service 3 60.0 0 0.0 1 20.0 I 20.0 0 0.0 





!1 6. S 3 1.3 
Analysis of the attitude of the scrutinised agencies over issues such as requests 
for information and witnesses showed that co-operation had been widespread. Overall, 
scrutinised organisations in more than four-in-five inquiries were evaluated as having 
been totally co-operative and there were relatively small variations in relation to local 
authority types and political management arrangements apart from the tact that all the 
scrutinies undertaken in authorities with a traditional committee structure dealt with 
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totally co-operative subject agencies. There were, however, more substantial 
variations in relation to the topic of each inquiry. In particular, the scrutinised agency 
in approximately three-in-ten of the inquiries about postal services and youth issues 
was judged to have only been `partly' co-operative (see tables 5.14-5.16). Such 
tensions might be explained by a focus on post office closures and perhaps the 
administrative culture within that organisation (see above); and the tendency for 
elected local government to marginalise and sometimes patronise youth organisations 
(see chapter six). 
'table 5.14: Co-operation of the scrutinised agency over issues such as requests 




















Yes 24 85.7 84 88.4 17 74.0 26 83.9 32 74.4 4 100.0 6 100.0 193 83.9 
No 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 I 2.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.4 
Partly 4 14.3 11 11.6 6 26.1 5 16.1 10 23.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 36 15.7 
Table 5.15: Co-operation of the scrutinised agency over issues such as requests 














Yes 15 88.2 - 162 82.2 16 ^ - - - -100.0 - 
No 0 0.0 I 0.5 _ ___ 0 __ _ _ _ 0.0 
Part l 2 11.8 34 17.3 0 0.0 
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Table 5.16: Co-operation of the scrutinised agency over issues such as requests 















24 80.0 0 0.0 -6 --20.0-- 
Policing and Community Safety 30 88.2 0 0.0 4 11.8 
Miscellaneous 23 88.5 0 0.0 3 11.5 
Utilities 15 83.3 0 0.0 3 16.7 
Economy, Planning, Regulation and Regeneration 17 94.4 0 0.0 1 5.6 
Leisure 16 88.9 0 0.0 2 11.1 
Post Office 12 70.6 0 0.0 5 29.4 
Youth 9 69.2 0 0.0 4 30.8 
Housing 9 81.8 0 0.0 2 18.2 
Health and Social Care 10 76.9 1 7.7 2 15.4 
Governance and Partnership 6 85.7 0 0.0 I 14.3 
Education 8 88.9 0 0.0 1 11.1 
Waste and Recycling 9 81.8 0 0.0 2 18.2 
Fire Service 5 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
There were many specific examples of enthusiastic, supportive and co- 
operative behaviour. For example, at Stockton-on-Tees an inquiry was facilitated 
through the positive attitude of Stagecoach, which 'demonstrated considerable good 
will'. Similarly, at Chichester, an evaluation of a local theatre was assisted by the 
attitude of the theatre's management, which was 'Frank, open and honest about their 
problems', while Thames Water Utilities engaged positively with an inquiry about 
flooding undertaken by a London borough. 
The study also, however, revealed evidence ol'antagonism towards the 
scrutiny process and strained relations between external agencies and the scrutiny 
committees. For example, at Bradford, an inquiry about the festival was characterised 
by a `struggle' to obtain information and evidence had to he taken in camera'. 
Similarly, at Salisbury developers and landowners claimed that commercial reasons 
precluded their direct involvement in a scrutiny about affordable housing. 
At Barnsley, a scrutiny inquiry about Berneslai I lomes, a local provider of 
social housing, was undermined by the strained relations between the agency and the 
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local authority and the underlying problem of member dissatisfaction at being 
excluded from having access to information regarding lettings. At Burnley, the 
attitude of the police towards an external scrutiny about anti-social behaviour was 
characterised as being `constrained by their own priorities'. Similarly, at Rutland the 
police were `reluctant to have their performance reviewed' in relation to an inquiry 
about a fire involving hazardous substances. 
Such outcomes represented, however, a relatively small minority of cases. In 
contrast, the scrutiny process often improved relations between the local authority and 
the scrutinised organisation (see tables 5.17,5.18 and 5.19). 
Table 5.17: Impact of the inquiry on the local authority's relations with the 













Counties 0 0.0 13 46.4 15 53.6 
Districts 2 2.2 47 51.6 42 462 
London Boroughs 0 0.0 12 50.0 12 50.0 
Metropolitan Boroughs 4 12.1 21 63.6 8 24.2 
English Unitaries 3 7.5 28 70.0 9 22.5 
Scottish Unitaries 0 0.0 2 50.0 2 50.0 
Welsh Unitaries 0 0.0 2 50.0 50.0 
Total 9 4.0 125 55.8 90 40.2 
Table 5.18: Impact of the inquiry on the local authority's relations with the 







I '- 1 
Ma or 0 0.0 10 71.4 4 28.6 
Cabinet 9 4.7 104 53.9 80 41.5 
1'ruditional 0 0.0 II 64.7 6 _ 35.3 
Relations were judged to have improved in relation to more than four in ten 
cases. For example, at Burnley an inquiry about recycling `cleared the air and allowed 
relationships to grow more strongly'. Similarly, at West Devon Borough Council a 
scrutiny about the local bus service strengthened relations with First Bus and a ibrmal 
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annual meeting between the company and the local authority was instituted to discuss 
matters of concern. At Suffolk Coastal, the inquiry about police deployment assisted 
relations between the district authority and the police because the constabulary was 
able to reassure local politicians that press reports about reductions in the number of 
officers allocated to the district were inaccurate. 
Relations were identified as having worsened in four percent of these 
inquiries. One of these rare examples occurred in a metropolitan borough authority in 
relation to a scrutiny of a regional development agency. The external body was critical 
about many of the recommendations made by the scrutiny inquiry and it was 
suggested that the agency might not be willing to participate in another scrutiny 
undertaken by the local authority. This experience had fuelled the concern of senior 
officers in the authority, who were said to be `twitchy about external inquiries' and 
afraid that future relationships might be jeopardised; a thought that has also been 
reflected in academic discussions about scrutiny (see Ashworth and Snape, 2004). 
In the counties, Scottish unitaries, Welsh unitaries, districts and London 
boroughs relations improved with the scrutinised agency in relation to approximately 
half of the inquiries. Improvements in relations between the local authority and the 
scrutinised bodies were, however, much less common in the metropolitan and English 
unitary authorities, where relations had improved in less than a quarter of the 
inquiries. There was also evidence to suggest that this process was more successful in 
improving relations where the authorities had executive cabinets (see table 5.18), 
although it should be noted that all nine inquiries where relations worsened occurred 
in authorities with executive cabinets. 
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The analysis revealed some notable differences in relation to the impact on 
relations between local authorities and scrutinised organisations in the various sectors 
(see table 5.19). 
Table 5.19: Impact of the inquiry on the local authority's relations with the 













Transport 3 10.0 19 63.3 8 26.7 
Policing and Community Safe 1 3.1 18 56.3 13 40.6 
Miscellaneous 0 0.0 13 52.0 12 48.0 
Utilities 0 0.0 6 30.0 14 70.0 
Economy, Planning, Regulation and 
Regeneration 
0 0.0 13 72.2 5 27.8 
Leisure 1 5.9 14 82.4 2 11.8 
Post Office 1 5.9 11 64.7 5 29.4 
Youth 1 7.7 5 38.5 7 53.8 
Housing 2 22.2 5 55.6 2 22.2 
Health and Social Care 0 0.0 5 45.5 6 54.5 
Governance and Partnership 0 0.0 4 57.1 3 42.9 
Education 0 0.0 6 66.7 3 33.3 
Waste and Recycling 0 0.0 2 18.2 9 81.8 
Fire Service 0 0.0 4 80.0 1 20.0 
With regard to housing relations worsened in more than a fifth of the cases, 
while in a majority of the areas relations did not worsen in connection to any of the 
inquiries. There were also substantial variations in relation to improvements in those 
relationships. Relations between the local authority and waste and recycling 
organisations improved in more than tour-in-live instances but the corresponding 
figures in relation to leisure was less than one-in-eight inquiries. The potential li)r 
substantial variations in the state of relations between the scrutinised body and the 
local authorities at the commencement of the scrutiny, however, caused problems Ior 
the interpretation of this data. Furthermore, the absence of'existing scholarship about 
these matters meant that it was not possible to compare with conclusions generated by 
other studies. 
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These findings suggested, therefore, that the vertical accountability process 
often improved relations between representative local democracy and a wide range of 
agencies operating in the same locality. Vertical accountability could, therefore, be 
viewed as a mechanism through which wider notions of local governance through co- 
operation, networks and perhaps partnership could be fostered (see Sullivan and 
Skelcher, 2002). 
5.7: Scrutiny process 
The study generated some important conclusions about the scrutiny process 
and potential innovations to improve performance. 
S. 7.1: Party groups 
The analysis produced no evidence to suggest that external scrutiny inquiries 
were subjected to a party whip. Overall, respondents said that no party whip was used in 
relation to 234 of these inquiries, while no information was supplied about four of the 
inquiries. These findings contrasted with those from Stoker et al. (2002), who found that 
more than nine percent of local authorities reported that a party whip was used to control 
scrutiny, although they were closer to conclusions reached by Snape et al. (2002), who 
found that whipping or party discipline was rarely applied to scrutiny. There was, 
however, evidence to suggest that political groups held meetings before some of these 
inquiries to discuss the external scrutiny, however the survey suggested that such 
involvement in external scrutiny was relatively rare (see table 5.20). 
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Table 5.20: Party group meetings 
N % N % 
Conservative 14 6.2 213 93.8 
Labour 14 6.2 213 93.8 
Liberal Democrat 11 4.8 216 95.2 
At least one group 20 8.7 211 91.3 
In contrast to findings from Stoker et al. (2002), less than nine percent of the 
external inquiries were the subject of a party group meeting held before the formal 
sessions. There was little variation in relation to practice amongst Conservative, 
Labour and Liberal Democrats groups, although the Liberal Democrats were slightly 
less inclined to adopt this procedure. Comparison with Stoker et at. (2002) in relation 
to whipping and party meetings was, however, difficult. These findings could be 
deployed to imply an evolution in the attitude of party groups towards scrutiny and the 
accountability role of councillors, however given the close proximity of both surveys 
such an interpretation was difficult to justify. A more plausible explanation might, 
however, lie in the lower political salience of these issues. Although external scrutiny 
might have related to important public policy issues, the capacity to damage the 
coherence and cohesion of the party groups was often much less than in relation to 
internal matters because these inquiries seldom concerned issues for which senior 
councillors had any responsibility. `' 
5.7.2: Public participation 
There was some evidence that external scrutiny had been strengthened through 
a more direct concept of democracy. For example, a scrutiny about flooding 
undertaken at Chesterfield was facilitated by the decision to allow members of the 
public to ask the external organisation questions, while at Camden another inquiry 
about flooding was enhanced by co-opting a member of a local organisation that had 
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been flooded. The respondent suggested that this approach showed that the `panel 
could empathise with what they heard, not just sympathise'. Similarly, at Hartlepool, 
an inquiry about the decommissioning of `ghost ships' provided `a local forum for the 
public to express their views' and, therefore, supplied. 'a local layer of accountability', 
although the benefits for public participation were limited because the terms of 
reference excluded discussion about the `key issue raised by the public .... we don't 
want the ships here'. 
These examples illustrated the capacity of external scrutiny to develop a form 
of downward accountability in which the role of elected representatives was 
supplemented by direct public participation in the process. This evidence also, 
however, indicated that most inquiries eschewed such an approach and that even 
where such innovations were deployed they were often marginal to the inquiry. It 
should not, therefore, be argued that this more direct form of democracy and 
downward notion of accountability represented a substantial challenge to the more 
traditional notion of representative democracy and vertical concept of accountability 
inherited from the Westminster select committee system. In contrast, these 
innovations were additions to a relatively small number of these inquiries. 
5.7.3: Flexibility 
Another theme was the capacity of flexible and innovative formats to 
strengthen some external scrutiny inquiries. For example, an inquiry about anti-social 
behaviour conducted at Easington benefited from the decision to interview some 
witnesses in `their own environment' because this approach generated `a more open 
response than... in formal hearings'. Similarly, a response from a local authority in 
the south east highlighted the potential contribution of one-session reviews for the less 
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complex issues, and where external timescales necessitated, a `täst-track' response 
from scrutiny. At Bedford, scrutiny committee members posed as mystery shoppers to 
sample the demand responsive transport service they were evaluating. This evidence 
implied, therefore, that external scrutiny had generated and developed innovative 
formats to promote the accountability process. 
5.8: The media 
The media covered sessions relevant to more than four in ten of these inquiries 
and reports, recommendations or outcomes concerning more than 47% oi'these 
scrutinies (see table 5.21). 
Table 5.21: Media coverage 
N %N % 
Report, Recommendations or Outcomes 99 47.4 110 52.6 
Sessions 93 40.6 136 59.4 
There were marked variations in the willingness of the media to cover 
inquiries about different topics. The number of inquiries about the Post Office, the 
utilities, the fire service and education covered exceeded or at least equalled the 
number that received no coverage in both sections. In contrast, only one-in-six of the 
inquiries about governance and partnership received coverage either in respect of the 
sessions or reports, recommendations or outcome(s) (see tables 5.22 and 5.23). The 
lack of academic literature about these issues meant it was impossible to compare this 
data with previous research. 
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Table 5.22: Media coverage of the reports, recommendations and outcome(s): topics 
N % N °/a 
Trans ort` 14 48.3 15 51.7 
Policing and Community Safety 13 40.6 19 59.4 
Miscellaneous 9 42.9 12 57.1 
Utilities 13 72.2 5 27.8 
Economy, Planning, Regulation and Regeneration 7 50.0 7 50.0 
Leisure 7 38.9 11 61.1 
Post Office 8 57.1 6 42.9 
Youth 8 61.5 5 38.5 
Housing 3 37.5 5 62.5 
Health and Social Care 5 38.5 8 61.5 
Governance and Partnership 1 16.7 5 83.3 
Education 5 55.6 4 44.4 
Waste and Recycling 4 36.4 7 63.6 
Fire Service 2 66.7 1 33.3 









Transport 14 42.4 19 57.6 
Policing and Community Safety 13 37.1 22 62.9 
Miscellaneous 9 36.0 16 64.0 
Utilities 10 50.0 10 50.0 
Economy, Planning, Regulation and Regeneration 7 43.8 9 56.3 
Leisure 4 22.2 14 77.8 
Post Office 12 80.0 3 20.0 
Youth 4 30.8 9 69.2 
Housing 2 20.0 8 80.0 
Health and Social Care 5 38.5 8 61.5 
Governance and Partnership 1 16.7 5 83.3 
Education 5 55.6 4 44.4 
Waste and Recycling 3 27.3 8 72.7 
Fire Service 4 80.0 1 20.0 
Occasionally, a media outlet encouraged the scrutiny process and or adopted 
the emergent agenda. For example, at Medway, the local newspapers adopted 
scrutiny's critical conclusions about the service supplied through the local rail 
franchise. Similarly, an inquiry undertaken by North Lincolnshire about I lumber 
Bridle tolls received significant and favourable coverage from the Scunthorpe 
Telegraph and the Grimsby Telegraph `as part of an ongoing campaign to waive 
bridge tolls for people attending hospitals in and around I lull'. Elsewhere, the media 
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were deployed in an overt attempt to increase public participation in the process. For 
example, at Chesterfield, the Derbyshire Times was used to advertise forthcoming 
sessions of a scrutiny about flooding and the public were invited to attend. In contrast, 
it was suggested that the failure of the local media to report a Breckland scrutiny 
about BT adequately reduced the impact of the process. 
In most cases, media coverage was focused on reporting rather than advocating 
the emerging agenda or advertising the meetings. For example, an inquiry about the 
Bicard review undertaken by Buckinghamshire County Council received significant 
coverage from the local newspaper and two radio stations because it `was clearly a 
topic that they considered important'. The launch event for an inquiry about healthy 
lifestyles undertaken by Cornwall County Council was televised, while the Burnley 
Express carried an article about the outcome of a scrutiny on fly-tipping. Similarly, an 
Oxfordshire County Council scrutiny of the police in relation to domestic violence 
generated a short article in the local press about the inquiry's sessions and a more 
substantial piece at the end of the process. A West Sussex County Council scrutiny 
involving Southern Water was covered in local newspapers, local radio and the BBC 
News website, while a Bristol City Council scrutiny about the Post Office was 
reported by BBC West. 
At Dover, a scrutiny of Kent County Council in relation to the closure of a 
local primary school was allocated four pages in the Dover Express. The analysis 
incorporated an `explanation of the issue, report on the meeting and follow-up/in- 
depth interviews with a member of the public affected by the current policy'. At 
Ashfield, the local paper contained short articles at the `start and end' of a scrutiny 
about the use of CCTV in the district. The chair of an inquiry about flooding 
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undertaken at Nottingham City Council was interviewed on Radio Nottingham, while 
the Evening Post sent a reporter to some of the sessions and, at least, one article 
appeared in the paper. 
There were also examples of negative media coverage. In particular, some 
inquiries suffered from distortions. For example, the press reported that an inquiry 
about road safety undertaken by Camden had decided to recommend a motorbike ban 
when the proposal was a suggestion from one resident. Similarly, at Middlesbrough 
reporting about an inquiry on prostitution served to `provoke/sensationalise the 
subject', while at Castle Morpeth local press reporting of an inquiry into the local 
strategic partnership sensationalised the threat from some councillors to resign if the 
issues were not addressed. Elsewhere, some coverage was hostile to the process and 
or the emergent agenda. At North West Leicestershire, an inquiry about the bus stop at 
Coalville hospital suffered from hostile coverage in the Coalville Times, which was 
initiated by a councillor `who wished to consult constituents before the designs were 
finished and ready for publication' and complained that he had been `gagged'. 
These findings suggested that the media often acted as an important agent of 
downward accountability by reporting the sessions and or recommendations and thus 
raising the profile of these scrutinies. This interest directed attention onto the 
committee members and the scrutinised organisations and could serve to intensify the 
accountability and shift its direction through increasing the range of people likely to 
obtain information about the process and its outcomes. In particular, media reporting 
could raise awareness amongst the electorate about the activities of democratically- 
elected local representatives as scrutineers and had the potential to increase the 
pressure on the councillors undertaking the inquiry to adopt a more direct democratic 
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agenda reflecting concerns arising from the grassroots rather than more elitist sources, 
such as the local political-administrative establishment or their own specific interests 
and or prejudices. The potential for scrutiny to be affected by a more direct variant of 
democracy was, however, determined, in part at least, by the political salience of the 
issue, hence inquiries about topics such as the utilities and the Post Office often 
received coverage whilst those about governance and partnership seldom interested 
the media. 
5.9: Impact of the inquiry 
Evaluations of the success of these inquiries suggested widespread satisfaction with 
the scrutinies. Overall, 79% were judged as being successful, whilst slightly over live per 
cent were classified as `fairly' or `very' unsuccessful (see table 5.24). These findings, 
therefore, supported positive conclusions about the effectiveness of scrutiny from scholars 
such as Snape et al., (2002), Campbell (2005) and Coleman and Glendinning (2004) rather 
than more sceptical evaluations (see Cole, 2001a; Leach, 2006; and Leach et at, 2003). This 
satisfaction was reflected across each type of political management. Inquiries held in mayoral 
inquiries were evaluated as successful in more than 85% ofthe cases, while none were 
considered unsuccessful. Similarly, inquiries in authorities with cabinet and traditional 
governance were rated as successful in almost 78% and 92% of cases respectively. Less than 
nine percent of the inquiries in either of these categories were assessed gis unsuccessful. 










"6 N "b 
Very successful 7 50.0 59 29.8 5 41.7 71 31.7 
Fairly successful 5 35.7 95 48.0 6 50.0 _ 106 47.3 
Neither successful or unsuccessful 2 14.3 33 16.7 0 0.0 35 15.6 
Fairly unsuccessful 0 0.0 8 4.0 I 8.3 9 4.0 
Very unsuccessful 0 0.0 3 1.5 0 0.0 3 1.3 
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[here were some variations in relation to the perceived success ofthe inquiries 
in different types of local authorities. In particular, in London the number of 
successful inquiries composed only two-thirds of the total, while almost 89% of'the 
scrutinies held by the county councils were evaluated as successful. 
Table 5.25: Success of the inquiry: local authority types 
N % N % 
TýN 





Counties 10 37.0 14 51.9 2 7.4 1 3.7 0 0.0 
Districts 32 35.6 40 44.4 13 14.4 4 4.4 I 1.1 
London 9 37.5 7 29.2 4 16.7 2 8.3 2 8.3 
Metropolitan 8 23.5 17 50.0 8 23.5 1 2.9 0 0.0 
En rlish Unita 8 20.5 22 56.4 8 20.5 1 2.6 0 0.0 
Scottish Unitary 3 75.0 I 25.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Welsh_Unitary_ I 16.7 5 83.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0_ 
Notable variations also existed in relation to the percentage of inquiries about 
different topics that were evaluated as successful, which ranged from economic, 
planning, regulation and regeneration (94%) to leisure (63%). In particular, nine-in- 
ten of the inquiries about the utilities were judged successful, a conclusion that might 
imply that this process was suited to improving the pcrlormance and delivery of those 
important public services. The study revealed many examples of external scrutinies 
generating considerable achievements. For example, an inquiry undertaken by Castle 
Morpeth in relation to the local strategic partnership succeeded in producing 'a 
significant change to the LSP partnership arrangenments', while the inquiry about the 
ßicard review undertaken by Buckinghamshire County Council was judged to have 
been `influential'. Similarly, a review of adult education provision in Fenland 
generated significant changes, the respondent commented that the inquiry 'opened the 
wound and explored the issues, which led to better things'. 
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fable 5.26: Success of the inquiry: topics 















Transport 6 20.0 15 50.0 5 16.7 3 10.0 I 3.3 
Policing and 
Community Safety 
8 22.9 20 57.1 6 17.1 I 2.9 0 0.0 
Miscellaneous 10 41.7 9 37.5 5 20.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 




5 27.8 12 66.7 1 5.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Leisure 4 25.0 6 37.5 5 31.3 1 6.3 0 0.0 
Post Office 4 23.5 9 52.9 1 5.9 1 5.9 2 11.8 
Youth 5 41.7 4 33.3 3 25.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Housing 2 22.2 6 66.7 I 11.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
health and Social Care 8 61.5 3 23.1 2 15.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Governance and 
Partnership 
I 14.3 4 57.1 2 28.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Education 3 33.3 4 44.4 2 22.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Waste and Recycling 5 55.6 2 22.2 0 0.0 2 22.2 0 0.0 
Fire Service 1 20.0 3 60.0 0 0.0 1 20. O 0 0.0 
Elsewhere, scrutiny was viewed as an important element of public 
consultation, a mechanism to improve the decision-making process and, by 
implication, to promote a more direct notion of local democracy and downward 
accountability. For example, at Blyth Valley a scrutiny about post office closures was 
viewed as a 'more appropriate way for the council to respond to consultation'. 
Questioning witnesses meant that the scrutiny commission was 'much more informed 
and able to respond more effectively'. At Scarborough, an inquiry about postal 
services gave the local manager of the Royal Mail delivery services an insight into 
`specific concerns of rural villages (north of Whitby).... somc local small businesses 
and some local areas that were puzzled that neighbouring areas were getting their mail 
delivered on a totally different time schedule'. Scrutiny could also he viewed as the 
first step in transforming local vertical accountability, strengthening the influence of' 
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local authorities and democratising the local state. For example, an inquiry about 
flooding at Camden provided the basis for Thames Water and the local authority to 
adopt a partnership approach to tackling flooding problems. 
This evidence in relation to the perceived success of external scrutiny implied 
that the local government modernisation agenda had made a notable contribution to 
making a wide range of organisations accountable to the main institutional terms of 
local representative democracy. The interpretation that almost eight-in-ten of these 
inquiries had been successful was, however, weakened when evidence about the 
implementation of recommendations was incorporated (see table 5.27)10. All the 
scrutiny committee's recommendations were implemented in less than a quarter of the 
inquiries for which relevant data was supplied, while no recommendations had been 
implemented in relation to almost 12% oithose evaluations. The evidence on the 
implementation of recommendations could, therefore, be interpreted as strengthening 
the more sceptical conclusions of scholars such as Cole (2001 a) and Leach et al. 
(2003), rather than the more optimistic conclusions of academics like Snape et al., 
(2002) and Campbell (2005). 

















implemented all the recommendations. 2 25.0 32 22.4 6 50.0 40 24.5 
Implemented most of the recommendations. 5 62.5 45 31.5 3 25.0 53 32.5 
Im Iemented some of the recommendations. 1 12.5 48 33.6 2 16.7 51 31.3 
Implemented none of the recommendations. 0 0.0 18 12.6 1 8.3 19 11.7 
There were also substantial differences between the implementation of 
recommendations in relation to variations in political management. Whilst all the 
recommendations were implemented in relation to half of the inquiries held in 
authorities with a traditional committee structure, this outcome occurred in a quarter 
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of the inquiries staged in authorities with a directly-elected mayor and 22% of those 
with cabinet governance. 
Variations also occurred in relation to the implementation oi' recommendations 
across different types of local authority. There were differences in the percentage of 
inquiries that had all their recommendations implemented, although in relation to the 
counties, districts and Metropolitan boroughs they were not substantial (see table 
5.28). However, in contrast, the implementation of all recommendations from external 
scrutiny inquiries was much less frequent in the English unitaries and non-existent in 
the small number of inquiries identified in Welsh unitary authorities, while the 100% 
success rate in Scotland was a reflection primarily of the small sample. The addition 
of the `most recommendations' category generated a broad convergence in that the 
English unitaries rose to 54%, slightly more than four percent less than the counties 
and less than one percent higher than the districts. Similarly, the London and 
Metropolitan boroughs both recorded a combined total of two-thirds. 
Table 5.28: Implementation: local authority types 
N % 
0 














all the 5 29.4 20 29.0 5 23.8 5 33.3 3 8.6 2 100.0 (1 0.0 40 24.5 
recommendations 
Implemented 
most of the 5 29.4 17 24.6 9 42.9 5 33.3 16 45.7 0 0.0 I 25.0 53 32.5 
recommendations 
Implemented 
some of the 6 35.3 26 37.7 2 9.5 3 20.0 11 31.4 0 0.0 3 75.0 51 31.3 
recommendations 
Implemented ------- 
none of the I 5.9 6 8.7 5 23.8 2 13.3 5 14.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 19 1 1.7 
recommendations 
The extent to which recommendations were implemented also varied in 
relation to the subject of the inquiry. The percentage of inquiries where all the 
recommendations were implemented ranged from half in relation to government and 
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partnerships to less than one-in-ten with regard to the economy, planning, regulation 
and regeneration, while the percentage of inquiries which had, at least, most of their 
recommendations implemented ranged between more than nine-in-ten (utilities; and 
economy, planning, regulation and regeneration) and slightly more than two-in-ten 
(Post Office). There was evidence to suggest that inquiries concerning some of the 
major public services such as health and social care, education and policing had 
relatively little success in securing the implementation of their recommendations. 
Table 5.29: Implementation: topics 
A ll M ost So me No ne 
N % N % N % N % 
Transport 5 20.0 7 28.0 II 44.0 2 8.0 
Policing and Community Safety 4 19.0 2 9.5 12 57.1 3 14.3 
Miscellaneous 8 38.1 6 28.6 5 23.8 2 9.5 
Utilities 5 33.3 9 60.0 I 6.7 0 0.0 
Economy, Planning, Regulation 
and Regeneration 
I 8.3 10 83.3 1 8.3 0 0.0 
Leisure 4 30.8 5 38.5 4 30.8 0 0.0 
Post Office 2 14.3 1 7.1 5 35.7 6 42.9 
Youth 2 22.2 4 44.4 2 22.2 1 11.1 
Housing I 33.3 1 33.3 I 33.3 0 0.0 
Health and Social Care 3 27.3 2 18.2 4 36.4 2 18.2 
Governance and Partnership 1 50.0 0 0.0 I 50.0 0 0.0 
Education 1 14.3 2 28.6 3 42.9 1 14.3 
Waste and Recycling 2 28.6 3 42.9 I 14.3 I 14.3 
Fire Service 1 33.3 1 33.3 0 0.0 1 33.3 
The relative success in influencing the utilities and failure in altering decisions 
taken by the Post Office suggested important lessons for the impact of external 
scrutiny on commercial organisations. External scrutiny had notable success 
persuading the utilities to implement their recommendations because many of those 
inquiries focused on clear failures to supply services of an adequate standard. In 
contrast, inquiries about the Post Office often concerned decisions to close branches 
and thus focused on the scale of the services to be supplied. In essence, it appeared 
that whilst external scrutiny might he able to raise the standard of'services where the 
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organisation was committed to maintaining a supply, it was a much less effective 
mechanism to challenge decisions by a commercial organisation to withdraw from 
areas it did not view as being viable economically. 
Scepticism about the achievements of some inquiries was amplified in the 
comments supplied by respondents. For example, at North Lincolnshire the inquiry 
about the impact of the Humber Bridge tolls on NHS patients achieved little because 
`there was little that the scrutiny panel could achieve'. It was suggested that scrutiny 
topics should be `chosen with more care'. Similarly, certain organisations ignored 
scrutiny recommendations with ease. For example, at Kent the rail franchise holder 
was able to ignore scrutiny recommendations, despite substantial local support for the 
scrutiny agenda. In this case, the scrutinised body was sufficiently powerful and was 
not obliged to make concessions to obtain local support and allies. 
The impact of these inquiries was also affected by weaknesses in the 
arrangements of the relevant scrutiny committee. For example, at Hull an inquiry on 
Sure Start was affected by the long duration, which meant that there were substantial 
changes to the committee's membership and `ownership' of the process and the 
recommendations were diluted. Elsewhere, the implementation of recommendations 
could suffer if the committee did not develop an effective plan of action. Failure to 
establish a strategy had lessened the impact of an inquiry about fly-tipping undertaken 
at Burnley. Similarly, a respondent from London suggested that a crucial element was 
the provision of `ongoing support to the external organisation with regard to building 
and implementing the..... recommendations' and that the absence of such support 
would jeopardise the implementation of the emergent agenda. 
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The evidence in relation to recommendations, therefore, challenged the 
positive conclusions drawn from the question about the perceived success of these 
inquiries and implied that the local government modernisation agenda had not, in 
general, enabled representative local government to enforce remedies. " In the absence 
of formal enforcement powers, external scrutiny had often struggled to acquire the 
political and moral legitimacy and authority necessary to implement its agenda. The 
impact on holding even the New Magistracy accountable must, therefore, be regarded 
as relatively marginal. In effect, scrutiny committees operated as less prestigious 
versions of House of Commons' departmental select committees. 
The absence of formal powers to enforce their recommendations combined 
with the failure of many of those recommendations to be implemented might also 
have undermined the deterrent effect of scrutiny on the activities of external 
organisations and thus weakened vertical accountability to democratic representative 
institutions because the costs of behaviour unacceptable to local councillors were 
usually low. 
5.10: Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the function of local authorities to hold external 
organisations accountable. While a notable number of external inquiries had been 
held, this activity remained quite marginal to local government, with over three-fifths 
of the authorities responding to the scoping survey claiming not to have held such a 
scrutiny in the specified period. External scrutiny was almost exclusively an English 
activity and concentrated disproportionately amongst top-tier authorities. In terms of 
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topics there was a relatively high degree of interest in transport and 
policing/community action. 
The scrutiny committee that staged the inquiry drove the scrutiny process 
substantially. There was also much satisfaction with internal support for these 
inquiries, a conclusion that challenged findings from previous studies. The main 
sources of advice were internal, although academic experts, other local authorities and 
the voluntary sector supplied advice to a notable number of scrutinies. 
The evaluation also indicated that most scrutinised agencies had a supportive 
attitude towards these inquiries. There was widespread co-operation from the external 
agencies over issues such as requests for information and witnesses, while the impact 
of the inquiries on relations between the local authority and the scrutinised 
organisation was often positive. There were also interesting variations in relation to 
the topics. 
The survey found no evidence to suggest that any political group subjected 
external scrutiny inquiries to a whip. In addition, a relatively small number of party 
groups held meetings about an external scrutiny before sessions of the inquiry. There 
were also interesting findings about the benefits of direct public participation and the 
development of innovative formats. The media covered many of these inquiries, 
although this focus was disproportionately on some topics such as the Post Office, the 
fire service, the utilities and education. Respondents suggested that almost eight in ten 
of these inquiries had been successful, although these positive conclusions were 
diminished when the extent to which the scrutinised agencies had implemented 
recommendations was assessed. 
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The emergence of external scrutiny had supplied a mechanism through which 
the New Magistracy of the appointed state and a wide variety of other organisations 
could be held accountable to local representative democracy. External scrutiny 
considered functions such as the postal service that were never undertaken by local 
authorities and services such as the water supply that were separated from local 
government decades ago. The scrutiny role of local authorities must be seen primarily 
as a mechanism of vertical accountability, although media pressures and the use of 
some elements of a more direct concept of democracy meant that this model 
incorporated elements of downward accountability. 
This enhanced accountability role for councillors resulting from the recent 
local government modernisation agenda had, however, to be qualified by two 
important factors. First, the limited capacity of scrutiny meant that only a small 
number of inquiries could be undertaken, although the institutional presence of 
scrutiny structures and the possibility of specific decisions being the subject of an 
inquiry might have affected the actions of external bodies. Second, the absence of 
formal enforcement powers and the variable extent to which recommendations were 
implemented suggested a recurrent weakness in this accountability model. 
The focus on external scrutiny could also be seen through the prism of the 
development of a partnership notion of local governance, which stressed a more 
collaborative mode of working. This approach extended the influence of democratic 
local governance but obliged local authorities to bargain and co-operate with non- 
elected organisations and establish formal and often wide-ranging institutional 
structures with them, examples included Health Action Zones (HAZs) and Local 
Strategic Partnerships (LSPs). There was, however, a potential for conflict between 
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these two components of the local government modernisation agenda: partnerships 
and scrutiny. The local accountability process inherent in external scrutiny could be 
viewed as a threat to the good relations required for an effective partnership approach, 
however the evidence presented in this study suggested that external scrutiny often 
strengthened and seldom worsened relations between the local authority and the 
external body thus enhancing this collaborative notion of democratic local 
governance. 
I Scrutiny can contain lay (ie non-councillor) members, although the preponderance of elected councillors 
meant that it was appropriate to consider them as instruments of representative democracy. In any case, 
many scrutiny committees had a membership composed exclusively of elected councillors. 
2 The discussions on media coverage and the inclusion of elements of direct public participation also 
incorporated the idea of scrutiny committee councillors and or scrutinised agencies being downwardly 
accountable to a grassroots agenda. 
3 For the first three columns percentages relate to the total number of local authorities in each category. In 
the last two columns they relate to the overall number of inquiries identified. Column three gives 
percentages in relation to the proportion of local authorities from each category completing at least one 
response to the second stage questionnaire. 
4 The figures in the 'main reason' column total 242 not 238 because some respondents listed more than 
one main reason. 
S The figures in the 'main reason' column total 243 not 238 because some respondents Iisted more than 
one committee as having the joint main role. 
6 The figures in the 'main role' column total 241 not 238 because some respondents listed more than one 
committee as having the joint main role. 
7 It is reasonable to suppose that if local authority staff supported external inquiries similar procedures 
existed in relation to internal inquiries; an assumption strengthened by the existence of dedicated 
scrutiny units in many authorities. In any case, in most instances, the same committee undertook both 
external and internal inquiries. 
8 Respondents were asked to choose from five options with regard to the attitude of the scrutinised 
agency. The full wording of the choices was: generally enthusiastic; supportive but little evidence of 
enthusiasm; polite and civil but viewed the process as an obligation or burden and showed some 
suspicion; significant tensions with the scrutiny committee; open conflict with the scrutiny committee. 9 There were some exceptions in relation to external bodies with councillor representation in their 
governance such as housing ALMOs and various partnerships with participation from the local 
authority. 
10 Tables 5.27,5.28 and 5.29 only recorded responses In relation to inquiries for which recommendations 
had been made and enough time had elapsed to evaluate implementation. No recommendations were 
made in relation to 34 inquiries, while insufficient time had elapsed in relation to 11. This section of the 
questionnaire was not answered with regard to 30 scrutinies. 
tt Exceptions could occur in relation to organisations that had councillors on their boards, bodies 





In this chapter, a selection of consultations undertaken by Devon County 
Council between 1996 and 2001 are evaluated. The term `consultation' was selected 
to reflect a reality that in many of these exercises the consultees had a relatively 
marginal role in the process of policy formulation (see Arnstein, 1971; Gyford, 1991) 
and because this term could also be deployed to incorporate Devon County Council 
initiatives allowing consultees a more direct input into the policy-making process. In 
contrast, using the term `participation" to describe initiatives discussed in this chapter 
was less appropriate because it often implied a more substantial degree of 
involvement and influence in policy formulation than was justified by the data, 
However, it should, of course, be noted that this discussion and these 
distinctions are clouded with theoretical subtleties and problems (see chapter two). 
The approach used here has similarities with that adopted by Gyford (1991), has 
echoes in Arnstein's (1971) analysis but contrasts with Lowndes et at. (2001a; 2001b) 
who deployed the concept of `participation' to address the full range of initiatives in 
this area. Although this conceptual debate is fascinating, it is not central to the 
research discussed in this chapter because whether `consultation' or `participation' 
was used the practical findings would remain unaltered, differences would be 
restricted to linguistic nuance and how the debate linked to the academic literature 
(see chapter two). 
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The survey of consultations conducted by Devon County Council incorporates 
examples from a wide-range of functions and covers the use of mechanisms such as 
questionnaires, interviews and group discussions. These consultations are assessed in 
terms of the relationship between the authority and the consultees; the methodological 
expertise of the officer(s) undertaking each consultation; co-ordination with the 
corporate centre of the authority; and the results and impact of the process. A series of 
factors affecting the impact of consultations are identified and discussed. The analysis 
is undertaken within a three-group classification, which reflected differences in the 
characteristics of the consultees. User surveys incorporate consultations about service 
responsibilities that are restricted to existing service users. Consultations classified in 
the `responsibilities' section also involve the participation of a wider range of 
individuals, while the `organisational' category contains consultations concerned 
exclusively with the management of the authority, such as staff training. The analysis 
is also linked with the themes of democracy, accountability and the local government 
modernisation agenda. 
6.2: Devon County Council and the consultation agenda 
In 2001 Devon County Council had just developed a corporate approach to 
consultations. At corporate and senior management level there was broad acceptance 
of the extension of consultation envisaged by central government as part of the 
modernisation agenda. Two groups had, therefore, been established to co-ordinate and 
facilitate consultations. The Consultation Co-ordination Group was responsible for 
linking consultations undertaken in different areas of the authority, while the Devon 
Consultation Group co-ordinated consultations performed by the council with those 
undertaken by other public bodies in Devon. A key aim was the elimination of 
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multiple requests for similar information so as to reduce the burden placed on specific 
individuals and institutions. The authority had also established a registration 
procedure for all its consultations. There was an obligation to register each 
consultation with a senior manager in each directorate, who was required to inform 
the corporate centre, which kept a list of consultations. The council had also adopted a 
code of practice and framework of ethics for conducting consultations, which arose 
out of good practice in the Social Services Directorate. This code incorporated 
guidance on a wide range of issues such as confidentiality and supplying feedback to 
the consultees. 
6.3: Relationship with the consultees 
The authority's consultation strategy identified good practice in relation to 
consultees. In particular, this agenda emphasised the importance of explaining the 
purpose and process of each consultation, supplying information about the 
relationship to the decision-making process and the giving feedback (DCC, 2000b: I- 
2). The evidence identified in this study suggested, however, that a substantial number 
of consultations did not reflect this best practice adequately. The survey evaluated 
information supplied to consultees. Managers were asked whether they explained 
policy on a wide range of issues to the consultees (see table 6.1). 
The survey showed that in most of these consultations important information 
was withheld. Policy about confidentiality and anonymity was not disclosed in almost 
57% of the consultations. Similarly, consultees were not informed about the methods 
for providing feedback or about the timetable for the consultation in 41% and 22% of 
the consultations respectively. Twenty-two percent of consultations also failed to 
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supply consultees with feedback either during the process or after the consultation had 
been finished. An officer from social services highlighted the importance of supplying 
feedback about the basis of decisions. She suggested that this approach was necessary 
in order to prevent consultees becoming angry when decisions did not reflect their 
attitudes. 
Table 6.1: Relationship with the consultees 






















What was inside and 
outside the remit of the 12 70.6 5 29.4 26 86.7 4 13.3 3 75.0 I 25.0 
consultation. 
What would be done with 13 76.5 4 23.5 29 96.7 I 3.3 3 75.0 1 25.0 
the responses. 
Policy on confidentiality 5 29.4 12 70.5 15 50.0 I5 50.0 2 50.0 2 50 0 
and anonymity. . 
Timetable I'or the 10 58.8 7 41.2 27 90.0 3 10.0 3 75.0 I 25.0 
consultation. 
Methods for providing 
feedback to the consultees. 
7 41.2 10 58.8 22 73.3 8 26.7 I 25.0 3 75.0 
Extent to which the council 
was committed to consider , 10 58.8 7 41.2 26 86.7 4 13.3 4 100 0 0 0 0 
act on or he bound by the . . 
results. 
These findings suggested that many officers in the authority had a restrictive 
notion of their obligations in respect ofdownward accountability to consultees`. 
Furthermore, commitment was typically weaker when the survey was restricted to 
service users. For example, only 59% of those consultations informed participants 
about the extent to which the authority was committed to consider, act on or be hound 
by the results, a total that was almost 20% lower than that generated by the complete 
sample. Similarly, policy on confidentiality and anonymity was not disclosed to 
consultees in more than seven-in-ten of the cases where the process was restricted to 
service users, compared with almost 57% liar the entire sample. "These findings also 
suggested that many consultations were constructed on a restrictive view of direct 
democratic participation, which implied the 'illusion of wide-scale political 
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involvement' (Copus, 2006: 101) and was situated firmly in the tradition of 
representative rather than direct democracy. 
6.4: Methodological expertise 
The authority had developed mechanisms to support the consultation process. 
Advice and practical assistance was available from Corporate Information Services 
(CIS), which claimed to have `expertise in compiling and analysing questionnaires 
and in undertaking survey work' (DCC, 2000a: 19). The existence of this unit was 
intended to provide the assistance necessary to maintain rigorous methodological 
standards. Indeed, in 2000 the council decided to oblige officers undertaking a 
consultation to approach CIS before hiring external companies or performing the work 
themselves (DCC, 2000a: 19). The CIS was, however, an inadequate mechanism. In 
particular, the unit lacked the capacity to assist more than a small percentage of the 
consultations undertaken on behalf of the local authority. 
Some consultations used external agencies to ensure that they were undertaken 
in a rigorous manner. For example, the University of Exeter designed the 
questionnaire used in a consultation on Help Desks. There was also evidence that 
some consultations used in-house expertise. Some officers in social services drew on 
the methodological skills of colleagues, while an officer in the Education Directorate 
used the Education Psychology Service to design questionnaires. In some other cases, 
such as the PLUS (library users survey) and the Best Value customer satisfaction 
survey, the authority used forms designed at a national level. 
Most consultations using in-house teams, however, lacked rigour. One 
supporter of hiring external consultants argued that if the authority undertook 
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consultations alone there was `a danger that we could make them more positive' than 
was justified and suggested that the authority could hear the message `we want to 
hear'. Similarly, an officer from social services commented that there was a risk that 
officers conducting consultations instinctively encouraged people to confirm the 
existing agenda and `help people to the view that you want them to get'. Another 
manager from social services argued that `in terms of formal consultations, we are not 
very good at it'. Most consultations in his directorate were `amateurish' and much in- 
house sampling performed by his directorate was suspect. Similarly, a senior 
education officer observed that the authority's consultations `could be more structured 
and professional'. 
A manager with responsibility for roads said that weaknesses in consultation 
procedures had been used against the authority at public inquiries. This officer cited a 
case in which the authority had been criticised for using the colour red for its preferred 
route for a new road on the basis that red was the most popular colour and introduced 
a bias in favour of the preferred option. He thought that an expert in consultation 
methodologies would have been aware of this potential difficulty and would have 
recommended that another colour be selected for the preferred route. 
Another officer in the Environment Directorate said that her directorate 
required advice about the phrasing of questions and how to avoid framing `leading' 
questions. Phrasing weaknesses had enabled Friends of the Earth to criticise a 
consultation on the construction of a ring road. A third environment officer noted that 
difficulties could arise in relation to technical terminology and argued that `we are 
inevitably insular and speak in a professional way that is inaccessible to outsiders'. 
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Similarly, an officer with a key role in a library service consultation observed that 
design faults in the questionnaire `made analysis difficult'. 
The interviews also revealed widespread resistance to the notion that 
methodological rigour was important. Indeed, some managers took pride in the idea 
that they were busy practitioners with little time or enthusiasm for methodological 
issues. For example, a social services manager dismissed methodological concerns 
and commented that she'did it (the consultation) on my feet'. Another officer from 
social services observed that pressures of cost and time meant that consultations were 
often performed `on the hoof and that speed was usually more important than 
producing a study that would conform to `rigorous academic standards'. Similarly, an 
Environment Directorate officer asserted that it was easy `to spend a disproportionate 
amount of money consulting on a small scheme'. 
Overall, there was little concern about methodological weaknesses or the lack 
of research skills amongst council employees. In particular, concerns about the extent 
to which consultees were statistically representative of the whole population were 
typically dismissed. Claims that the sample was statistically representative were made 
for only two consultations. In some instances, particular characteristics of the service 
meant that such an objective was impossible to obtain. An officer responsible for a 
consultation about the registration service said that surveys in this area could not be 
statistically representative because statutory confidentiality requirements meant that 
they could not ask for the names and addresses of service users. Furthermore, this 
consultation suffered from a pronounced problem of non-response because many 
people were resistant to the idea of participating in a survey at what was often a very 
stressful time. 
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A consultation with carers was also unable to locate a statistically 
representative sample because there was no obligation to register as a carer. The 
survey circumvented these difficulties by focusing on people who had contacted their 
GP in relation to their role as a carer. The interviewee admitted, however, that this 
methodology created a sample bias in favour of people who had asked for support. An 
officer with responsibility for a consultation on breaks for carers of children with 
disabilities also admitted sample bias because her team targeted people they knew. 
She asserted that trying to establish a statistically representative sample that 
incorporated people not yet closely involved with social services would have 
consumed too much officer-time, Similarly, an officer with responsibility for the 
consultation on the Devon Early Years Development and Childcare Plan 
acknowledged that the consultation had `a lot of theoretical weaknesses' and that her 
sample was biased against the unemployed, the socially excluded and teenage 
mothers. 
For many managers, the extent to which the sample represented a wider 
relevant population was unimportant. In contrast, it was suggested that the key issue 
was the need to allow people to participate and that if people did not participate they 
had no right to complain if unrepresentative results emerged. An officer involved in 
consulting about residents' parking and traffic calming in Exeter argued that 
`everyone gets a letter so everyone gets an opportunity to be involved in consultation'. 
However, colleagues who worked on a similar consultation in Okehampton said that 
with questionnaires there was a significant risk that the sample would be biased in 
favour of the scheme because opponents would not reply. Many officers, however, 
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justified their consultation in terms of a high response rate or positive outcomes and 
implied that the rigour of the methodology was a relatively minor matter. 
There was also resistance to innovative techniques and faith in the 
accumulated experience of individual directorates and/or managers. This position was 
acknowledged by a senior manager in the Environment Directorate who commented 
that `we are rather traditional.... maybe we have not been challenged enough about 
whether the way we are consulting is effective'. He further observed that the 
effectiveness of consultations on minor road schemes was reduced by the use of wall 
plans because some people had difficulty in understanding the implications. In 
contrast, he suggested that 3D models would communicate the impact of such 
schemes more successfully. 
These problems supported conclusions about weaknesses in the research 
capacity of local authorities (see Percy-Smith and Sanderson, 2000: Sanderson et al., 
2001) and also implied an institutional malaise or, at minimum, carelessness with 
regard to injecting an element of direct democracy into policy formulation and 
establishing strong lines of downward accountability in respect of the decision-making 
process. These methodological weaknesses and the lack of an institutional 
commitment to address such problems implied that consultation was often viewed 
more as a formal process that needed to be completed than a mechanism to extend 
meaningful involvement in the policy process. Furthermore, these findings also 
questioned the capacity of local government to deliver on this important aspect of the 
modernisation agenda and suggested that training, funding and a cultural shift in 
relation to research methods might be required for a cultural shift in relation to 
consultation. 
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6.5: Co-ordination and the corporate centre 
Although the benefits of co-ordinating the council's consultation activities 
were recognised there was, however, significant reluctance to engage with this 
agenda. First, some managers assumed that it was inappropriate to apply this agenda 
to their work. This focus was emphasised by an officer from social services who 
viewed `joined-up' consultation in terms of establishing co-operation between the 
local arms of social services and the NHS. 
Second, there was some clear resistance to this approach. For example, a 
manager in the Environment Directorate argued that the logic behind the `joined-up' 
agenda was suspect because the authority's service responsibilities were the result of 
`a historic accident'. Concern was also expressed that the `joined-up' agenda could 
constrain their capacity to consult and deny them some of the required information. 
For example, an interviewee argued that `with joined-up consultation there is a danger 
of losing focus and not asking the questions in the way we want to ask them'. Other 
respondents commented that the `joined-up' agenda was not relevant to their work 
because the conduct of their consultation(s) was determined by legislation. 
The corporate consultation agenda was implemented in the context of an 
entrenched culture of departmentalism within the authority. This characteristic had 
been identified by the Local Government Improvement Team, which had observed 
that departmentalism needed to be `complemented by an equal measure of cross- 
service working' (LGIT, 1999: 1) and commented that such working should be 
viewed as `mainstream activity and not an added chore' (LGIT, 1999: 1). The culture 
of departmentalism helped to explain the low priority given to `joining-up' 
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consultations across the authority and the preference for co-ordination with external 
organisations operating in similar areas. 
Departmentalism blunted the effectiveness of attempts to co-ordinate 
consultations. Nineteen interviewees (43%) were not aware of this agenda, a total that 
included some senior officers. Furthermore, only seven (16%) of the interviewees 
knew about the establishment of the Consultation Co-ordination Group. These 
findings were strengthened by evidence that few consultations were registered. In 
total, only six consultations out of the 51 covered in this study had been 
unambiguously registered at the corporate centre. In addition, the register contained 14 
vague references to `all aspects of social care' that could have been relevant to several 
consultations incorporated in this study. 
The corporate centre had, therefore, little appreciation of the scale and 
diversity of consultations undertaken by the authority and devised policies founded on 
a substantial underestimate. For example, the establishment of an obligation to 
approach CIS before proceeding was credible in the context of the registration of 25 to 
30 consultations per year but less feasible if the substantial volume of unregistered 
exercises were taken into account. 3 This weakness of the corporate centre chimed 
with conclusions reached by Lowndes et al. (2001 a: 206) who wrote to chief 
executives to construct a census of the participation methods used by local authorities 
and subsequently observed that `the complex operational structures of most local 
authorities... make it difficult for one individual to have complete knowledge of all the 
organizations' initiatives'. The Devon study complemented the earlier analysis and 
showed that this ignorance can extend to the information specialists at the corporate 
centre and can be substantial. 
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These findings suggested that extending democratic involvement and 
downward accountability through consultations was hampered through managerial 
weaknesses which could only be resolved at the most senior level and supported the 
previous conclusions about an institutional malaise surrounding factors crucial to 
implementing the local government modernisation agenda in this area. In a politico- 
administrative culture with a strong focus on matters such as strengthening downward 
accountability and increasing the direct democracy element in decision-making it 
would, for example, be expected that senior managers, and or the research staff with 
an interest in these issues, would have addressed questions such as the low number of 
registrations and the evident non-registration of most exercises. 
6.6: Results and impact 
There was evidence that senior management recognised, in theory at least, the 
potential of the consultation agenda to engage the wider community. A senior officer 
in the Environment Directorate commented that `consultation raised awareness.... and 
established better working channels with people we would only normally see when 
there was a problem'. The key question was, however, whether this rhetoric reflected 
the impact of specific consultations on the policy-making process, This question was 
addressed by asking managers whether their consultation(s) had produced unexpected 
results and or had a substantial impact, this aspect of the evaluation excluded cases 
where it was too soon to make an assessment. The results are shown in table 6.2. 
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User Surveys 4 26.7 11 73.3 
q 
3.3 4 26.7 
Responsibilities 11 36.7 19 20 63.3 69.0 9 31.0 
Or anisational 2 50.0 2 50.0 5.0 3 75.0 
Total 17 34.7 32 65.3 32 66.7 16 33.3 
This analysis can be adapted to produce an assessment of the effect of these 
consultations on the policy agenda in terms of a threefold classilication. 4 
Consultations that transformed the agenda were those generating unexpected results 
and having a substantial impact. Consultations that confirmed the agenda had a 
substantial impact and produced predictable results. Marginal consultations did not 
have a substantial impact. This evaluation is outlined in table 6.3. 












User Surveys 2 13.3 9 60.0 4 26.7 
Responsibilities 8 27.6 12 41.4 9 31.0 
Organisational I 25.0 0 0.0 3 75.0 
Total II 22.9 21 43.8 16 33.3 
Examples with a marginal impact included a consultation can the historic 
environment strategy, which resulted in `tweaking' rather than significant alterations. 
The only changes derived from tensions between the County Council and Dartmoor 
National Park in relation to the management ofmonument registers. The alterations 
affected a few sentences about the current position and did not alter future strategy. 
Similarly, a consultation on the county structure plan had a limited impact because the 
debate was restricted by the imposition of regional planning guidance. 't'here was, 
therefore a 'limited' opportunity for consultees to alter the plan. A consultation on the 
provision of'skips had no impact on the authority's decisions. Despite evidence that 
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skips were valued throughout the county, budgetary pressures led the authority to 
decide to reduce the number of skips from 63 to ten and force many people living in 
rural communities to undertake significant journeys to dispose of their rubbish. As the 
relevant office commented `the consultation did not change the decision'. 
Two-thirds of these consultations had a substantial impact5, however most of 
them also produced predictable results. These consultations, therefore, confirmed 
existing assumptions, attitudes and agendas rather than challenged or changed them. 
For example, a consultation on the potential use of digitalised information produced 
the predictable conclusion that the relevant organisations valued the materials and 
supported the move towards digitalisation, while results from the PLUS library users' 
survey confirmed criticism of specific buildings. 
A consultation about public access to computers in libraries also served 
primarily to re-enforce staff observations. This evidence did, however, assist in 
justifying important changes such as a movement away from purchasing CD-Roms for 
branches, enhancing staff training to enable them to help users, increasing the 
provision of computers, linking all libraries onto the computer network and catering 
for disadvantaged members of the community. There was, however, also evidence to 
suggest that some consultations that gave support to the status quo had been designed, 
either implicitly or explicitly, to achieve such an aim. Similarly, support for the 
current agenda could be justified by the selective interpretation of the survey evidence. 
For example, a readership survey conducted on behalf of Link, a local authority 
published magazine for people with disabilities, was interpreted as vindicating the 
current editorial strategy and praised for generating some improvements. This 
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interpretation, however, ignored evidence that the magazine offered little for young 
readers and overlooked the failure to survey disabled non-readers. 
Only 17 (35%) of these consultations were evaluated as having produced 
unexpected results. 6 For example, a survey of users of the Devon Record Office 
generated the unexpected finding that only 36% of the users lived in Exeter. Only 11 
(23%) consultations both produced unexpected results and had a substantial impact 
and were thus classified in the transform category. 7 Some of these consultations, 
however, produced notable policy changes. The consultation on the Barnstaple 
Western By-Pass led the County Council to raise the height of an important bridge and 
remove the link road from the scheme, while a consultation on respite care led to the 
introduction of a voucher scheme for carers. A consultation on the Devon Early Years 
Development and Childcare Plan produced the unexpected conclusion that the 
anticipated demand for childcare, in general, and breakfast clubs, in particular, did not 
exist. This finding had a substantial impact because the team concluded that the lack 
of demand for childcare reflected the low aspirations of the mothers and their 
reluctance to re-engage with employment and education. The focus was, therefore, 
shifted to place greater emphasis on lifelong learning. 
A consultation on staff attitudes towards IT undermined many traditional 
assumptions and helped to shift the agenda within the authority, This exercise 
dispelled the myth that most employees were hostile towards IT and served to 
counteract an anti-IT agenda that had been promoted by a vocal minority of staff who 
thought that IT issues were `beneath them'. The results of the survey were used to 
assist in shaping the training and implementation of the new IT system for care 
management. A proposal to establish a new unit in Exeter for people with learning 
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disabilities was abandoned after evidence from a consultation found that clients were 
opposed to the scheme. Similarly, most of a proposed scheme for residents' parking in 
the Heavitree and Poleshoe area of Exeter was abandoned after a consultation 
suggested that a majority of local people opposed the plan. 
Some consultations had an impact on the budget for the relevant service. 
Indeed, consultation results were used routinely to expand or defend budgets. For 
example, expenditure on respite care was increased when a consultation disclosed the 
extent to which carers valued the scheme. Consultation evidence from a user survey 
was also deployed to stop planned cuts to the budget for libraries. The survey results 
served to raise the profile of an unglamorous department within the authority and 
highlighted its value. As an officer proudly observed, survey results were published in 
the bulletin sent to all councillors. 
The relatively small number of consultations in the transform category could 
be interpreted to suggest that downward accountability mechanisms were ineffective 
in relation to their impact on policy formulation and that the impact of a more direct 
concept of democracy was marginal. However, some of those consultations in the 
transform category were associated with important policy changes. Furthermore, the 
interpretation of this evidence was accompanied by methodological problems in 
relation to consultations that were judged to have made a substantial impact but also 
generated predictable results. Arguing that they contributed very little to direct 
democracy or the effectiveness of downward accountability risked overlooking the 
possibility that confirmation of the status quo might have played a key role in policy 
formulation in relation to some of these issues and could have persuaded the authority 
to abandon more radical options. Furthermore, results that supported the 
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bureaucratic/politico consensus might reflect the fact that the earlier stages of the 
policy-making process had been responsive to popular opinion rather than confirm 
theories about an undemocratic and unaccountable bureaucracy. 
It could, however, be deduced that direct democracy and downward 
accountability facilitated through consultations seldom altered the agenda (see table 
6.3). The study also identified several factors that affected the impact of consultations. 
6.6.1: Timing 
The impact of consultations on many of the key countywide plans was 
diminished because consultees were incorporated into the decision-making process at 
a late stage. Public consultation occurred primarily on complex proposals and was not 
used to devise them. The officer with responsibility for the consultation on the historic 
environment strategy commented that the consultation should have occurred earlier in 
the process and implied that there was `institutional reluctance' to allow consultees 
into the process at a stage where they could affect major changes. 
A senior officer in the Education Directorate, with responsibility for a major 
education plan, raised this problem and argued that the council should `involve more 
people at an earlier stage, before they get into the detail'. This interviewee suggested 
that public consultation on his plan would have been improved by establishing a 
representative panel at the start of the process to identify priorities used to write the 
draft plan. Public consultation had been confined to asking for opinions on the draft 
plan. 
In contrast, an officer in the Environment Directorate highlighted the 
advantages of giving the public a coherent set of alternatives. A consultation on a road 
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scheme at Moretonhampstead failed because the authority asked the public to devise 
routes and obtained 30 different alternatives, many of which could not be justified in 
terms of cost. This interviewee implied that the public had been incorporated into the 
process at too early a stage and that the authority should have devised three or four 
viable alternatives and then consulted the public. An extreme example of the 
restrictions imposed by timing was provided by the consultation on the economic 
development plan, which occurred two months after the annual budget had been 
agreed. The consultation could, therefore, have had little impact in that financial year 
although it might have affected subsequent decisions. 
6.6.2: Attitude towards the consultees 
The impact of a consultation can be affected by the perceived importance of 
the consultees. The value social services placed on obtaining opinions from clients 
with learning disabilities was reflected in their response to evidence from the Exeter 
Learning Disabilities Review and the deployment of an advocacy worker, who used 
signing and symbols to translate the proposals into a form that could be understood by 
individuals of limited intelligence. 
Elsewhere, the analysis showed that the opinions of some groups were treated 
with much less respect, In particular, recommendations resulting from consultations 
about facilities for travellers were ignored on a regular basis. The manager responsible 
observed that the council lacked the political will to spend money in this area and 
commented that the politico-administrative leadership regarded him with suspicion. 
The key problem was that money spent in this area could attract adverse publicity and 
lose politicians votes. Failure to improve their facilities had bred a cynicism amongst 
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this client group and they expected consultations to be followed by long periods of 
inaction. 
The council also lacked the will to treat consultation with the county's young 
people in a serious manner. Devon Youth Council (DYC) had been established with 
the objective of supplying `a two-way link between the young people of Devon and 
Devon County Council' (DYC Constitution: 1). However, DYC suffered from two 
fundamental weaknesses that undermined the effectiveness of consultation with the 
county's young people. First, the budget of £10,000 per year was inadequate for a 
large county with a substantial rural population and a relatively low population 
density. Second, there had been no attempt to integrate DYC into the decision-making 
structures of the local authority (Goldsworthy, 2001: 2). Clare Goldsworthy, the 
Youth Co-ordinator, commented that in her first six months in office `apart from the 
Youth Service, no one had ever come to see me about anything'. Furthermore, DYC 
had not been invited to participate in any county consultation affecting young people. 
The County Council's determination to secure the autonomy of DYC had `effectively 
meant neglect and a lack of support' (Goldsworthy, 2001: 2). The ineffectiveness of 
DYC meant that few young people were willing to serve as youth councillors. Clare 
Goldsworthy commented that `we don't have a Youth Council. I have three or four 
young people who come into the office to help me. ' 
Ms Goldsworthy had developed a coherent reform agenda. First, youth 
councillors should be paid a basic allowance. This funding might free them from the 
need to have part-time jobs, enable them to travel around their district, meet a wide 
range of young people and convey a wide diversity of views to the County Council. 
Second, she suggested that the youth councillors could feed this information into the 
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district level youth strategy groups. This approach would have created a formal 
mechanism through which DYC's consultations could be channelled into the decision- 
making process. The County Council recognised that DYC was in need of reform and 
instituted a review in winter 2000/2001, which was published in March 2001. 
Unfortunately, the review was complacent, did not address the often-strident 
criticisms of DYC from young people and youth workers and failed to frame a 
coherent reform agenda that dealt with DYC's problems. 
The problems of DYC reflected the marginal position of young people in the 
authority. The Youth Service was a relatively minor and small section of the Education, 
Arts and Libraries Directorate, while the executive member with responsibility for youth 
issues had a relatively junior position on the Executive Committee. DYC also suffered 
from the fact that almost half of its age group had no vote and that turnout amongst the 
remainders was low (see Bartle, 2002: 200). The high average age of councillors also 
militated against the interests of youth. 9 The low position on the political agenda meant 
that officers outside the Youth Service ignored DYC. 
The evidence suggested, therefore, a form of social exclusion in the capacity of 
certain groups to have a direct input into the decision-making process or assert the 
validity and importance of downward accountability. The study implied that the 
reasons might lie in the attitudes of senior managers and councillors who have, 
therefore, created or affirmed a politico-administrative culture which failed to 
recognise the legitimacy of the contribution of such groups to the democratic process 
or acknowledge the importance of accountability to them. There was a contrast with 
the legitimacy attached to the direct input into policy formulation of certain user 
groups, such as those with learning disabilities (see above), and the consequent 
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strength of downward lines of accountability in respect of the services they used, 
although, in relation to the issues discussed in table 6.1, downward accountability was 
relatively weak in consultations restricted to user groups. 
6.6.3: Public relations 
This survey also revealed evidence to suggest that despite the modernising 
agenda, some consultations were motivated by cynical objectives. These consultations 
were designed as a mechanism for persuading consultees to accept the agenda selected 
by the local authority and were not genuine attempts to allow a wider range of people 
to influence decision-making. One manager from the Social Services Directorate 
thought that consultation was primarily a device to explain difficult decisions to 
clients and reduce their opposition. Similarly, an officer involved in a consultation on 
intelligent transport systems in Exeter observed that the key role of the consultation 
was to make the plans acceptable to local politicians and stakeholders. 
An officer conducting a consultation amongst the council's staff commented 
that the process was intended to `create the illusion that people are involved'. The 
consultation was primarily a public relations exercise designed to reduce staff 
resistance to change. An officer based in the Chief Executive's Directorate observed 
that his consultation was designed primarily to inform rather than consult and 
commented that the consultation was a `charade' because there was little capacity for 
the consultees to exert influence. Similarly, the manager conducting a consultation on 
the design of facilities for travellers commented that `we have to implement a basic 
design...... this consultation is primarily PR'. It was also suggested that the 
responsibility of DYC to consult young people could be explained through public 
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relations and that DYC had been established to enable `Devon County Council to say 
it is consulting young people'. This public relations orientation suggested that some 
consultations lacked any meaningful focus on enhancing direct democracy or a 
commitment to genuine downward accountability. 
6.6.4: High expectations and cost constraints 
The impact of some consultations was reduced because consultees had high 
expectations of service delivery that the local authority could not or was unwilling to 
fund. For example, the consultation on the provision of skips had little impact because 
it produced the predictable conclusion that the public wanted 'facilities within 
reasonable driving distances and reacted badly when a reduction was suggested'. The 
council was unwilling to sustain the existing level of provision and closed most of the 
rural skips despite strong opposition within the ruling political group (see chapter 4). 
Similar problems were experienced in relation to consultations about bus services, 
which invariably generated demands for additional services regardless of probable 
use. This evidence was, therefore, often discounted and decisions taken on the basis of 
separate assessments. 
6.6.5: Professional expertise 
The impact of a consultation could be constrained by the professionalism and 
skill of managers. Several managers commented that if they were performing their 
jobs effectively consultations would produce predictable results and the consequent 
changes would be minor. For example, a senior manager in the Environment 
Directorate commented that'we don't get many public responses that make us take 
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notice' and that'it would be a substantial failing if we received many unexpected 
results'. 
6.6.6: Choice of consultees 
Consultations concerned with technical matters were often restricted to a select 
group of institutional partners. For example, consultation on the historic environment 
strategy was confined to specialist organisations. It was thought inappropriate to 
incorporate a wider range of people on the grounds that nobody else would `know 
whether the statements were true or not'. 
Some consultations had to resolve problems in relation to how to handle the 
involvement of parishes. Parishes were too numerous and important to ignore but they 
had a limited administrative capacity and were targeted by a significant number of 
consultations. In consequence, the response rate from them was often very low and 
not statistically representative of the total. It was, however, possible to engage the 
parishes. In a study of community appraisals (see chapter seven) the author achieved a 
79% response rate from parishes. This success was, however, obtained through 
extreme perseverance and allowing them nine months to respond. Local authority 
officers usually work to more restrictive timescales and have too many commitments 
to devote the necessary energy to contacting non-respondents. 
Where focus group type exercises were used the decision on whether to 
consult different types of consultees separately could have a significant impact. For 
example, an officer with responsibility for a consultation on respite care commented 
that her decision to combine professionals and carers in the same group had been 
mistaken. The carers felt intimidated by the expertise of the professionals and obliged 
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to agree with their comments. She observed that `the professionals damp down the 
enthusiasm of the users'. 
6.6.7: Organisational culture 
The strong departmentalism at Devon County Council (LGIT, 1999: 1) had 
lead to the evolution of different attitudes towards consultation in the different 
directorates. ' 0 In social services the senior management had a positive attitude 
towards the consultation agenda and a commitment to `open dialogue' with their 
clients, although a significant number of the middle and junior level staff that had to 
implement this agenda were less enthusiastic. Such individuals regarded consultation 
as a marginal activity and a burden. One officer suggested that consultation was 
regarded by many in the directorate as a `bolt-on' and a `rock they have to carry round 
with them'. 
In the Environment Directorate scepticism was widespread at all levels of 
management. One officer commented that the directorate had a `patronising attitude 
towards consultation', considered the process as a requirement but often paid little 
attention to the results. In general, the directorate regarded consultations as `a hoop you 
have to jump through'. This impression was re-enforced by a senior officer in the same 
directorate who commented that `you can't pander to people's wishes'. Similarly, an 
officer with responsibility for the consultation on skips commented that `people don't 
understand waste issues'. These conclusions again stressed the importance of the 
politico-administrative culture to the impact of consultations and hence the capacity of 
such initiatives to foster a more direct form of democracy, strengthen downward 
accountability and promote the local government modernisation agenda. 
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6.6.8: National government and statutory limits 
The impact of consultations could also be affected by statue and non-statutory 
regulations. The Best Value satisfaction survey primarily represented the local 
implementation of a national agenda because the questions were determined at 
national level. In particular, the questionnaire lacked specific questions on schools or 
residential care because national government had determined that these areas should 
not be incorporated in the survey. These omissions meant that the Best Value 
consultation `gave an unbalanced view of the...... performance of the County 
Council'. A senior officer described this position as `unbelievable'. The effectiveness 
of the Best Value survey was also constrained by the government's decision that the 
survey should focus on the general public and thus marginalise the experience of 
service users, who possessed genuine knowledge about performance. In consequence, 
a senior officer described this survey as `a blunt instrument'. 
The impact of consultations on road safety was often reduced because 
consultees asked for the installation of 20mph speed limits and sleeping policemen on 
main roads, which were prohibited by statue. A consultation on the registration and 
inspection of care homes was constrained by statutory guidance about how inspections 
should be conducted. The consultation, therefore, covered the narrow range of issues 
over which national regulations gave local authorities some discretion. Similarly, an 
officer noted that the consultation on the design of facilities for travellers was 
restricted by health and safety regulations. 
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6.7: Conclusion 
This chapter raised a range of important issues. First, there were significant 
gaps in the information given to consultees. For example, the provision of feedback 
was far from universal. Second, the analysis suggested that the authority lacked the 
research skills to conduct methodologically rigorous consultations. Few of the 
managers interviewed had any training in basic research techniques, while some were 
proud of their practical focus and, by implication, methodological ignorance. 
Third, the study identified the weakness of the corporate centre. This problem 
undermined attempts to `join-up' the consultations performed by the different 
directorates and the implementation of common standards or guidelines covering 
consultations undertaken throughout the authority. The corporate centre was also 
starved of information about consultations and, therefore, underestimated the number 
undertaken by its employees. Fourth, while the study found that a relatively high 
number of consultations had a substantial impact; several factors that reduced their 
impact were identified. In particular, most of this group of consultations generated 
predictable results that strengthened the existing agenda rather than challenged and or 
altered policy. 
The analysis produced evidence to support the claim that some consultations 
were undertaken for cynical purposes (Arnstein, 1971) and reflected a public relations 
agenda. Some consultations were, therefore, held to mobilise consent rather than 
affect the decision. These consultations concerned image and lacked the substance of 
genuine consultation aimed at strengthening democratic participation in decisions. 
This approach implied what the political marketing literature coined a `sales 
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orientation', through which there was a pronounced emphasis on presenting these 
activities in `the most positive light' and on `communicating the benefits' (Lees- 
Marchment, 2001: 24). The scepticism about the authority's commitment to more 
participative and direct concepts of democracy suggested an inclination towards a 
more elitist and representative notion of democracy in which power was more firmly 
located with senior officials and councillors, although some consultations were 
associated with notable changes and the interpretation of those in the confirm category 
was beset with methodological problems. 
The evaluation could also be interpreted as implying that consultations were 
seldom an effective agent of downward accountability in respect to influencing 
specific decisions. However, once again the presence of a large number of 
consultations that were evaluated as having a substantial impact while generating 
predictable results meant that immense care had to be taken when deducing such 
conclusions from this evidence. 
The findings presented in this chapter also suggested limited progress with the 
aim of the local government modernisation agenda to alter the attitudes of local 
authorities and embed consultation and participation `into the culture of all councils' 
(DETR, 1998: 39). The analysis implied that there existed a substantial number of 
attitudinal and practical obstacles towards the achievement of this agenda. It must, 
however, be noted that the research was undertaken before the end of the Labour 
government's first term and evaluated events that occurred relatively early in the 
modernisation process or before it had started. The research might, therefore, have 
been undertaken before such a shift in the politico-administrative culture of the 
authority could have been expected to occur. 
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I This term is, however, used in other contexts. 
2A few consultations such as those on the economic development plan and the historic environment 
strategy incorporated horizontal accountability to peer groups. There was, however, insufficient data 
about this accountability direction to draw conclusions about consultation with peer groups. 
3 It was not possible to estimate the number of consultations undertaken by the council, In particular, the 
definition was imprecise. Although the evidence from this study suggested that only a small percentage 
were registered. 
4 The effect could only be evaluated in relation to 48 out of the 51 consultations. 
5 Thirty two of the 48 consultations where a judgement could be made. 
6 Seventeen out of the 49 consultations that had generated a final result. 
7 Eleven out of the 48 consultations that could be evaluated in terms of their impact. 
8 DYC represented young people aged between 14 and 24. 
9 Immediately before the June 2001 elections the authority had only one councillor under 40 years old. 
10 There were five directorates (Education, Arts and Libraries; Social Services; Environment; Chief 





In this chapter, community appraisals undertaken in a wide range of 
overwhelmingly rural communities in Devon are evaluated. There is a focus on two 
distinctive themes. First, the responsiveness of various agencies to concerns expressed 
by those communities is assessed. Second, the capacity of these appraisals to promote 
community development and enhance the stock of social capital is analysed, This 
research is discussed in the context of the modernisation agenda both in relation to 
central government's aim of making local authorities more responsive to the 
communities they serve and the wider focus on community, which has incorporated 
debate on topics such as social capital. The evidence from the appraisals is also related 
to democracy and accountability. 
7.2: Community appraisals in Devon 
The 1990s saw an increased interest in community appraisals and an enhanced 
capacity to conduct them. The number of appraisals supported by the Community 
Council of Devon1 increased from approximately five a year in the 1980s to around ten 
a year between 1990 and 1995. In the mid-1990s funding was obtained to enable the 
Community Council to employ two full-time appraisal workers (Taragon, 1998; 27) 
The existence of this level of support for the appraisal process was unusual but 
not unique. Appraisals in Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire and Somerset had benefited 
from substantial finance from the Training and Enterprise Council, the relevant county 
council and LEADER 11 (European) respectively. In Devon, the presence of external 
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funding altered the role of the Community Council. As Taragon (1998: 28) observed, 
the Community Council became more `proactive in encouraging appraisals'. 
The appraisals evaluated in this study resulted either from the initiative of the 
Community Council of Devon or the locality, the latter usually through the parish 
council(s). The process was organised through a steering group appointed by the 
relevant parish council(s) and guided by a fieldworker appointed by the Community 
Council. The steering group produced the questionnaire, in collaboration with the 
Community Council, and arranged delivery to every household in the area. Each 
questionnaire contained two sections. The first part requested information about issues 
such as household members and car ownership, and required a response from one 
individual. In the second section, each resident over the age of ten was asked to 
answer a wide range of questions about local issues, facilities and services. Each 
appraisal incorporated questions on topics such as adult education and health to satisfy 
the funders. Steering groups had the discretion to select additional questions to reflect 
local circumstances. 
Completed questionnaires were collected by a representative(s) of the steering 
group, sent to County Hall and analysed by researchers employed by Devon County 
Council. The steering groups interpreted the results and wrote a report, which 
incorporated recommendations based on the questionnaire responses. Devon County 
Council printed the publication and the completed document was often presented to 
the community at a public meeting. Electronic copies of these reports were placed on 
the Community Council's website. The results have been used for a variety of 
purposes such as assisting funding applications for specific projects, influencing the 
local planning process and developing the agenda of parish councils. 
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7.3: Issues arising from the appraisals 
There were replies from 46 communities, a response rate of 79%. Eighty-five 
percent (39) of these appraisals were evaluated as having enabled the community to 
identify local needs. However, only half (23) of those communities agreed with the broad 
proposition that they had `improved their facilities as a result of the appraisal', although 
evidence from elsewhere on those questionnaires suggested that in the communities not 
agreeing with that proposition progress had been made in addressing some concerns raised 
in the appraisal report. Eleven communities (24%) said that funding had been acquired as 
a result of their appraisal. Progress in addressing concerns expressed in 48 areas was 
evaluated. 2 Each topic was assessed in relation to whether the concerns had been met in 
full; met in part; investigated but not met; or whether no action had been taken (see table 
7.1). 
The analysis suggested that there had been modest progress in addressing the 
concerns raised in the appraisal reports. Some progress had been made to address 
problems outlined in almost 46% of these areas. Furthermore, concerns about issues raised 
in almost nine percent of the areas had been met in full. This analysis had, however, to be 
placed in a wider context. Appraisals did not occur in a vacuum and it was, therefore, 
seldom possible to identify a pure cause and effect link between an appraisal and the 
resolution of a specific problem unsullied by an external factor. In this study, it was, 
therefore, decided to focus on whether the concerns had been met and eschew language 
such as `the appraisal produced' or an `appraisal generated' unless respondents had used 
such terms. Statements about cause and effects were confined, in general, to discussions 
that did not relate to the resolution of a narrow topic, analysis of the obstacles to 
implementation and cases where there had been a clear failure to respond. Given that 
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appraisal evidence was, in general, sent to the relevant authorities it was, however, 
legitimate to view appraisals as part of the public policy debate and as a potential catalyst 
for change. 
Table 7.1: Progress in addressing concerns expressed by the communities 
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7.3.1: Overall impact 
There was significant evidence of improvements in some of the `smaller-scale' 
issues that were dependent substantially or totally on the local community. For 
example, concerns about millennium celebrations; local information; social activities; 
the environment; and footpaths were met in full or met in part in relation to more than 
six in ten of the appraisals that raised such issues. At Holbeton, the appraisal was 
evaluated as having `led to more communication through the newsletter and other 
local organisations'. At Dartington, concern about the smaller-scale village facilities 
had been met through improvements such as the provision of a new bench and the 
renewal of footpaths. This process culminated in the award of Best Kept Village. 
Litter and dog bins had been increased at Willand, while at Instow more dog bins were 
installed and the litter bins were being emptied more frequently in summer. At 
Tedburn St Mary, the community produced a map of local footpaths. At Bigbury-on- 
Sea, the establishment of a parish website by the local community improved 
communications. The study also identified evidence of community activists explicitly 
rejecting appraisal recommendations. Holbeton Parish Council noted but dismissed 
calls for a village design statement, while at Plymtree those responsible for the parish 
newsletter rejected the suggestions made through the appraisal. 
There was evidence that some of the more complex and substantial issues such 
as housing; health and social services; parking; and the local economy, which were 
dependent primarily on action by external agencies, had been addressed. At Mary 
Tavy, appraisal concerns about the lack of affordable housing had been met through 
the involvement of the parish council on the Southern Link Committee. This 
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participation enabled the community to establish connections with West Devon 
Homes and secured eventual agreement for the construction of a `small estate with a 
good affordable housing element'. 
At Bere Ferrers, concerns about rail links had been met through the 
establishment of a Sunday service. Furthermore, the village had been chosen as a pilot 
area for Devon County Council's rural transport initiative. At Spreyton, concerns about 
the bus service were met, in part, through the establishment of one more weekly service 
to Exeter, Crediton and Okehampton. At Bigbury-on-Sea, South Hams District Council 
constructed a new car park complete with a cafe and new toilet block, while South 
Western Electricity Board (SWEB) replaced overhead cables with underground ones. 
Overall, however, the analysis suggested that concerns about many of the more 
complex and `large-scale' issues were less likely to have been resolved than those that 
related to the topics susceptible to community resolution. Concerns about housing; 
parking; the trains; the electricity supply; and health and social services had been met 
in full or part in less than a third of the cases. Similarly, concerns about housing; road 
safety; traffic management; parking; the bus service; trains; the Post Office; the local 
economy; and health and social services had been met in full in less than ten percent 
of the appraisals where such concerns had been acknowledged (see table 7.1). 
For example, criticism about the absence of a daily bus service at Dittisham 
was met initially by the running of a service four times daily in summer and twice 
daily in winter, but in 2001 the winter service was axed and the bus company was 
unresponsive to comments that low usage had reflected the inappropriate timing of the 
service. At Westleigh, requests to improve the appearance of the village by placing 
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overhead cables underground have not resulted in action. Similarly, although the 
Cornworthy appraisal identified a need for new housing, South Hams District Council 
opposed planning permission to build new homes in the village, while at Salcombe, 
parking problems raised in the appraisal were not resolved. It was observed that 
`Devon County Council officers protest they have little or no money and we are cast 
aside'. Evidence from the Whiddon Valley appraisal about the desire for a sub-post 
office was met with a refusal from the Post Office on the basis that such facilities 
existed in Newport, which was not in walking distance for most residents. At Halwell 
and Moreleigh, appraisal evidence about the need for more low-cost housing had not 
generated any response. 
The difficulty in establishing a definitive casual link between appraisal reports 
and agency action, from the evidence presented in this section, limited the capacity to 
identify conclusions about the impact of the appraisals on the downward 
accountability of the agencies or the extent to which these appraisals injected an 
element of democracy, in the case of the non-elected bodies, or direct democracy, in 
the case of elected local governance, into the decision-making process. However, the 
failure to address concerns about many of the more substantial matters suggested that 
appraisals were not an effective mechanism to enhance the democratic or direct 
democratic elements of decision-making or downward accountability in respect of 
many of the larger agencies controlled by individuals who were based outside the 
local community. 
7.3.2: 7Ype of community 
The capacity of the appraisal process to resolve specific local problems was 
also affected by the type of community(ies) covered. Appraisals were relatively 
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ineffective mechanisms in two types of settlement: towns and collections of several 
distinctive parishes. Appraisals incorporating several diverse communities/sub- 
communities risked producing aggregate results that either exaggerated or obscured 
key issues. Substantial concern about an issue in one sub-area could be obscured by 
satisfaction in another, while there might be too wide a variation in the type of 
problems across the appraisal area. For example, the response from Bigbury 
questioned whether `such a diverse parish with three distinct separate 
entities... can.... benefit from this type of exercise because their individual 
expectations are quite different'. Similarly, the Bampton return observed that the 
appraisal would have been strengthened if the questionnaire had included one or two 
questions specific to the distinctive community based around Shillingford and Petton. 
In the larger settlements, the high cost of undertaking appraisals could impose 
a substantial burden on steering groups and act as a constraint. In Totnes, fund-raising 
was a critical issue. Conflict over the lack of finance led the Totnes appraisal group to 
vote on whether to disband, and although the vote supported continuing the appraisal 
four members, a third of the group, resigned in protest. The suggestion by the support 
worker that the steering group should seek funds from other organisations was 
rejected and several people had to subsidise the process from their own resources. For 
example, one member bore the cost of phoning Ireland about the design of the cover 
of the report, while others failed to claim postage costs. Despite the commitment of 
the steering group, cost constraints meant that the number of questions had to be 
restricted. The key problem being that the scale of the community meant that the 
appraisal was expensive. Such problems led some steering group members to question 
whether the appraisal was an appropriate mechanism for such a large community. 
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This evidence implied, therefore, that the capacity for the appraisal process to 
enhance democracy and or direct democracy in the decision-making process and or 
encourage the agencies to be more accountable in a downward direction was likely to 
be weakest with regard to towns and collections of several distinct parishes. 
7.3.3: The appraisal process 
The impact of the appraisals, and thus their potential for enhancing local 
democracy and downward accountability, was also constrained by methodological 
weaknesses. The use of a single form to record the attitudes of all household members 
meant that there was no confidentiality within each household and increased the 
possibility that one individual might pose as several respondents. Confidentiality was 
also compromised through the use of door-to-door collectors. As one questionnaire 
noted, `it was felt that had the appraisal forms been returned by post, anonymity 
would have offered a chance of somewhat more honest replies'. Door-to-door 
collection did not comply with best practice as identified by participants and scholars 
(Horton, 1996: 43). 
The amateur status of most steering group members meant that communities 
struggled with important aspects of the process. In particular, steering group members 
lacked expertise in writing questions, At Moretonhampstead, one key participant 
observed that the greatest problem was to write `unbiased questions... .. without 
emotion'. Similarly, a participant at Tedburn St Mary acknowledged weaknesses in 
the wording of some questions. 
Steering groups also struggled to involve the wider public. At 
Moretonhampstead, the initial public meeting was a disaster because it was 
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unstructured and resulted in `chaos'. Some appraisals were weakened because the 
time commitment led to the resignation of steering group members before the process 
had been completed. Despite initial enthusiasm, the appraisal at Mary Tavy `defeated 
many of those who supported it because of the hard work involved'. 
There were also problems with the data analysis undertaken at County Hall - 
some reports contained elementary statistical errors. For example, an interviewee from 
Westleigh observed that the first page of their report contained elementary 
arithmetical mistakes. Similarly, another community observed that the analysis was 
`superficial'. 
7.3.4: Implementation of the agenda 
The extent to which the steering group remained active after the report had 
been disseminated also affected the impact of the appraisal agenda and the 
implications for democracy and accountability. Where active steering groups or 
successor sub-groups survived, the agenda benefited from the presence of a cohesive 
team of activists with a personal commitment to the process. In most communities, 
however, steering groups ceased to exist after the report had been published. In 
general, steering groups possessed the enthusiasm and commitment to administer the 
appraisal but lacked the capacity to promote the emergent agenda. At Mary Tavy, it 
was observed that the steering group `failed to construct a mechanism to bring its 
findings to those authorities..... in a position to help'. 
In such communities, the implementation of the appraisal agenda suffered 
because ownership was unclear. For example, in Totnes uncertainty about ownership 
meant that it was difficult to hold elected representatives to account in relation to the 
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progress of the appraisal agenda, so `apart from a couple of things' the 
recommendations emerging from the appraisal had `fallen into a vacuum'. Assurances 
from the fieldworker that the appraisal agenda would influence policy were viewed 
with scepticism. The appraisal at Hennock and Teign Village also suffered from 
confusion about its ownership. It was suggested that `if it were clear to everyone that 
the parish council was responsible for the appraisal', then complaints about the `lack 
of progress would be directed at those with the power to change things'. In contrast, 
although it was clearly stated at the start of the process that the steering group would 
disband after the publication of the report, the steering group was viewed by some as 
an active group and thus blamed for the lack of progress on implementing the 
recommendations. 
The long-term effectiveness of the steering groups was weakened because their 
democratic legitimacy arose from the appraisal process alone. Once the agenda on any 
issue extended beyond that covered by the appraisal report it was, therefore, difficult 
to justify their mandate. Their long or medium-term effectiveness was, therefore, 
undermined by reliance on an agenda based on a variant of direct democracy and the 
absence of any or, at least, sufficient credibility in relation to representative 
democracy. 3 This issue explained the disappointing climax to the process in Tedbum 
St Mary - the appraisal `fizzled-out' because the parish council declined to pursue the 
emergent agenda. 
Elsewhere, parish and town councils often acquired responsibility for the 
implementation of the appraisal reports. These authorities did use evidence from 
appraisals to support long-standing campaigns, obtain additional resources and 
stimulate community activity; however few town or parish councillors had a 
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substantial attachment to the appraisal process. First, few councillors served on a 
steering group, a position which reflected a best practice consensus that steering 
groups should involve a wide range of community members and was based, in part at 
least, on the aim to use appraisals to empower local people. Second, some councillors 
thought that their involvement would have precipitated the departure of many 
volunteers. Given the involvement of councillors others might have been much less 
inclined to assume a significant administrative role and tempted to take comfort in the 
thought that quasi-professional activists would ensure the project's success. 
Third, some town and parish councillors feared that the process might raise 
public expectations of their council `without a parallel appreciation being in place of 
the need for the necessary executive powers and corresponding financial resources'. 
Fourth, significant tensions existed between some town and parish councils and their 
local steering group. Some councillors felt threatened by the appraisal process because 
it drew into public life potential competitors for their seats. In Devon, at least one 
county councillor became involved in public life through participation in a steering 
group. Success in developing the capacity of more local people to participate in 
community affairs could be viewed by existing local political elites as a challenge to 
their authority and an unwelcome development. In one community, it was suggested 
that parish councillors `feared the development of a parallel group threatening their 
authority' and that `they slowed the process down'. The implementation of the 
appraisal agenda could, therefore, be undermined by a clash between grassroots 
institutional manifestations of representative and direct democracy. Such tensions 
were not, however, universal. One respondent commented that the appraisal was an 
`excellent PR exercise for the parish council'. 
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The successful implementation of an appraisal agenda also raised problems. 
The key difficulty was that appraisals had been undertaken in a limited number of 
communities. In highlighting the needs of those communities the process could, 
therefore, generate a geographic shift in the allocation of resources that could not be 
justified in terms of a universal and accurate evaluation of need. Communities that 
had undertaken an appraisal might, therefore, benefit at the expense of areas that had 
not participated solely because their need had been made explicit. The small number 
of urban appraisals also meant that this process had the potential to transfer resources 
from urban to rural communities that would be difficult to justify in terms of a 
universal and accurate evaluation of need. There was, therefore, a potential conflict 
between an agenda emerging from the appraisal process and the fair and transparent 
spatial allocation of resources. 
This latter effect could become important because there was an existing issue 
about the fairness of the spatial allocation of resources across the county. The main 
concern was the widespread feeling in Exeter that the city subsidised rural Devon and 
should have been given unitary status, a mood also fuelled by wounded civic pride 
that Torbay became a unitary authority in the same review that refused to grant Exeter 
this status. In 2007, this agenda was endorsed by central government, which 
recommended that the city become a unitary authority, although the proposal is 
currently the subject of a legal challenge. There was also concern, primarily amongst 
the most politically knowledgeable element of the population, that the Liberal 
Democrat leadership of Devon County Council was biased in favour of the north and 
north-west of the county and pushed as much discretionary expenditure as possible 
into those areas (see chapter four). 
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The evidence presented in this chapter also suggested that appraisals 
undertaken in Devon had not contributed to the implementation of the local 
government modernisation agenda with respect to generating an atmospheric shift in 
which consultation and participation would become `embedded into the culture of 
councils' (DETR, 1998: 39). There was a central tension between the traditional 
notion of representative democracy and a more participative or direct alternative that 
also embraced a substantial strengthening of downward accountability. This 
characteristic could be seen in the reluctance of county and district authorities to 
implement the emergent agenda and the negativity expressed by some parish 
councillors towards the appraisals. Although some of the evidence suggested that 
appraisals could enhance the responsiveness of parish and town councils to this more 
direct idea of democracy. 
The reluctance to engage with this more direct notion of democracy and 
enhanced notion of downward accountability was shared by the non-elected agencies, 
which, in general, preferred to deal with elected politicians rather than local activists. 
These organisations were, therefore, inclined to favour representative democracy 
rather than more participative alternatives or meaningful downward accountability. 
The limited impact of the appraisals should, however, be placed in the context of 
budgetary constraints and national government policies which limited severely the 
autonomy of local elected and non-elected public sector agencies. Given that the 
appraisal process occurred independently of any obligation on participants to specify 
priorities it was perhaps not surprising that these initiatives often generated numerous 
demands for improved public services that the agencies could not justify. Similarly, 
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private companies might struggle to justify implementing this agenda to their 
shareholders in the absence of imposition from government appointed regulators. 
7.4: Community development and social capital 
The focus on community was strengthened through an assessment of the 
impact of these appraisals on community development and social capital. 
7.4.1: Participation and voluntary activity 
The analysis produced some evidence to suggest that appraisals in Devon had 
enhanced the trust and networks crucial to the development and maintenance of social 
capital. This effect could be seen in answers to the questionnaire. Twenty-three or half 
of the communities agreed with the proposition that the appraisal process had `brought 
many people in the community together and enhanced the feeling of the community'. 
For example, Inwardleigh observed that there was an `enhanced community 
spirit.... particularly on the sports side'. The findings implied, therefore, that the 
appraisal process had increased the capacity of these communities to function 
collectively and `break the chain of dependency' (Wright, 1990: 59), which was an 
essential prerequisite for community development. 
The focus group discussions identified several examples of the benefits 
generated for community development and social capital. In Willand, the positive 
impact on community development was illustrated by the actions of the appraisal 
steering group, which increased local provision of social housing by negotiating the 
sale of some new properties to the local housing association. The initiative occurred 
independently of elected local government, which had told local people to solve their 
own social housing shortfall. Similarly, this exercise led to an increase in social 
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capital as a consequence of the strengthening of local associational structures and the 
enhanced degree of trust and co-operation within the community. 
In Totnes, enhanced community development was expressed through the 
creation of a group charged with considering traffic management in the centre of the 
town, a problem that had existed for over 30 years. This strengthening of local 
associational structures and the emergence of trust amongst individuals with 
contrasting attitudes and who (in some cases) had not previously been on speaking 
terms, generated additional social capital. The appraisal process could, therefore, be 
seen as the catalyst to empower local people to solve or, at least, tackle problems that 
traditional institutions were unwilling to address. 
In most of these cases, the impact of the appraisal on associational structures 
was, however, more modest and confined to activities such as the establishment of 
social or sporting clubs, improving the local environment, the publication of a parish 
newsletter or the organisation of a successful social event. For example, at Dittisham 
a group of volunteers had been assembled to maintain the footpaths and was operating 
successfully. At Holne, an Agenda 21 Group was established, while at Ugborough `a 
very successful walking group was created'. At Westleigh, volunteers restored the 
memorial gardens and thus improved the appearance of the village. 
However, most promises to undertake voluntary work in response to survey 
questions evaporated quickly. An important problem arose because the Community 
Council of Devon stipulated that responses had to be anonymous. Steering groups 
were unable to ask respondents directly to identify themselves or code the forms and 
were, therefore, unable to determine which residents had expressed interest in 
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voluntary work. In consequence, few people became community activists through the 
appraisals and the increase in overall associational activity was marginal. The failure 
of the appraisals to increase markedly the number of local activists limited the impact 
of the exercise. For example, Whiddon Valley concluded that there were `not enough 
people with time available and a co-operative willing spirit to do the work' on the 
issues emerging from the appraisal. 
This issue of anonymity highlighted wider problems about the ownership of 
the process, which reduced the value of appraisals for community development and 
the possible benefits for social capital. Tensions arose because the discretion of 
steering groups was curtailed through restrictions on the number of questions and the 
wide range of compulsory questions necessary to satisfy the funders. The Dittisham 
steering group sought but failed to drop some of the compulsory questions. One 
interviewee from Westleigh commented that his group was `asked to co-operate 
within a prearranged parameter' and observed that the appraisal was `quite a top-down 
process, although it was marketed as the reverse'. The Horrabridge steering group had 
a less contentious relationship with the Community Council, although a leading 
participant commented that they were `steered along a particular route' because the 
Community Council told the steering group which questions to omit in order to reduce 
the questionnaire to the required length. In contrast, steering group members from 
Tedburn St Mary reported that the Community Council merely gave guidance, did not 
attempt to impose an external agenda on the community and emphasised that the 
appraisal had been tailored to the requirements of the locality. 
A representative from Instow observed that the steering group had to justify 
departures from the model question about Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty 
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(ANOB) to match local requirements. The steering group wanted to ask a question 
about the designation of AONBs but the Community Council decreed that respondents 
would not understand the term and attempted to block the question. The interviewee 
observed that the steering group had to `justify why we wanted to divert from the 
model we were given'. Another community had specific problems with the 
prescriptive approach adopted by their fieldworker and `had to put our foot down' to 
cajole that individual to accept a local agenda. 
Relations between the fieldworker and the steering group at 
Moretonhampstead were described as `strained' and disagreement with the 
Community Council over which questions to ask was noted. At Westleigh, there was 
criticism that the steering group was excluded from the process of publishing the 
report. In particular, one interviewee commented that, despite his professional 
background in art and design, his suggestions about graphics had been ignored. At 
Instow, `ownership' issues were raised through the refusal of the Community Council 
to return the questionnaires to the steering group. The Community Council of Devon, 
therefore, claimed de facto ownership of the questionnaires. 
In contrast, some communities praised the role of their fieldworker in assisting 
the steering group and enhancing their capacity to undertake the appraisal. In 
particular, several communities appreciated the role of the fieldworker in supplying 
advice about phrasing questions and resolving conflict between steering group 
members. For example, Slapton observed that the `support and suggestions from the 
Community Council were excellent'. The evidence suggested, therefore, that the 
relationship between the fieldworker and the steering group varied markedly. The 
study identified three explanations. First, there were two distinctive interpretations of 
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the fieldworker's role. One stressed the importance of acting primarily as a facilitator, 
whilst the other emphasised a more prescriptive approach. 
Second, there was evidence that the involvement or association of a prominent 
local politician affected the relationship between the fieldworker and the steering 
group. The two communities with relatively close links to prominent county 
councillors had good relations with a fieldworker who was found to be too 
prescriptive elsewhere. This effect resulted from the close relationship between the 
County Council and the Community Council. Both organisations shared the County 
Hall site at Topsham Road, the County Council funded the Community Council and a 
member of the county's executive worked for the Community Council on community 
appraisals. 
Third, relations tended to be strained when the appraisal steering group 
contained more confident and assertive middle-class participants. It could be claimed 
that a prescriptive agenda might assist community development and raise the level of 
social capital where the steering group lacked sufficient expertise. In such 
communities, a prescriptive style might be required so that local participants could 
acquire key skills (resources) to facilitate future collective action. A prescriptive 
approach was, however, inappropriate where the steering group possessed the basic 
skills, was capable of organising the appraisal and required less guidance. In such 
circumstances, the gains for community development and the stock of social capital 
were likely to be much reduced. 
The holding of appraisals in a relatively small number of communities also 
had implications for community development and social capital. Success in this area 
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might increase spatial inequalities in community development and social capital 
because appraisals tended to be concentrated in the more vibrant localities. In general, 
communities that possessed sufficient cohesion and confidence to undertake an 
appraisal had a relatively enhanced degree of community development and a high 
stock of social capital. This finding challenged the assumption that community 
development was largely irrelevant for middle-class communities (Haughton, 1998: 
876). In contrast, the analysis suggested that this tool of community development was 
most suitable for predominantly middle-class communities, although the process, 
therefore, risked widening spatial inequalities in social capital and community 
development between middle-class and marginalised localities. This analysis 
strengthened concern expressed by Mayo (1975: 140) that appraisals might assist the 
middle-classes to the detriment of working-class communities. 
7.4.2: Communities and the service providers 
The impact on community development and the stock of social capital could 
also be evaluated through an assessment of the relationship between the local 
communities and the service providers. Evidence that the appraisal process had 
improved the responsiveness of the key agencies towards grassroots' concerns and 
strengthened community participation in decision-making could be interpreted to 
imply that the appraisals had stimulated community development. Similarly, such an 
outcome would also suggest that the appraisals had created `the potential for social 
capital at the interface between citizens and the state' (Maloney, et al., 2000: 811). 
Evidence from the questionnaire revealed that in 14 (30%) of these 
communities the appraisal strengthened the links between the locality and its 
associations and the key agencies and stimulated expectations of enhanced support 
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from those agencies. This movement towards closer `inclusion or integration' 
(Maloney, et al., 2000: 811) created the conditions for social capital at the interface 
between the local associations and the agencies, assisted community development and 
stimulated the emergence of a locally determined agenda. The process can be 
illustrated by events in Totnes, where the improvement of the relationship between the 
community and a senior manager in the county highways department assisted the 
establishment of a new association (a community traffic group) and facilitated the 
influence of the new association on local traffic decisions. 
Close relationships between the key agencies and the appraisal communities 
resulted typically in the direct inclusion of appraisal evidence into the decision- 
making process without extensive and or intensive local campaigns. Conclusions were 
valued because the appraisal process was regarded as legitimate. In several 
communities close relationships were expressed through the direct incorporation of 
appraisal recommendations into the local land use plan. In South Hams, the district 
council `actively tied their local plan to the appraisal process' (Taragon, 1998: 66). 
Concern expressed, about affordable housing and the allocation of additional houses 
to the parish, in the Bere Ferrers appraisal was fed into the local plan. Similarly, at 
Instow, the appraisal findings highlighting the need for a new village hall were fed 
directly into North Devon District Council's local plan, which identified land that 
could be used for that purpose. At Moretonhampstead, appraisal evidence in favour of 
housing development was used in support of Dartmoor National Park's ten-year plan 
against a vocal minority of residents who opposed the construction of more homes. 
Overall, there was, however, little evidence to suggest that agencies had 
dedicated mechanisms to incorporate appraisal evidence directly into the policy- 
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making and planning processes. There was, however, evidence to suggest that failure 
to make a significant impact on community development and social capital at the 
agency/community interface had generated social capital at community-level. For 
example, in Willand the failure of the district council to solve the housing problems 
led the community to strengthen its associational structures to enable local people to 
tackle the problems. 
7.4.3: Democracy, accountability, community development and social 
capital. 
The analysis presented in this chapter suggested that the appraisal process 
made a limited or marginal contribution towards strengthening civic society and 
developing a more activist and direct notion of democratic participation or a more 
localised form of accountability. Under such a model local responsibility for the 
solution of many problems would have been effectively transferred to community 
organisations and local activists who would, therefore, be held accountable by their 
neighbours. Such a position suggests horizontal rather than downward accountability. 
A key problem appeared to be that some employees of the Community Council 
of Devon had a relatively paternalistic approach to the appraisals process and 
attempted to impose a `top-down' model of community participation. The potential 
for appraisals to enhance community development was, therefore, often limited. 
Similarly, the variation between the capacity of respondents to express willingness to 
participate on a form and their inclination to act on such words was substantial. 
Perhaps the key constraint on the capacity of the appraisals to generate an activist 
notion of local democracy and accountability, therefore, lay in the priorities of most 
residents. In addition, the typical reluctance of the agencies to alter their relationship 
204 
with these localities also limited the capacity of the appraisals to assist community 
development, generate social capital and strengthen a more grassroots or direct notion 
of democracy and or downward form of accountability. 
The direct connection with the modernisation agenda was quite weak. 
Although the notion of social capital has been championed by Giddens (2000) and 
was a component of the Third Way agenda that was associated with the emergence of 
New Labour, the connection of either concept to the local government modernisation 
process was at most implicit. In any case, the notion of the Third Way gradually 
became marginalised in the rhetoric of senior Labour politicians. In contrast, the 
origins of community development lay in more radical ideas of society rooted much 
further towards the political left and implied a much more fundamental shift in power 
structures than the governments' aspiration for local authorities to embrace 
participation and consultation assumed. 
7.5: Success of the appraisals 
The appraisal process was evaluated as successful in almost 85% of the 
communities. Only two appraisals were classified as unsuccessful (see table 7.2). This 
evaluation did not, however, support the wider analysis, especially the study of 
progress made in addressing the concerns (see table 7.1). In contrast, these results 
implied that satisfaction might be primarily a function of low expectations and or 
cynicism. It could also reflect an attachment to the process on behalf of the 
respondents. 
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Table 7.2: Success of the appraisals 




Very Successful 15 32.6 
Fairly Successful 24 
_52.2 Neither Successful or Unsuccessful 5_ 10.9 
Fairly Unsuccessful I 2.2 
Very Unsuccessful I 22 
Four appraisals (Bradworthy; Tedburn St Mary; Moretonhampstead; and 
Halwell and Moreleigh) were assessed as not having obtained the views of members 
of all sections of the community. Suspicion of the process amongst older residents 
was assessed as having reduced the input from that group at "l'edburn St Mary, while 
Moretonhanipstead failed to involve young people adequately. The process at I laIwell 
and Moreleigh suffered from the fact that residents on the western edge of the parish 
identified with neighbouring parishes such as Cornworthy, Blackawton and 
Harbertonford and were thus disproportionately disinclined to participate in the 
appraisal. 
The satisfaction with the spread of participation elsewhere might he viewed as 
surprising given that the process was based on a household survey --- how did 
respondents know which individuals had actually completed the questions? In 
addition, evidence from the focus groups suggested that membership of the steering 
groups, in general, was concentrated amongst the middle-aged and the middle-class. 
fhis satisfaction was based substantially on reasonable overall response rates and the 
presence of a good spread of people types in the houses that had replied. For example, 
responses from residences containing young people were deployed to conclude that 
the survey had acquired an input from those specific; young people. The responses to 
this question might imply, therefore, as much about the methodological skills of the 
respondents as the success of the appraisal process. Such conclusions might also 
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indicate a lack of concern with the inclusion or exclusion of specific groups or 
satisfaction arising from close involvement in the appraisal and a consequent tendency 
to defend the process of delivery and collection, which was the responsibility of the 
steering group. 
7.6: Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the problems of improving the responsiveness of 
public services, developing social capital and empowering a collection of 
predominantly rural communities. The analysis of the questionnaires suggested that 
concerns raised in these reports were more likely to have been addressed if they 
concerned relatively simple matters that could be resolved through the parish or town 
council or as a consequence of actions of the steering group, other community 
group(s) or more informal structures of the local community. In contrast, concerns 
about relatively complex and substantial issues that were the responsibility of 
statutory agencies or private companies were much less likely to have been resolved 
satisfactorily. Furthermore, the fact that appraisals had been undertaken in a minority 
of communities raised an important problem in relation to the impact of the process. If 
agencies responded to the appraisal agenda there was a danger that resources would be 
skewed towards communities on the basis that they had held an appraisal and that 
their needs/concerns had been expressed, while more substantial needs/concerns could 
be ignored elsewhere because they had not been made explicit through an appraisal. 
The study also identified how the characteristics of the communities 
influenced and constrained the capacity of the appraisal process to address local 
issues. In general, appraisals were less effective in market towns and rural areas 
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defined in terms of two or more small parishes. In both types of appraisal the diversity 
of the geographic area weakened the strength of the conclusions and the impact of the 
process. In addition, the analysis also identified tensions in some communities 
between representative and participative forms of local democracy. First, many local 
politicians were wary of appraisals and felt threatened by them. Second, the 
implementation of an appraisal agenda often suffered because steering groups lacked 
legitimacy once the debate shifted beyond a narrow agenda that could be justified 
through reference to the appraisal report. 
The analysis suggested that the staging of an appraisal could generate some 
benefits in relation to community development and the local stock of social capital. In 
particular, the study implied that community appraisals often strengthened trust and 
associational networks. However, in general, such gains were modest and limited by 
the framework within which the steering groups operated. In particular, the anonymity 
of the questionnaire responses reduced the capacity of the process to promote 
associational activity, while, in some communities; the adoption of a prescriptive style 
by the fieldworker limited the benefits for community development. 
The process could also increase spatial inequalities in factors such as 
community development and social capital because success was often dependent on 
the existence of a vibrant community with a strong tradition of public participation 
and significant associational networks. Furthermore, the analysis suggested that 
although many appraisals had improved relations between the key agencies and the 
local community, this effect was marginal. In particular, agencies typically lacked 
dedicated mechanisms to channel evidence from appraisals into the decision-making 
process. Overall, the analysis implied that the impact of community appraisals on the 
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evolution and delivery of a coherent grassroots' agenda, community development and 
the stock of social capital had been marginal. 
Community appraisals could also be interpreted as a challenge to the 
traditional notion of representative democracy through the creation of a mechanism to 
give a wider community a direct route to participation in the development of policy 
and a device to hold service providers accountable to concerns arising from the 
grassroots. While democratic responsiveness might have been strengthened in relation 
to many of the smaller-scale and less costly items, the record in relation to major 
services such as housing and social services implied that the appraisals had a more 
marginal impact. These results suggested that although parish councils might have 
became more responsive to democratic pressures, the impact on higher tiers of elected 
governance and non-elected agencies was much less marked. The study also implied 
that the accountability gains were concentrated in relation to organisations located in 
the local community. 
There was a link to the modernisation agenda in relation to the government's 
desire to improve the responsiveness of local government to the grassroots and the 
association of social capital with the Third Way. However, appraisals pre-date this 
agenda by almost 30 years, while notions such as community development draw on a 
more radical political agenda considerably to the left of New Labour, which sought to 
address fundamental inequalities in the distribution of political power and ultimately 
wealth. The link with the current modernisation agenda was partial, combined with 
the relatively modest achievements of the appraisals, this evidence suggested that the 
contribution of community appraisals to the modernisation agenda was quite marginal. 
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I The council's principle areas of work included planning, regeneration and social inclusion. This 
organisation was the rural community council for Devon. 
2 Table 7.1 records issues raised in the appraisal reports. Some reports did not discuss concerns in relation 
to compulsory questions and no topic was covered by all the communities. 
3 Where appraisal steering groups contained councillors there was an element of indirect democracy, 
although such individuals were typically outnumbered by unelected activists. 
4 Parish councillor in a letter in the author - 8th May 2001. 
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CHAP PTE R8 
LOCAL BOUNDARY REVIEWS 
8.1: Introduction 
This chapter considers the attitudes of sitting councillors to reviewing ward 
and divisional boundaries and certain implications of these alterations. There are 
sections about the decision to review; reviews and the local community; the review 
process; the changes and electioneering; and the impact of the reviews on the 
workload of councillors. The chapter uses a range of data methods and tests of 
significance. The evidence is also related to democracy, accountability and the local 
government modernisation agenda. 
8.2: Decision to review local boundaries 
Overall, most councillors supported the decision to hold the most recent 
review of their ward or divisional boundaries (see table 8.1). 
In total, almost seven-in-ten respondents said that their review was necessary, 
while slightly more than three in ten argued that the review was unnecessary; a result 
that could he interpreted as endorsing the principle of a regular boundary review. 
Cross tabulations between respondents' opinions about the necessity of the changes to 
their ward or division and local authority type (see table 8.2) suggested that 
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Table 8.1: Necessity of the review 
acceptance of the necessity of this process was lowest in the counties. "These attitudes 
might reflect the emphasis of the Local Government Commission for Fngland on 
electoral equality rather than community ties, which might be less acceptable to 
county councillors given the often more intensive community tocus of councillors 
representing rural areas (see Cole, 2001 a). 
Table 8.2: Necessity of the review and local authority types 
Uni 
N 




Necessary 168 71.5 263 77.8 92 67.6 161 59.2 
Unnecessary 67 28.5 75 22.2 44 32.4 111 40.8 
Opposition to the necessity of the last review of their ward or division was not 
reflected in opposition to the principle of reviewing those boundaries, which was 
supported by over 98% of the respondents (see table 8.3). However, more than a 
quarter of respondents thought that the process should be less frequent than the 15 
year maximum suggested in the legislation (see Railings et al., 2002: 37)', although 
more than one-in-ten respondents argued that these reviews should occur more often 
than the lower end of the frequency guidance, which was established at teen years. 
Overall, these results suggested that discontent was concentrated on their locality 
rather than the principle that regular boundary reviews were required. There was, 
however, a notable minority of these councillors whose lack of enthusiasm fier the 
process could be interpreted as approaching neglect or even hostility. For example, 
over seven percent of respondents commented that reviews should be staged at 
intervals of 25 years or more. 
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Eve t)5 years. 44 4.3 
Every 8 years. 61 6.0 
Every 10 years. 372 36.7 
Every 12 years. 123 12.1 
Every 15 years. 135 13.3 
Eve 20 years. 188 18.6 
Every 25 years. 56 5.5 
Every 30 years. 6 0.6 
Every 40 years. 4 0.4 
Every 50 years. 8 0.8 
Never 17 1.7 
There were also significant variations between local authority type and 
attitudes about the appropriate frequency of the reviews (see table 8.4). 2 In London 
and the unitary authorities holding reviews every ten years or less was the most 
popular option, while in the shire and metropolitan areas the 12 to 20 year option was 
the most popular choice. The spread of opinion amongst county councillors was 
probably best explained in terms of a desire to avoid the disruption to community 
representation, which often accompanied boundary reviews, and concern about the 
time commitment required to establish a reputation in the new areas (see below). The 
high level of support for reviews to be staged at a maximum of every ten years 
amongst respondents from unitary authorities, might reflect positive attitudes towards 
the outcome of the last review, which in many areas had occurred as part of'a process 
that contcrred single-tier status on the authority and enhanced the authority and 
remuneration of sitting councillors. 


















10 ears or less 144 59.5 141 41.2 75 54.0 1 1 42.7 47 ---4'-7.8-'- 
From 12-20 dears 84 34.7 168 49. I 58 41.7 136 49.6 446 44.7 
25 years or more 14 5.8 33 9.6 6 4.3 21 7.7 74 7.4 
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This analysis suggested that there was overwhelming support amongst 
councillors for the view that for local democracy to function effectively regular 
boundary reviews were required. These attitudes were also consistent with a notion of 
representative democracy that focused on the advantages of having relative equality in 
the size of the wards or divisions, which usually reduced disparities in the 
representative burden amongst councillors. Such assumptions were often to the 
detriment of the idea that the downward accountability of councillors to their 
communities was strengthened through the maintenance of relatively stable ward or 
divisional boundaries and hence relative consistency in the individuals and grassroots 
organisations to which they were theoretically responsive. To test whether these 
respondents, in general, possessed a concept of local representative democracy and 
downward accountability that prioritised equalising the size of wards or divisions over 
community factors, the councillors were asked about their attitude towards the 
importance of local councillors representing coherent communities. 
8.3: Community 
The evaluation of the attitudes of councillors towards the extent to which 
wards and divisions should reflect natural community links showed, however, that 
most councillors thought that such links were very important. In contrast, less than 
five percent of the respondents commented that natural community links were 
unimportant (see table 8.5). 
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Table 8.5: The importance of natural community links 






Fairly unimportant 30 --- --. - 2.9 
Neither important nor unimportant 32 3. 
Fairly important 276 26.6 
Very important 655 63.0 
These conclusions were supported by data from another question, which 
showed that a majority of councillors thought that the capacity of wards or divisions to 
unite similar communities was more important than those units having a similar ratio 
of councillors to electors. The proportion rejecting the notion that wards or divisions 
should have a similar ratio regardless of community links exceeded the supporters by 
almost 12%. (see table 8.6). It was clear, therefore, that whilst the principle of'regular 
reviews had widespread support, many respondents favoured a cautious approach to 
change with a pronounced focus on local circumstances. 





Yes 450 44.1 i- 
No 570 _ 55.9 
There was also a significant relationship between this issue and local authority 
type (see table 8.7). 
Table 8.7: Wards or divisions should have a similar councillors to electors ratio 










Yes 105 41.7 184 53.0 78 54.9 83 29.7 
No 147 58.3 163 47.0 64 45.1 196 70.3 
Support for the proposition was substantially lower than average amongst 
county councillors and relatively low amongst councillors representing wards in 
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unitary authorities. This result could be explained by the proportionally stronger 
community focus of rural wards and divisions. 3 When asked about the priority the 
public attached towards equalising the size of wards or divisions or ensuring that 
individual councillors represented coherent communities, respondents thought that 
popular opinion favoured the latter consideration over the former (see table 8.8). In 
total, almost two-thirds of the respondents thought the public were more concerned 
about having electoral units that reflected natural communities. 
Table 8.8: Public attitudes towards councillor ratios and natural community 
links. 
N % 
Councillor/elector ratios should be similar between the wards. a 344 34.7 
Councillor/elector ratios are less important than natural community links. 648 65.3 
These findings should be placed in the context of the local Government 
Commission for England's approach, which assumed that electoral equality should be 
the main consideration and that the "definition of communities and 'local ties' 
was... subjective and likely to be contested" (Railings et al., 2002: 48). The evidence 
suggested, therefore, that the Commission's approach might be at variance with public 
opinion, although the evidence presented in this survey is based exclusively on the 
estimates of politicians and thus should only be used to indicate it possible research 
agenda and not as the basis for firm conclusions about public opinion. 
the study also suggested that more councillors thought that their old wards or 
divisions better reflected natural community links than the new creations (see table 
8.9) 
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Table 8.9: New boundaries and natural community links 




[ inks. New ward better reflects natural community 287 28. 
. The extent to which their ward reflects natural community links has not altered. 378 37.0 
New ward does not reflect natural community as well as the former ward. 356 34.9 
Although the difference between the two categories was not substantial, this 
research implied, however, that the requirement of electoral equality had become such 
a dominant factor that in over a third of these cases the extent to which the councillor 
represented a coherent community or group of communities had been judged to have 
diminished. It also raised questions about the accumulative impact of this policy 
across a series of boundary revisions and issues about the long-term nature of' 
representation under the plurality system, which is often defended on the basis that 
politicians represent coherent and identifiable communities. For example, Hain (1986: 
23) used the fact that some parliamentary constituencies were `formed out of distinct 
communities' to defend the plurality model. 
A cross-tabulation between the type of authority and the responses about the 
impact of these boundary changes generated a significant relationship (see table 8.10). 
The data showed that for each type of local authority more respondents thought that 
these changes had generated wards or divisions that did not reflect natural community 
links as well as the former units than those taking the opposite view. There were, 
however, wide variations in the magnitude of this gap. Respondents from the unitary 
and metropolitan authorities claiming that the natural community links had worsened 
exceeded those reporting the opposite by approximately two to three percent. In 
contrast, the corresponding differences in relation to the London boroughs and the 
counties were more than 11% and 13% respectively. 'Ehe evidence From the counties 
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might be explained through a stronger focus on distinctive communities in rural areas 
arising from the presence of a wide range of small parishes in many divisions, the 
greater focus on the locality and the more intensive commitment to divisional work 
and representation that characterised the role orientation of many county councillors 
(see Cole, 2001 a). The London findings might arise from the diverse and changing 
social, economic, cultural and ethnic mixture, which often meant that a wide range of 
small and diverse groups lived close to each other and that small boundary changes 
could often be very disruptive to the community cohesion of a ward. 
Table 8.10: New boundaries, natural community links and types of authority 














Better reflects links. 68 27.3 102 29.1 35 25.2 82 29.1 
Not altered links. 108 43.4 137 39.0 53 38.1 80 28.4 
Not as well as former ward. 73 29.3 112 31.9 51 36.7 120 42.6 
There was also a significant relationship between a respondents' view of the 
necessity of the boundary changes and the importance of natural communities (see 
table 8.11). This question again raised the community lOCus of many councillors. For 
example, while more than 85% of those thinking that the new ward or division better 
reflected natural community links commented that the changes were necessary, only 
53% of those thinking that the alterations had generated an electoral unit that did not 
reflect natural community links as well as their former ward or division also thought 
the redistricting was necessary. 
Table 8.11: Natural community links and the necessity of the changes 
N % N % 
Better reflect natural community links. 237 85.6 40 14.4 
Not reflect natural community links as well as the former ward. 180 53.3 158 46.7 
Not affected natural community links. 257 73.4 93 26.6 
Total 674 69.8 291 30.2 
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Fhe impact of these boundary changes on community cohesion and democratic 
representation was explored further by asking respondents whether the alterations had 
created and or resolved dilemmas about how to balance the interests ofdifterent 
geographic areas of the ward or division. While a majority of councillors said that the 
changes had neither created nor resolved dilemmas, almost 30% replied that dilemmas 
had been created by the changes. In contrast, less than 16% argued that the changes 
had resolved dilemmas5 (see table 8.12). This data can be interpreted as supporting the 
evidence acquired about natural community links and implied that there was a 
tendency for boundary changes to create more diverse wards or divisions containing a 
wider range of competing interests. An interesting result, given the Fact that rising 
population meant that boundary reviews often generated geographically smaller wards 
or divisions and was perhaps indicative of the importance attached to achieving 
similar councillor to elector ratios in the redistricting process. 
Table 8.12: Impact on dilemmas about balancing the interests of different 
geographic areas of wards or divisions 




Created dilemmas. 231 22.9 
Resolved dilemmas. 90 8.9 
No impact on dilemmas. 619 61.4 
Resolved and created dilemmas. 68 6.7 
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These findings implied that local councillors had a notion of representative 
democracy and their downward accountability that was rooted firmly in the idea that 
their wards or divisions should comprise natural communities. Local authorities 
should, therefore, be composed of politicians who represented coherent and distinctive 
communities, which typically had similar concerns and problems. These attitudes 
suggested resistance to the idea of local councillors as mediators between conflicting 
interests in their ward or division, which arose from its diversity (see chapter four). 
The community focus of many councillors could be interpreted as compatible 
with the local government modernisation agenda, which sought to make councillors `a 
champion of their community' (DETR, 1998: 34). In contrast, the preference of the 
Commission for mathematical equality could be regarded as an obstacle to the 
development of modernised councillors because in some areas, at least, it risked 
diluting the community coherence of wards or divisions thus forcing elected 
representatives to champion one section of the community against another or develop 
a compromise position that threatened to deny everyone adequate democratic 
representation. 
Such a model would also be compatible with a policy specialist orientation 
(see Newton, 1976) because coherent natural communities would be more likely to 
generate a concentration of issues and problems in a similar area. For example, a large 
number of socially excluded people should generate more ombudsman work in 
relation to issues such as social housing and social services. In such circumstances, 
councillors might be more inclined to specialise in specific aspects of the authority's 
responsibilities. The establishment of electoral units based on distinctive 
communities, rather than wards or divisions that better reflected the diversity of the 
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whole local authority area, might also encourage a parochial focus in relation to 
representative democracy in which many councillors placed a relatively low priority 
on the interests of the wider geographic area. This effect might arise because many 
issues important to the local authority as a whole had little resonance within a 
distinctive unit with atypical social-economic characteristics. The creation of such 
wards or divisions, combined with the plurality electoral system, could also increase 
the proportion of safe seats and thus diminish the extent of effective electoral 
competition, a consequence that is viewed by some writers as a reduction in the 
performance of representative democracy (see Linton and Southcott, 1998). 
8.4: The process of change 
Views about the outcome of the review in relation to their ward or division 
varied, with opinion divided approximately six-to-four in favour (see table 8.13). This 
result reflected existing evidence that decisions of the Local Government Commission 
for England were often controversial and struggled to win acceptance, as 'many 
consultees feel that their concerns are dismissed for reasons that they do not consider 
legitimate' (Railings et al., 2002: 232). 
There was a significant relationship between respondents' opinions about the 
changes to their wards or divisions and the type of authority they represented (see 
table 8.13) 













Supported 130 61.0 201 65.3 65 _ 55.1 122 _ 48.2 
. 518 58.1 Opposed 83 39.0 107 34.7 53 44.9 131 51.8 374 41.9 
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The analysis suggested a low level enthusiasm for these changes amongst 
county councillors, a fact that might again be explained by the strong attachment to 
the view that democratic local representation should reflect natural communities (sec 
table 8.7). In contrast, the relatively high level of enthusiasm for these changes in the 
unitary authorities could again be explained by the fact that many such changes 
occurred alongside the establishment of those authorities as single-tier local 
government units. Concern about any reduction of the capacity of the electoral units to 
link natural communities could be offset by satisfaction about the substantial transfers 
of power inherent in the attainment of unitary status. 
There was also a significant relationship between attitudes towards the 
reconfiguration of their wards or divisions and age (see table 8.14). The analysis 
implied that support declined and opposition increased with age. Support for the 
outcome of redistricting fell from almost 64% amongst the under 50s to 55% aniongst 
the 60 years and older category. In contrast, opposition rose from 36% amongst the 
under 50s to 45% amongst the older councillors. 
Table 8.14: Attitudes towards the boundary changes by age 
Attitudes 
Up to 419'; '; 
N%N "0 
Supported the boundary changes. 93 63.7 178 61.4 213 55.0 514 5.5 
O osed the boundary changes. 53 36.3 112 38.6 199 45.0 364 41.5 
A cross-tabulation also implied a significant relationship between support or 
opposition to the boundary changes affecting their wards or divisions and opinions 
about whether those changes resolved or created dilemmas about how to balance the 
interests of different geographic areas. Supporters divided between a fifth arguing that 
dilemmas had been created and 22% saying that dilemmas had been resolved by the 
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boundary changes. In contrast, almost 47% of opponents said that the changes had 
created dilemmas, while just ten percent replied that the alterations had resolved 
dilemmas6 (see table 8.15). It was, therefore, reasonable to suggest that attitudes about 
the impact on representational dilemmas might explain, in part, differing opinions 
about the merits of the specific reconfigurations. 
Table 8.15: Extent to which the boundary changes created or resolved dilemmas 
about how to balance the interests of different geographic areas of 













Created 63 12.5 146 40.8 209 24.2 
Resolved 72 14.2 15 4.2 87 10.1 
Resolved and Created 37 7.3 22 6.1 59 6.8 
No Impact 334 66.0 175 48.9 509 58.9 
More than three-quarters of those who had expressed an opinion on the 
boundary changes expressed their views in public, while more nine-in-ten discussed 
these issues with local political and or administrative elites in private meetings (see 
table 16). 









602 Yes 75.9 863 -----93.6 
No 191 24.1 59 6.4 
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An appraisal of how these councillors expressed opinions about boundary 
changes to their ward or division showed a notable focus on activity in the locality 
beyond the narrow confines of the local authority (see table 8.17). Approximately a 
quarter had sent a leaflet about these issues to residents of the ward or division, while 
more than six-in-ten had spoken at a private ward, division or constituency party 
meeting. However, only two percent discussed the proposed changes with parish and 
or town council(s). 
A large number of respondents also recorded that they had approached 
important individuals about these proposals: approximately four-in-ten had lobbied 
key leadership figures in their local political party, while a similar proportion had 
spoken to senior officers in their local authority. A notable minority of members had 
participated in a public inquiry about these issues: more than 15% had given written 
evidence, while more than six percent had spoken at such an inquiry. There was 
evidence of media interest in these issues; more than one-in-ten had given an 
interview to a local media outlet about the proposed alterations, while more than five 
percent had written a newspaper article. 
Table 8.17: flow councillors expressed an opinion 
N % N % 
Gave an interview to the local media. 100 10.3 869 89.7 
Spoke at a ublic inquiry. 60 6.2 909 93.8 
Gave written evidence to a public inquiry. 153 15.8 816 84.2 
Wrote an article for a local newspaper. 51 5.3 918 94.7 
Sent a leaflet to residents of the ward. 250 25.8 719 74.2 
Discussion with parish and town council(s). 19 2.0 950 98.0 
Meetings and one-to-one discussions in the ward. 34 3.5 935 96.5 
Spoke and or voted on a council committee. 14 1.4 955 98.6 
Spoke at a private meeting of the ward or constituency party. 603 62.2 366 37.8 
Lobbied key fi pures in the local political part V. 375 38.7 594 61.3 
Spoke to senior officers in the local authority. 391 40.4 578 59.6 
Held private cross artdiscussions. 12 1.2 957 98.8 
Wrote or spoke to another governmental Organisation. 44 4.5 925 95.5 
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[here was a significant relationship between the attitudes of respondents to 
boundary changes to their wards or divisions and whether they expressed these 
opinions in public or confined their contribution to the debate to private forums (see 
table 8.18). The analysis suggested that opponents were more likely to state their 
opinions in public than supporters of the changes. Overall, 74% of advocates of these 
specific boundary changes went public, while the corresponding statistic for 
opponents was 84%. 
Table 8.18: Opinions about boundary reviews and expression of a public opinion 








Yes 325 74.0 256 83.7 581 78.0 
No 114 26.0 50 16.3 164 22.0 
These findings showed that there was a notable degree of transparency about 
the debate on these changes because more than three-quarters of the councillors 
discussed these alterations in a public forum (see table 8.16), thus allowing them to be 
scrutinised democratically and held accountable for their views. I lowever, the Cact 
that almost a quarter of the respondents failed to discuss the changes in public 
suggested that it was also common for that debate to be hidden from the wider 
community and thus for politicians to avoid public accountability and democratic 
scrutiny for their attitudes. Furthermore, the analysis also suggested that there was a 
greater probability of supporters avoiding public accountability and scrutiny, whilst 
opponents of change were more inclined to engage in a more open, accountable and 
democratic process. This variation might reflect the political marginalisation of 
opponents over this issue and the feeling that they needed to rally public opinion to 
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their viewpoint in order to be able to challenge proposals that might he supported by 
powerful elites. 
8.5: Elections 
Amongst this group of councillors, the survey suggested that the prospective 
boundary changes had led few individuals to consider abandoning their council career, 
in total less than six percent of the respondents had considered standing-down as a 
result of alterations to the boundaries of their ward or division (see table 9.19). This 
result reflected, of course, the fact that the survey was restricted to sitting councillors 
and excluded former councillors who had retired when new boundaries were 
introduced, a group which might have been substantial given the frequency with 
which sitting councillors stand-down (Railings and Thrasher, 1997: 79). 





Yes 59 5.7 
No 978 94.3 
Respondents were asked which factors had affected their decision to contest 
the new ward or division and to rank them (see table 8.20). The key finding was that 
connections to and an affinity with the local community wcrc of CCntral importance 10 
this decision. 
The most important factor in deciding whether to contest their current ward or 
division was the fact that it contained most of their li rmcr ward or division; more than 
seven-in-ten cited this issue as a reason, while more than tour-iii-ten suggested that 
this factor was the main reason for their decision. In addition, almost one-in-ten said 
their decision to contest their current ward or division was based primarily on the 
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presence of part of their old ward or division in the new electoral unit, while almost a 
quarter said this was a factor in their decision. 
These councillors were also motivated strongly by the fact that many of them 
lived in the new ward or division. Overall, this issue was cited as the main reason by 
more than 28% and as a reason by almost 57% of these politicians. Other factors of 
community representation were also important for a substantial number of councillors. 
The existence of `strong links' with the local community was chosen as the main 
reason by more than one-in-five, while almost three-quarters said this issue was a 
reason for their decision. Similarly, one-in-five said that a 'strong affinity' with the 
problems and or interests of people in the ward or division was the main reason to 
stand in this area, while almost three-quarters said that this factor was a reason for 
standing in the locality. Furthermore, more than 11% cited strong links with the ward 
or divisional political party as the main reason for standing, while almost 54% said it 
was a reason for that decision. The two remaining community factors were, however, 
of much less importance. Strong family links with the ward or division and working in 
the ward or division were cited as the main reason by five percent and a reason by 
approximately a quarter of the respondents. 
The strong influence of factors relating to community representation was 
brought into sharper focus when electoral issues were considered. Although more than 
62% said that they were influenced by the good prospect of winning the ward or 
division, less than 15% cited this issue as the main reason for contesting their present 
seat. The two other electoral issues mentioned in the study had a relatively marginal 
impact. The probability of their political party controlling the local authority and the 
greater chance of winning the seat than an alternative candidate(s) were cited as the 
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main reason by approximately seven percent and as a reason by 31 % and 35% of those 
councillors respectively. 
Table 8.20: Decision to contest this ward or division? 







Contained most of old ward. 433 41.6 732 70.2 
Contained part of old ward. 102 9.8 259 24.9 
Live in the ward. 296 28.4 592 56.8 
Good prospect of victory. 155 14.9 649 62.3 
Political party likely to control local authority. 68 6.5 323 31.0 
Strong links with local community. 223 21.4 777 74.6 
Strong family links. 54 5.2 270 25.9 
Strong links with olitical party in ward. 117 11.2 562 53.9 
Work in ward. 52 5.0 263 25.2 
Strong affinity with problems/interests of co le in ward. 210 20.2 768 73.7 
Greater chance of winning than alternative candidate(s). 76 7.3 363 34.8 
Persuaded by local political elites. 36 3.5 173 16.6 
Persuaded bard party. 33 3.2 143 13.7 
Less than four percent mentioned persuasion by local political elites as the main 
factor, while less than 17% said such a consideration influenced their decision. 
Similarly, persuasion by the ward or divisional political party was cited as the main 
reason by three percent and as a factor in their decision to stand by less than 14%. "I'his 
evidence about why respondents contested their current ward or division implied, 
therefore, a style of democratic representation and accountability focused substantially 
on the concerns of specific grassroots communities and a reluctance to relocate to 
represent areas with which they were not familiar and with which they had little affinity. 
There was also evidence that alterations in ward or divisional boundaries had a 
notable impact on how elections were contested. The main observation was that these 
changes seldom reduced the intensity of the campaign. Each of the six aspects of 
campaigning evaluated in the study (see table 8.21) declined for less than eight 
percent of these councillors. In contrast, the intensity of activity in each of the six 
areas increased for more than 18% of the respondents, while in relation to finer Factors; 
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the amount of canvassing; the number of leaflets and newsletters delivered; the locus 
on issues specific to the ward or division; and the total time spent fighting the seat 
more than four-in-ten councillors claimed that the intensity of their of orts had risen. 
The analysis showed, therefore, that these boundary changes often increased the 
intensity of local democratic electoral competition. 
These findings are fascinating because periodic boundary reviews tend to 
reduce the average size of electoral units. Increases in population often lead to 
increases in the number of councillors while reductions in the number of councillors 
and consequent increases in the size of wards or divisions are much less frequent. The 
exception to this generalisation concerned the establishment of unitary authorities, 
which invariably generated a reduction in the number of councillors present in a two- 
tier structure. However, the impact on the size of population covered by individual 
councillors was more complex because this restructuring created unitary wards with a 
higher councillor to elector ratio than the county divisions they replaced. 
Table 8.21: Impact of the boundary changes on the way elections were fought 











_ Amount of canvassing 462 46.5 460 46.3 71 7.2 
Number of leaflets and or newsletters sent. ___________ 468 47.6 446 45.4 69 7.0 
Number of public meetings. 144 18.3 610 77.7 31 3.9 
Focus on issues s ecific to ward. 369 41.5 499 56.1 21 2.4 
Focus on issues specific to the whole authority area. 157 19.6 622 77.6 23 2.9 
Time pent fijhting ward. 444 47.9 459 49.5 24 2.6 
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The increases in the intensity of effort combined with the contradictory impact 
of boundary changes on the councillor/electorate ratio suggested that these findings 
might arise from the requirement to reach out to areas of the ward or division they had 
not represented previously and focus on issues distinctive to the new areas. 
8.6: Role(s) of councillors 
The survey assessed the extent to which the boundary changes altered the way 
in which councillors performed their role(s) as democratic local representatives. The 
evaluation looked at the impact of the boundary revisions on the time respondents 
spent on their ombudsman role, representing voluntary groups, campaigning for 
resources for public services and their total activities as a councillor. 
The boundary changes increased the time devoted to dealing the personal 
problems of their constituents (ombudsman role) for almost 37% of the councillors, 
while only six percent decreased the time devoted to this ombudsman function. (see 
table 8.22). 
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Increased 372 36.8 
Unchanged 584 57.0 
Decreased 61 6.2 
The study showed that for more than seven-in-ten of these councillors the 
boundary changes did not affect the time spent on representing voluntary groups, a 
statistic that incorporated those who claimed not to represent such organisations. 
More than 23% of the respondents said that they increased the time allocated to this 
aspect of their work after the boundary reorganisation, while just three percent 
recorded a reduction in the hours devoted to this activity (see table 8.23). Perhaps the 
most distinctive findings from this question related to the number of councillors 
saying that they did not represent voluntary groups, which suggested greater resistance 
to representing such organisations than found by two of the more recent surveys 
(Barron et al., 1991; Cole, 2001a), although the data about the number of councillors 
who did not represent voluntary bodies was very similar to the number of resistors 
identified by Newton (1976) and implied that attitudes had shifted little over more 
than three decades. Furthermore, the wide discrepancies with Barron et al. (1991) and 
Cole (2001a) might arise from the fact that those surveys were confined to county 
councillors, many of whom represented highly distinctive local communities. 
Table 8.23: Time spent representing voluntary groups 
N 
Increased 240 23.5 
Unchan ed 606 59.4 
Decreased 35 3.4 
Doesn't re resent them 139 13.6 
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Almost 32% of the respondents calculated that these boundary changes had 
increased the time they spent on campaigning for resources for public services 
relevant to their ward or division, while less than two percent said that these 
alterations had led to a decrease in the time they spent on this activity (see table 8.24). 
Table 8.24: Time spent campaigning for resources for public services 
C ill - Time oll" 
N 
C ol S 
Increased 325 31.8 
Unchanged 679 66.4 
Decreased 19 1.9 
The analysis also suggested that following the changes almost 44% of these 
councillors increased the time they devoted to their council work, while only three 
percent decreased their time commitment (see table 8.25). 
An assessment about whether the changes in workload in relation to these lour 
factors were permanent or temporary (less than six months in duration) is shown in 
table 8.26. The analysis implied that for each issue in more nine-in-ten cases the 
change occurred on a permanent basis. 
Table 8.26: Boundary changes altered the time worked: permanent or temporary 
N % N % 
Ombudsman role 398 91.5 _ 37 _ 
Voluntary groups 252 95.1 13 4.9 
Cam ai nin for resources 307 90.3 33 9.7 
Time spent as a councillor 434 92.3 36 7.7 
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Table 8.25: Time worked as a councillor as a result of the boundary changes 
The findings in this section suggested that for most councillors boundary 
changes had no impact on their workload; however for a notable minority of 
respondents in each category the boundary revisions increased the time they spent on 
the relevant activity. Explanations might lie in the need to establish their reputation in 
new areas of the ward or divisions or the presence in the sample of a disproportionate 
number of councillors representing wards or divisions that had acquired a substantial 
influx of the type of areas that generated a greater workload, examples include 
socially and economic deprived localities and or villages. Similarly, the increase in 
the time spent on campaigning for resources for public services experienced by almost 
one-in-three members might be a consequence of those wards or divisions becoming 
more diverse. The most interesting finding was, however, the revelation that more 
than four-in-ten members increased their overall time commitment as democratic 
representatives following these changes despite the fact that boundary reviews 
typically created geographically smaller wards and divisions containing fewer people. 
An evaluation of support for these changes and alterations in the time 
commitment for certain aspects of the representational role also suggested a plausible 
explanation for support or opposition to the boundary changes might lie in the workload 
implications. In other words, councillors experiencing workload increases following 
boundary changes were more likely to indicate opposition. For example, while the time 
spent dealing with their ombudsman role increased for 32% of the supporters it rose for 
more than 46% of the opponents. Similarly, while slightly more than one-in-five 
supporters increased the time spent on representing voluntary groups after the boundary 
changes, the corresponding statistic for opponents was more than 29%. A similar pattern 
was found in relation to the time spent on campaigning for resources for public services: 
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the workload of slightly more than a quarter of supporters and more than 43% of 
opponents increased following the boundary changes. There was a large difference 
between the percentage of opponents and supporters that increased the hours they 
worked as a councillor following these changes. Overall, while slightly less than 37% of' 
supporters increased the hours spent on their council duties, the corresponding figure fier 
opponents was more than 57%. (see table 8.27). 
Table 8.27: Attitude to the changes and impact on council work 

















Ombudsman work increased 162 32.0 172 46.4 334 
_ 38.0 
Ombudsman work unchanged 311 61.3 176 47.4 487 55.5 
Ombudsman work decreased 34 6.7 23 6.2 57 6.5 
Representing voluntary groups increased 102 20.2 108 29.3 210 24.1 
Representing voluntary groups unchanged 311 61.6 205 55.7 516 59.1 
Representing voluntary groups decreased 16 3.2 16 4.3 32 3.7 
Don't represent voluntary groups 76 15.0 39 10.6 115 13.2 
Campaigning for resources9 increased 131 25.8 159 43.1 290 33.1 
Campaigning for resources unchanged 368 72.4 200 54.2 568 64.8 
Campaigning for resources decreased 9 1.8 10 27.1 19 2.2 
Hours worked as a councillor increased 188 36.7 210 57.4 398 45.3 
Hours worked as a councillor unchanged 310 60.5 140 38.3 450 51.3 
Hours worked as a councillor decreased 14 2.7 16 4.4 30 3.4 
The implications for local democracy and accountability related to the 
intensity of such representation, which appeared often to increase following boundary 
reviews. Such data suggested, therefore, that a common consequence of boundary 
reviews was to increase the quantity and perhaps, by implication, the quality of local 
democracy and accountability (especially downward) supplied through local 
councillors. These findings implied, therefore, that boundary revisions assisted the 
aim of the local government modernising agenda to intensify the activities of 
councillors as community representatives. 
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8.7: Conclusion 
The survey generated some interesting data about the attitudes of, participation 
in and impact on local councillors of changes to the boundaries of their ward or 
division. There was substantial acceptance of the necessity of staging the last review 
impacting on their ward or division, although a notable minority of councillors 
thought the last review to their ward or division to have been unnecessary. In addition, 
many councillors disagreed with the current timescale for the process. 
The survey also identified the priority attached by councillors to wards or 
divisions reflecting natural community links. In addition, an assessment of attitudes 
towards the specific changes to the ward or division held by each respondent showed 
notable support and opposition to the revisions and suggested that younger members 
were more receptive to these changes. Most councillors also expressed opinions 
about boundary changes relevant to their ward or division in public. 
There were also notable insights about the impact of boundary changes on 
elections. First, the main reasons why respondents chose to fight their present ward or 
division was the fact that it contained most of their former ward or division or their 
residence. Community links and affinities were listed next and the prospects of victory 
cited as the fifth most important factor. There was also evidence that boundary 
changes increased the intensity of electioneering for many councillors and seldom 
generated the reverse effect, an interesting result given the frequency with which 
redistricting generated smaller units, 
The discussion of the relationship between the boundary alterations and 
councillors' performance of their local authority responsibilities also showed that a 
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notable number of members increased their time commitment in relation to their ward 
or divisional work and the full range of their council duties. The analysis implied, 
therefore, that boundary changes often intensified both the process of electing 
democratic local representatives and the effort they expended on their post-election 
activities as democratic local representatives. 
These conclusions generated some interesting findings into the responsiveness 
of the boundary review process to local democratic pressures. In particular, the 
scepticism of some councillors about the changes to their ward or division and or the 
timescale of the review process, their attachment to community representation and 
attitudes towards the impact of the changes on the extent to which their ward or 
division contained a natural community were notable insights. Such conclusions 
suggested, therefore, that attitudes of many elected representatives were at variance 
with the opinions of the bureaucracy responsible for revising wards and divisions. 
The implication of these findings was that boundary reviews were driven less by local 
democracy and more by a bureaucratic and nationally imposed agenda. However, such 
a conclusion had to be modified substantially to reflect the fact that almost seven-in- 
ten respondents though their review was necessary while almost six-in-ten agreed with 
the outcome. There were also some fascinating findings about the participation of 
councillors in the redistricting process which implied that there was, at least, a notable 
input from democratic representatives even if the framework and many of the 
conclusions owed more to a bureaucratic rather than a grassroots agenda. 
The study implied weaknesses in the local accountability of the Local 
Government Commission for England, which had interpreted its remit as a 
requirement to implement `electoral equality between wards' (Railings et aL, 2002: 
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224), an attitude which was often in conflict with local elected representatives who 
typically emphasised `the interests and identities of communities' and the 
`preservation of local ties' (Railings et al., 2002: 224). The finding, however, that 
boundary changes led many councillors to increase the time devoted to their work as a 
councillor implied that, in some areas, redistricting might strengthen downward local 
accountability through councillors. The greater intensity of effort in relation to local 
representation that the changes generated with regard to a notable percentage of 
councillors also suggested that boundary reviews could assist local government 
modernisation in relation to community representation. 
I Although (in practice) reviews in many areas do not adhere to this timescale. 
2 The table excluded those councillors opposed to the principle of reviewing ward or divisional 
boundaries. 
3 Many unitary authorities incorporated wards with a notable rural element. 
4 The tables use the language of the questionnaire. The term 'ward' in the tables should, however, also be 
interpreted as including the term 'division'. Headings have been written to incorporate both terms. 
s Last two figures incorporate respondents saying that dilemmas had been created and resolved. 
6 Last four figures incorporate respondents saying that dilemmas had been created and resolved. 
7 The total number of main reasons exceeds the number of respondents because some councillors failed to 
differentiate between all or some of the reasons they specified and ranked all or some of them as most 
important. 
8 This activity might take longer than six months so would not be defined as temporary in this study. 





The aim of this thesis has been to evaluate five important aspects of the new 
local governance; the contemporary role(s) of local councillors; the impact of scrutiny 
inquiries on external agencies; consultations; the community appraisals; and changes 
to ward and divisional boundaries in terms of specific academic work in those narrow 
areas and in relation to the broader themes of democracy and accountability. The 
analysis has also encompassed discussion of the local government modernisation 
agenda 
9.2: The role(s) of local councillors 
These findings represented a critical re-evaluation of the existing literature and 
implied that previous studies (see, for example, Moss and Parker, 1967; Hampton, 
1970; Newton, 1976; Barron, et al., 1991; Bochel and Bochel, 2000) had become 
dated. An important conclusion concerned the time commitment given by councillors, 
that exceeded substantially the estimates derived from the earlier research and 
suggested a shift in the intensity of local representation. 
This research also suggested that the traditional emphasis on identifying 
different interpretations of the councillor's role might have to be reassessed (see 
Corina, 1974; Newton, 1976). The notion that substantial numbers of councillors 
specialised in narrow aspects of policy (see, for example, Heclo, 1969; Dearlove, 
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1973; Newton, 1976) might also have to be re-evaluated after this study. Similarly, 
conclusions that many councillors focused on either policy matters or local 
representation (see Jones, 1973; Newton, 1976) were challenged through the Devon 
evaluation. There was also evidence that scepticism about the activities of voluntary 
groups (see Dearlove, 1973; Newton, 1976) had declined to negligible levels, a result 
perhaps of the contemporary focus on community and the belief amongst many 
policy-makers that voluntary organisations could enhance the delivery of public 
services through factors such as greater innovation, expenditure savings, enhanced 
user input and more flexibility. 
9.3: External scrutiny 
This study strengthened the academic literature in relation to external scrutiny 
undertaken by local authorities in Britain, an area largely overlooked by scholars of 
local government scrutiny committees. The initial scoping study showed that local 
government scrutiny was focused primarily on internal scrutiny of that local authority 
and that scrutiny of external organisations was relatively marginal and confined 
almost exclusively to England. There was a key finding that the scrutiny committee 
undertaking each inquiry had a substantial level of autonomy over the scrutiny 
process, in particular the respondents suggested that party groups rarely attempted to 
control or influence the process. 
Satisfaction with scrutiny, in relation to issues such as the attitude of each 
scrutinised agency and the overall success of the process, was weakened by the 
acknowledgement that recommendations made by the scrutiny committees were often 
not implemented by the relevant agencies. In total, all the recommendations were 
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implemented in relation to only one in eight of the inquiries. The study also generated 
new insights about the attitude of the media towards local authorities, a research 
agenda that has been neglected or marginalised by most scholars of local government 
(see, for example, Stoker, 2000; Stewart, 2003; Wilson and Game, 2006). This 
evaluation suggested that there was significant media interest in external scrutiny, 
which was concentrated with regard to certain topics such as the Post Office and 
education. 
9.4: Consultations 
The evaluation of consultations undertaken at Devon County Council drew on 
the legacy and weaknesses of theoretical distinctions made by scholars such as 
Ainstein (1971), case study analysis (see Sergeant and Steele, 1998) and the work of 
Lowndes et al. (2001a), who undertook a census of practice towards consultations 
amongst local authorities. The Devon study generated significant insights into the 
process, the impact of local authority consultations and sceptical and sometimes 
cynical conclusions about this agenda. The authority suffered from capacity problems 
that impeded its ability to deliver effective consultation. Key difficulties included the 
poor methodological skills of many of the officers undertaking specific consultations 
and weaknesses at the corporate centre, which meant that the authority both 
underestimated the scale of its consultations and struggled to implement a coherent 
agenda throughout the county and the different directorates. 
A culture of paternalism amongst some individuals and sections of the 
authority, which on occasion produced exercises that were little more than public 
relations initiatives, also undermined the effectiveness of these consultations. There 
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was evidence that consultations with groups, such as travellers or young people, that 
were either unpopular and or possessed little political clout were often characterised 
by this PR driven approach. The objective of such exercises was more to give the 
impression that such people were involved in the `decision-making' process rather 
than to provide a genuine channel through which outsiders could formulate or alter 
policies. 
The survey found that quite a high number of these consultations produced a 
substantial impact. This conclusion had, however, to be placed in the context that 
most of these exercises generated predictable results which re-enforced traditional 
agendas, assumptions and attitudes rather than challenging or altering them. Overall, 
almost two-thirds of the consultations classified as having a substantial impact 
generated predictable results that strengthened the status quo. 
9.5: Community appraisals 
This evaluation concerned the responsiveness of a range of service providers, 
community development and social capital. It made a notable contribution to the small 
literature about community appraisals undertaken in Britain (see, for example, 
Moseley et al., 1996) by generating an empirical assessment of whether the issues 
raised in community appraisals undertaken in Devon had been dealt with. The analysis 
of 46 communities found that relatively simple issues capable of resolution through 
town councils, parish authorities or local community groups were more likely to have 
been resolved than substantial matters that were the responsibility of an external 
agency. Community appraisals appeared, therefore, to be more effective mechanisms 
through which to `clean-up' the local environment or establish a local newsletter than 
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to strengthen the provision of key services such as health and social services; parking; 
and housing. These findings, therefore, strengthened the results of the consultation 
survey in relation to the capacity of agencies to promote and encourage consultations 
and then to subsequently ignore the findings if inconvenient and in opposition to 
contemporary policies. 
The survey also suggested that the impact of appraisals was affected 
substantially by the type of community and that the process was relatively ineffective 
in market towns or communities which contained distinctive and diverse sub- 
communities. Problems in ownership of the appraisal agenda and tensions between 
local politicians and appraisal steering groups were identified. In addition, the study 
drew attention to dilemmas over the allocation of resources in relation to the 
differential identification of need if appraisals had been undertaken in some 
communities but not others. 
There was also a consideration of the impact of appraisals on community 
development and the stock of social capital, which enhanced the literature on the 
application of these important concepts to British governance. The evaluation 
suggested that appraisals could produce some benefits for community development 
and the stock of social capital, for example trust and associational networks could be 
strengthened. Such gains were, however, typically modest and often constrained by 
prescriptive and paternalistic elements of the appraisal process. 
9.6: Local boundary reviews 
This research focused on an area that has been largely neglected by scholars of 
UK governance, the key exception being Railings et al. (2002). The study generated a 
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series of interesting findings about local councillors' participation in and attitudes 
towards the review process. In particular, the survey suggested that many local 
councillors disagreed with the status quo in relation to the frequency of these reviews 
and the contemporary emphasis on equality in the number of electors rather than 
natural community links as the prime consideration in re-drawing ward and divisional 
boundaries. In general, councillors debated changes to their ward or division in public 
forums, although a notable minority of these politicians confined their contribution to 
private arenas. 
There were also important findings about the impact of redistricting on 
electioneering. First, the process increased the intensity of the campaign for many 
councillors and seldom produced the opposite effect, a fascinating result given the 
tendency of many reviews to produce geographically smaller units. Second, responses 
implied that connections with the local community and affinity with local matters 
were crucial factors in the decision about which ward or division to fight following 
redistricting. 
The survey also supplied data on the impact of boundary alterations on the 
performance of these councillors. The returns suggested that boundary changes 
generated a permanent increase in the time commitment of a notable number of these 
members towards their local authority duties. 
9.7: Democracy and accountability 
Each chapter generated conclusions relevant to the democracy and 
accountability of local governance in Britain although the focus between these two 
themes varied. The analysis of the role(s) of councillors strengthened and updated 
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academic knowledge about the role(s) of elected politicians as agents and facilitators 
of local democracy under modernised political management structures. Similarly, the 
evaluation of external scrutinies undertaken by British local authorities addressed the 
issue of the extent to which scrutiny has been deployed to plug the democratic deficit 
in local governance arising from the power of the private sector, local quangos and 
even elements of the voluntary sector. Some positive conclusions about the 
contribution to making external agencies responsive to local representative democracy 
were, however, undermined by the relatively small scale of such scrutiny and the 
failure to implement many of the recommendations. 
The analysis of consultations undertaken by Devon County Council concerned 
primarily the impact of a more direct concept of democracy on that authority's policy- 
making process and suggested that some consultations owed more to a public relations 
agenda than a genuine desire to incorporate external opinions. This chapter also 
considered a few internal consultations with the authority's staff and thus democratic 
responsiveness in relation to employees. The evaluation of community appraisals 
undertaken in Devon generated sceptical conclusions about the impact of a more 
direct form of democracy on the local authority and a diverse range of other agencies 
and supported conclusions generated through the evaluation of consultations. In 
addition, the contribution of the process towards enhancing local democracy through 
community development and strengthening social capital was modest. 
The analysis of local boundary reviews enhanced an understanding of the 
connection of the process with local democracy through an evaluation of the role of 
local councillors in these changes. However, while the survey concluded that 
councillors typically participated in the process, the analysis also showed that their 
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desire that wards and divisions reflected natural community links had little impact on 
the Local Government Commission for England, which focused on equalising 
electorates, and paid little attention to grassroots concern with having units that 
reflected coherent communities. 
Throughout the thesis there has been a strong focus on accountability issues. 
The analysis of the role(s) of councillors generated notable insights about the local 
accountability of elected representatives. Public accountability formed the prime focus 
of the chapter about external scrutiny, which concerned the accountability of a wide 
range of agencies to local councillors and thus local governance. Downward 
accountability of public sector agencies and some private companies formed a central 
theme of the evaluation of community appraisals. This study also highlighted tensions 
with the more traditional concept of vertical accountability to councillors in respect of 
sometimes-strained relations between local councillors and appraisal steering groups. 
The downward accountability of the local authority to service users or the general 
public was also a central theme of the evaluation of consultations performed by Devon 
County Council. This chapter also included insights into some consultations that 
involved horizontal accountability to peer groups. 
The analysis of the local boundary reviews was also relevant to accountability 
issues in relation to the participation in and influence of local councillors over a 
process undertaken by a quango and suggested that downward accountability 
mechanisms' were relatively weak and did not affect the Local Government 
Commission for England's predisposition for equality in the size of electorates. This 
research also generated insights about the impact of the changes on the manner in 
which councillors were accountable to their wards or divisions. 
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9.8: Conclusion 
This thesis has tackled five distinctive areas of research relevant to the debate 
about the modernisation of local governance, which has been an important theme of 
British government over the last decade. Each area has been linked with the themes of 
democracy and accountability. The analysis strengthened the academic literature about 
British government in each of these fields, while in relation to the analysis of local 
boundary reviews and external scrutiny the contribution has been substantial, an 
outcome that reflected the relative neglect of these areas by academics. 
The evaluation generated some notable insights into the impact of the local 
government modernisation agenda. In particular, the evidence from the studies about 
consultation and the community appraisals implied that progress towards making local 
authorities and, in the case of the appraisals, other forms of local governance more 
responsive to an agenda driven from the grassroots had not been substantial and that 
consultations tended to make a substantial impact when they reinforced the status quo. 
These findings suggested, therefore, that the government had failed to generate a 
cultural shift in local government in relation to consultation. Local authority decisions 
still typically represented the agenda of a narrow local elite of senior officers and 
councillors and or the dictates of central government. 
The work on external scrutiny illustrated the limits of that aspect of the 
modernisation agenda because the study suggested that the focus of local government 
scrutiny had been overwhelmingly inward and that when external organisations were 
evaluated the recommendations were seldom implemented in full. The establishment 
of scrutiny committees appeared, therefore, to have made a marginal contribution to 
holding the New Magistracy of unelected local governance to account to elected 
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politicians. The key finding relevant to the local government modernisation agenda 
from the work on the changing role(s) of councillors was that the drive to strengthen 
the community role of county councillors was of marginal necessity because most of 
those elected representatives had a strong focus on community representation that 
predated this agenda. The research on local boundary changes supported these 
findings about the importance of community to local councillors. In addition, this 
chapter suggested a deficit of joined-up thinking in relation to local government 
reform. While the local government modernisation agenda contained a pronounced 
emphasis on the community representation role of local councillors, the process of 
reviewing local government boundaries eschewed the proposition that wards or 
divisions should reflect natural communities in favour of generating units with similar 
sized electorates. 
The assessment in relation to democracy and accountability suggested a 
cynical interpretation of the operation of local governance and a reluctance to extend 
democratic participation in decision-making or strengthen local accountability for 
those decisions. These conclusions were, however, diminished by some evidence of 
positive attitudes towards democracy and accountability in relation to areas such as 
the community representational role of local councillors, the resolution of many of the 
smaller-scale problems raised in the community appraisals and the outcomes of some 
external scrutinies. 
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